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Political & Social

'Brain Drain' Due to Emigration Foreseen

904F0193A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 24, 16 Jun 90 p 11

[Article by L. Radzikhovskiy, candidate of psychology: "How to Stop Those Who Are Leaving"]

[Text] **On 14 April we published a special column "The Faces of Emigration" with the purpose of starting a conversation about this far from simple phenomenon. The phenomenon obviously requires an analysis of all aspects of our life. Today L. Radzikhovskiy, candidate of psychology, describes the problems of the emigration.**

In the near future the USSR Supreme Soviet is to pass the Law on Immigration and Emigration which will be in accordance with international law. After that they will stop separating people into "those who can and those who cannot leave."

According to official data 235,600 people emigrated from our country in 1989. Mostly they were Jewish and German, a smaller number were Armenian. What is going to happen next? Jews and Germans will obviously continue to leave in increasing numbers.

The chain reaction among Jews is going on even without the hysterical efforts of the Pamyat. If some miracle does not occur one can tell that in about three or four years the number of Jews in Russia will not exceed that of some very minor ethnic group.

The situation with the Germans is quite similar and all the more so at present. Now, at the time of the unification of Germany, the desire to identify with the nation would obviously grow stronger.

But the emigration is now not only a Jewish or a German problem. The moment we get rid of the ethnic privileges which are now hiding behind the fig leaf of "family reunification" (for some reason the families always reunite only "over there") the emigration will acquire a different character. From that moment on large-scale Russian emigration begins.

That is what we have to be prepared for now that our habit of hiding our head in the sand of ideology is dying out. The forecast for 1990 is hundreds of thousands of emigrants, some 200,000 of which are Russian. And we can expect up to a million or a million and a half emigrants annually within the next three or four years. As a total it is a considerable labor army, a small nation if you will.

Can we use the immigration quotas that exist in some countries as a means to calm our fears? The United States, for instance, is ready to receive only 50,000 people this year. Europe is not burning with the desire to receive the Soviet emigres with open arms anyway. But emigrants differ. Anyone who is leaving, especially if he suffered in an ethnic conflict, would definitely like to receive refugee status with its benefits and work placement aid. However, now that the number of emigrants is growing we have to expect that for each one receiving certain aid, several people will leave who will not be covered by any quota. To have their "status" you just have to cross the border. Nobody is responsible for them, of course. Dozens and hundreds of thousands of "barefoot" Soviet emigrants will try to get to the United States and Europe by hook or by crook—just like Mexicans, Turks, and Yugoslavs. They might try to go even further—to Australia, Southeast Asia, Brazil, South Africa, etc.

The Brain Drain

But the numbers are not the only problem. The trouble is that our specialists are leaving. The majority of the emigrants are obviously young, active people and "strong" specialists. These people consider themselves "convertible"—ready to compete in the world market; they are computer programmers, electronics experts, technicians, artists, molecular biology experts, and solid-state physicists. In other words they are the hope and future of our country—those who should have pulled our country out of the hole. Scientific communism experts are not going anywhere, unfortunately.

The more people of that nature that leave, the less competitive our country becomes. And this is a depressing rule.

And another thing: Uncle Sam is choosing those he needs beforehand. The applicants visiting the U.S. Embassy in Moscow fill in different forms; some of them almost manage to pass some of the tests. All is organized according to a strict and honest order: If there is such a crowd then, of course, we will take our pick.

The third wave emigration was born from an "ingenious" idea to exile dissidents and other "suspicious" persons, and we paid dearly for it. At present there are three Nobel Prize winners in the USSR, which is about 50 times fewer than in the United States. There are also three Nobel Prize winners among the Russian emigres—Solzhenitsyn, Brodskiy, and Leontyev. And there are a lot more Nobel Prize winners among those whose parents had emigrated from Russia. It was the "brain drain" numbering thousands and tens of thousands. What if the numbers grow into hundreds of thousands and millions?

Why They Are Leaving

Three reasons are the most obvious ones.

The standard of living. Some periodicals like to publish figures—the amount of meat per capita here and there, the number of cars per capita, etc. All of these figures serve to our disadvantage. The quality and standard of living here and there have been impossible to compare for ages. We here, the citizens of a superpower with a gigantic armor-plated fist (the armor is rather rusty though), live at the level of the developing countries. They there own their houses, a personal computer, fruits

all year round, a student who traveled around half of the world—all this is a norm that is way beyond the reach of even our most privileged elite. And this is a norm not for rich people who have their own values and standards but for a well-qualified working person. How can we keep our qualified people? The most that a good electronics engineer can earn here is R300-400 a month. If he goes to work for a cooperative he can make up to about R2,000 by trying to grab all the work he can find. But what can he buy for this money? A person of similar qualifications in the United States earns about $5,000 a month and he finds heaps of goods at every corner just waiting for his money. And this becomes a vicious circle: The more of the highly qualified people that leave the country, the lower its standard of living will be, and the lower the standard of living, the more people will want to leave.

A job. A "workaholic" does not value the money so much as the opportunity to work to his heart's content. And they "there" have all the advantages of this also. Where, in what other country, is an expert so humiliated as to be forced to struggle against general negligence instead of doing his best in his own field? And what about "getting" absolutely anything—from a spanner to a computer—when nobody can find anything, anywhere, at any time? And what about any hope of a promotion, which depends on your "public activity"? It is a vicious circle again. The more of the masters that leave, the more effort the wall-newspaper editors put into replacing them. And the more bosses of the proven party level there are, the worse it is for the masters.

Finally, political instability. It is not only the minorities that are afraid of the "civil war." The fear of violence is very widely spread in our society nowadays. And here also—the more people who cannot accept any violence leave, the stronger the position of those who count on it.

What We Should Do

The USSR's signing of various agreements was not the only reason, as you know, for the collapse of the iron curtain. Whatever the cost of the emigration is, it can be basically reduced to just one thing—without the qualified personnel, without the "brains" and the hands, we will fall even further below the world level. But if try to reintroduce isolationist policy we will slide in the direction directly opposite to that of world civilization. This reminds one of using the guillotine to cure a headache.

Another obvious way is to raise the living standard for highly qualified specialists, and raise it to a level comparable with the Western one. This depends on a minor point—where do we find the means for it? Not the paper money, but the goods and services which are used to identify that very standard of living.

It is obvious that our strategy should not be directed toward ideology even if we understand the latter as being theoretical ideas of the economy. It should be a pragmatic direction. We need not turn back the human deluge, we need to learn to use it. And this means we have to learn to use the emigration process for the good of our country; we have to turn things around so that we do not lose the qualified people, but that they advance their knowledge in the West and earn hard currency for their own and their country's good.

For this we need to introduce dual citizenship as well as to expand all kinds of training abroad, whether the training period involves a year's stay in another country or a longer one. Anyone who is dying to leave will leave anyway; but now he is not tied by anything except his obligations to the government of the receiving country. But if his obligations are to his own country he will repay them hundredfold.

Our economic policy should encourage joint ventures as much as possible. We should not be afraid to involve foreign investments—the example of the FRG and the countries of the Southeast Asia prove that foreign investments can become the thrust necessary to move the country forward. The experience of prerevolutionary Russia shows the same: A Swede, Nobel, developed the oil industry in Baku; a bulb produced at the factories of Siemens in Petersburg did not give less light; the Englishman Hughes helped to start the development of the industrial Donbass. Did all of this as well as many other things work for the West and not for Russia?

Joint ventures create flexible structures where the people and the technology circulate in both directions. And that is what we badly need at present. A lot of it can be insulting for our national pride, but the "voting with the feet" by hundreds of thousands of our compatriots and the envious and delighted looks our teenagers cast at a Volvo are just as insulting, are they not? We can find comfort in the unique character of the national-patriotic concept until such time as the issue of the bloodless colonization of Russia arises for real, so hopelessly behind the West is it. Whether one likes it or not the young people have lost any faith in ideological icons. We cannot bring back respect for our country by using promises, oaths, or armored cars—all of this is canceled by a Mercedes passing by peacefully and without any slogans. The way out is to learn to manufacture goods just as well, and this we cannot do without expanding our contacts. And another thing. The question "Where does our country start?" has been answered for 70 years with various fancy, high-flown, and nice-sounding phrases. Only one, quite important source of patriotism was not accepted—private property.

An opportunity and a hope to become your own master—is this not a stimulus for a talented and active person? When the problems of the multistructure economy are duly resolved in Russia, this will be a strong stimulus against emigration.

The State Program

One thing is indisputable: We should understand that the emigration problem is a problem of global strategy, and if we resolve it we may possibly open a door to the road toward world progress in science and technology. We have already lost a lot of time. New problems

demanding a "quick reaction" face us every day, and the emigration proceeds quietly and inconspicuously. And procrastination becomes all the more dangerous.

We need an organizational center powerful enough to deal with these problems; it really does not make any sense to reduce a government problem to some paperwork done in the Visa and Registration Department. We need to have a USSR Supreme Soviet committee for the problems of emigration, immigration, and refugees. Maybe we even need to have a corresponding ministry.

We have to find optimal financial and organizational structures for joint ventures; we have to find other forms of flexible contacts with countries of high technical culture and with Russian (Russian-Jewish, Russian-German, Russian-Armenian, etc.) emigres; we have to learn to mobilize their finances and knowledge to our mutual benefit.

We should learn from the experience of other countries, primarily the East European ones, also suffering from the brain drain. We need to forecast various possible emigration situations depending on the state of affairs in the country. For that we need special research carried out by economists, sociologists, lawyers, and psychologists.

All these problems are problems of today: If we continue to lag behind in the solution of all major problems we risk remaining behind for ever. Dealing with the emigration problem sensibly and purposefully is still possible, and it would be criminal to lose this opportunity.

Volga Anti-German Feelings Reported

PM2106143290 London MOSCOW NEWS in English No 3, 15-21 Jun 90 p 11

[Text] When Alexander Krieger revisited his birthplace in the Saratov Region, he was approached by a Young Pioneer wielding a petition: "Mister, if you're against the return of the Germans, please sign here."

Krieger soon realised how unwelcome he was in the region from which his family, along with many other Volga Germans, were deported at the outbreak of the second world war.

An experienced agronomist, his heart sank as he looked over the once fertile fields ruined by ill-conceived land improvement projects, the abandoned villages and the overgrown rubble where houses had stood. He trudged from one state farm to another, trying to find a job, but was refused work when people heard his German surname.

The farms are short-staffed and the shops are empty, yet the locals still hold rallies waving banners declaring: "Better AIDS Than Germans."

The Saratov branch of the "Rodina" (Nation) committee circulates leaflets which read: "The creation of a Germany in our own land is being decided behind our back. What the kaiser failed to do in 1914, and Hitler in 1941, is being attempted today!"

Last year, 105,000 Soviet Germans—professionals and skilled workers—left the country. The exodus continues, with 45,000 emigrations already this year.

The Institute of German Economy in Frankfurt estimates that West Germany is capable of absorbing two million Soviet Germans over the next ten years.

The injection of skills is likely to increase the country's GNP by 84 billion marks by the end of the century. Soviet losses, according to the State Planning Committee, will amount to 80 billion roubles.

So we shouldn't remain indifferent to the future of Alexander Krieger. Or of Valeriy Stendauer, a driver, with 25 years' experience, or Vladimir Witt and his three sons, or 25-year-old Tatyana Kim, a trained cook, musician and sales manager, or 25-year-old chauffeur Volodya Mayer or concrete worker Volodya Weber, or vet, crane operator, agronomist and builder Alexander Gart—to name but a few.

Many of them were set to leave, when they heard that the Ulyanovsk Region was welcoming Germans. So, with Germans from all over the country, they went to Ulyanovsk, hoping to revive their German homeland on the Volga.

As our jeep left the asphalt road and bounced along the pot-holed dirt track towards the village of Krasnoye Syundyukovo, we saw the site of the first German settlement planned for the Ulyanovsk Region.

"Soyuz," the Ulyanovsk industrial association, is soon to build two German settlements, a series of small factories to process farm produce, a brick and tile factory and an ecologically safe power station on the Sviyaga River.

Each of these projects will provide jobs in winter, when there is no work in the fields, and will yield sound economic returns.

The settlement was originally planned for the village of Vasilyevka. Then the people of Krasnoye Syundyukovo held a meeting, and decided to invite the Germans to settle in their village. Here, they wouldn't have to start from scratch, said the locals, adding that they would like to work on the new industrial and agricultural farm planned by the Germans.

I saw the people of Syundyukovo welcoming delegations of Soviet Germans, showing them around the farms and praising the fertile black soil. I also saw abandoned courtyards over-run by weeds, the boarded up windows, and the old wooden school building which will close next year because the sole pupil has finished the third grade and is ready to go on to another school.

The Ulyanovsk Region is just one of the many Russian regions where villages life is dying. Its rural popu'ation has dropped by 64,400 in last ten years. Forty-five population centres have simply disappeared from the map. In many places there are several pensioners for every working farmer.

These areas are crying out for skilled workers. With this in mind, Yevgeniy Miller, department head at the local Teacher Training Institute, decided to try and stem the exodus of Germans by inviting them to settle in the Ulyanovsk Region.

In a 15-page letter to the regional party committee, Miller argued that the region should at the very least invite 10,000 Germans to settle in the area, as that was the number who lived there before the war. Having read the letter, the local goverrnment head and First Scretary of the regional party committee Yuriy Goryachev agreed to the proposal.

We know from history that the Germans, Danish, Dutch and French settled the unpopulated area along the Volga in the mid-18th century. They cultivated the land and even exported high-quality grain. For hundreds of years they lived side by side with Russians, never quarelling with them, and working to improve the Volga Region.

In 1918, on Lenin's initiative, a Labour Communist of Soviet Germans was formed on the Volga. Soon it was transformed into the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans. Then in 1941, Volga Germans were accused of collaborating with German fascists. Despite the total lack of evidence, they were all sent to labour camps, and deprived of their civil rights until 1956. Today, many of them do not even know their own language.

Yevgeniy Miller was himself deported as a child. When he was allowed to resettle in Ulyanovsk, he set up a regional branch of the Soviet Germans' Society "Revival". He now hosts German language programmes on local tv, and edits the newspaper NACHRICHTEN. He sees his main task as helping fellow Germans to return to their Russian homeland.

"We are going to start by building two German settlements. We are planning to harvest 4,514 hectares worth of crops this autumn. we're also negotiating a number of joint ventures with West Germany," he says.

"I'm confident that German farming methods will return to the Ulyanovsk Region, methods which have been successful even east of the Urals."

Why do two neighbouring regions have such different attitudes concerning the return of the Volga Germans? Aleksandr Kichikhin, an officer of the KGB department which protects the constitutional system, gave this analysis in an open letter to President Gorbachev: "...Corrupt elements in the Saratov Reigon are trying to cling on to power, to cover up their economic failures and abuses of office.

"They are using people they themselves have provoked as a pretext. They have fanned the flames of ethnic conflict in the area. A whole campaign is being conducted by officials on the regional committee, and some urban comnmittees of the Communist Party. They have humilitated the dignity and honour of Soviet Germans, and have both directly and indirectly impaired their rights as Soviet citizens."

In the meantime, the Ulyanovsk Region continues to welcome the Germans home.

Youth Movements, Attitudes Described

90US1044A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 23, Jun 90 p 4

[Article by Konstatin Mikhaylov: "The Youth Movement: Parade of the Planets"]

[Text] *The VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], which has renounced monopoly representation of the interests of all of the youth, has had to take the next step also—to recognize other youth organizations' right to exist and represent others' interests. It was taken at the 21st VLKSM Congress, and the first plenum adopted a decision on the establishment of a fundamentally new office—chairman of the VLKSM Central Committee Coordinating Committee for Relations With Youth Organizations. Aleksandr Zinchenko is this chairman. In his interview with SOBESEDNIK (No. 20) he declared: "The committee's main task is a search for allies in the youth movement and their support. To evaluate in good time with whom we are on the same road...and with whom, not." Choosing is undoubtedly the right of any organization. Beginning its new rubric "The Youth Movement: Parade of the Planets," SOBESEDNIK, however, sets itself a more modest task—objectively describing, as far as possible, who's who.*

Astrologers have always closely followed the disposition of celestial bodies. They have linked the fate of people, dynasties, and states with the motion of the planets. There is currently a parade of planets in the political firmament of our perestroyka. Politics has become the fate of thousands of young people.

It is difficult painting a picture of the political currents of Soviet youth. There are no adult and youth politics, there is politics, and the young person who comes within its orbit is perfectly capable of giving an account of himself in an "adult" political organization. The movement of anarcho-syndicalists is young, the ecology volunteers are young, the youth also participates in the activity of other parties and movements, which SOBESEDNIK, for example, described in "Political Atlas of Russia" (No. 13, 1990). The "informal life" of the young people of our country may be represented in the form of a huge pyramid, at the base of which are thousands of collectives and small groups, and at the apex, political organizations with a clear-cut structure and program.

The Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League], which was for a long time the sole legal political youth organization, has recently become a kind of floating island in a turbulent pluralistic sea of youth opinions and organizations. A new—political—wave has been rolling through this sea in the past year or so.

From the "Manifesto" of the Young Communists League:

"At a menacing time of stern trials the Young Communists League raises the banner of the Soviet and international youth movement. A petty bourgeois revision of Marxism has gained the ascendancy and the 'Soviet bourgeoisie' class has been revived in the USSR."

The program of the Young Communists League contains "struggle against bourgeois ideology," "Bolshevization of the CPSU, the VLKSM and the trade unions," the imposition of a quota—two-thirds of the seats—for "worker-peasant-intelligentsia democracy" in the elective authorities, work force councils, and public organizations, "a class approach to propagandized works of art".... The organ of the Young Communists League, ZOV, notes that "the crisis in the Komsomol has come to a head" and announces that the Young Communists League has been registered for the first time under the auspices of Moscow's Gagarinskiy VLKSM Rayon Committee.

From the "Political Program" of the Russian Young Democrats League:

The league's purpose is "political struggle for the rights and liberties of the youth". The cause of the crisis in the country is the "monopoly power of the CPSU" and "totalitarianism." The reforms begun in 1985 are a "liberalization of the regime." The main program demands are freedom of political alliances, freedom of the press, independent unions, a market economy with a guaranteed minimum wage, and the creation of a "united front of democratic forces." The youth, in the opinion of the Russian Young Democrats League, should recognize itself as a political force. There are religious-political associations also. A striking example of the latter is the Youth Christian Democratic Association Christian Democratic Union [as published] (formed in Tbilisi in November 1989), which has become a real alternative to the Georgian Komsomol. We could mention also the Leningrad "Young Christians Union," which even organizes religious rock concerts.

The informals have ceased to be a sensation and have become a sign of the times (as usual, we have here also lagged behind the West, which has since the end of the 1960's been accustomed "concerned citizens groups" and an independent civic movement, in which up to 15 percent of the gainfully employed population in various countries participates). The young Soviet informals will tomorrow be the members of youth political organizations, the day after tomorrow, of "adult" political parties. Who are they?

As youth "informal studies" testify, these are the most active members of society. There are among the participants in informal associations three times more (compared with "ordinary" youth) of those who are involved in elective work or have a public assignment. One-third of informals predicts for itself in the future an active public life (among "ordinary" youth, 4 percent). The number of informals does not, of course, lend itself to computation on account of the extreme changeability and turnover of these unofficial structures. According to expert estimates, there are in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] approximately 40 political organizations laying claim to the role of parties alone, in the Baltic, more than 30, in the Transcaucasus, more than 10, in the Ukraine and Belorussia, approximately 10, and in Central Asia, three-five. There are in the USSR as many ecologists, pacifists, rights activists, Afghanistan vets and antiquity, charity, philosophy, and healthy lifestyle activists, not to mention heavy metal fans, punks, and hippies—the list is simply unimaginable.

The latest trends of informal life, in scholars' opinion, are as follows: polarization (a sharp separation into supporters of theoretical search and practical action); an orientation toward the domestic policy arena; an aspiration to association at the regional and all-Union levels; a growth of contradictions in relations with public and state organizations.

British political scientist D. Riordan names five types of Soviet informal groups. "Interest" groups—rock music fans, for example. "Public pressure" groups—in spheres where the activity of state "is failing" ("greens," protectors of historical monuments). "Western-oriented" groups—rockers, hippies, punks, fans, and so forth. "Ultra-patriotic" groups—conservative and reactionary youth groupings engaged in combating on the one hand corruption and bureaucratism and, on the other, people who reject "socialist values" ("lyubery" [skinhead-type toughs] and, partly, Afghanistan vets). "Illegals"—engaging in unlawful activities (young fascists, underground rock groups, drug addicts, and so forth).

This classification, not the only one possible, of course, is interesting in that it shows the political "niche" of the various informal currents.

If we are to believe a recent poll of the research center of the Higher Komsomol School, the affections of Soviet youth belong primarily to the "green," charity, Afghanistan vets, and "cultural ecologists" movements—they obtained 75, 74, 64, and 56 percent respectively of approbatory comment on their activity. Less support is enjoyed by social and political, religious and peace associations and regional people's fronts—38, 21, 41 and 23 percent "in favor." However, only 26 percent of those polled believe that the informal associations could in the immediate future become a serious and influential political force. Politics is the art of the possible. With every passing day we are becoming increasingly aware of the

wisdom of this aphorism. What do Soviet young people consider it permissible to employ in the political struggle?

A poll conducted by the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences (1989, 2,500 respondents) testifies that:

41.6 percent believe that strikes are perfectly or partially permissible;

40.8 percent—unsanctioned meetings and demonstrations;

35.3 percent—picketing of enterprises and establishments;

10.4 percent—weapons, including violence;

59.1 percent of respondents find "nothing wrong in breaking the law to benefit the common cause."

What is the general disposition of the youth in our society? According to sociologists' data, 51.3 percent of those polled are confident on this score that they enjoy real freedom of speech; 30.7 percent, freedom of criticism; 49.6 percent, freedom of worship. But only 26.2 percent believe that they obtain truthful political information; 3.7 percent, that they can influence decisions on matters of state.

Some 6.8 percent of youth informal associations, according to the studies of the Moscow Higher Police School, are openly or semi-legally connected with the criminal world. It is a question, of course, of groups of the lower tier of the informal pyramid—juvenile collectives. They are as yet far removed from politics, but increasingly new social strata here are being pulled into the orbit of political life—what they could be bringing with them here is not without interest. Data of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Academy indicate that 15-20 percent of school students and half the students of vocational-technical schools are in the grip of the influence of crime-inducing informal groups.

A sociological survey of the fall of 1989 in Leningrad provides interesting food for thought concerning the role of violence in the life of our youth. Some 32.8 percent of young Leningraders polled agreed that "it is impossible in our day to achieve anything without force." Some 47.2 percent declared that "the law does not interest me because it exists independently, as does life". Some 51.2 percent are capable of resolving conflicts with their peers with the aid of force, and 45.1 percent would respond to insults in words with "action." This mass acknowledgment of violence should not come as a surprise—48.8 percent had been subjected to violence (beatings or humiliation) on the part of coevals, 33.7 percent, on the part of parents and teachers (!). Each people deserves its informals, as they say.

SOBESEDNIK thanks officials of the Moscow Bureau of Information Exchange and the Department of Social Initiatives and the Social Movement of the Youth of the VLKSM Central Committee Higher Komsomol School Research Center for help in preparing this article.

Readers Debate Price Rises, Market Switch

PM2106111590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

["Reading the Mail" article by letters department special correspondent Lyudmila Savyelyeva: "Poverty Is a Crime"]

[Text] "I am sure that the editorial office will have been inundated by letters following N.I. Ryzhkov's speech. It would be a good idea to summarize them and in some way elucidate people's positions in the newspaper." Muscovite V. Yegerov is right: It is a long time since there have been so many letters on one topic (there have been more than 1,000 in the past week alone). All right, let us try, as far as possible, to summarize readers' opinions and pick out the most important, the most painful aspects.

The mailbag makes it clear that the government head's report on the transition to a market economy did nothing to increase optimism in society. Moreover, the pendulum of social consciousness has rapidly swung in the direction of panic, bordering on horror in the face of an "unpredictable future." The panic, as one might guess, was caused primarily by the possible rise in prices. Many were quite clear about this: "Life will be even harder, even more intolerable" (the most frequent description). Here are just some of the most typical opinions: "Living with increased prices offset by compensation of 35-40 rubles is crazy" (A. Parkhanov, Kharkov); "they promised an increased standard of living and we get increased prices" (S. Parfentyeva, Kishinev); "the rich will get richer and the poor will get poorer: That is the economy in a nutshell" (K. Lavrinenko, Sumy). "In the remaining six months," L. Yakovlev (Perm) forecasts, "people will buy up the counters as well as all the goods—if the stores themselves have not been smashed to pieces by then, of course." Are our leaders so cut off from the people that they did not foresee what a fuss, what a storm price increases would cause in a situation where there is a dire shortage of literally everything?" K. Moskalenko of Kharkov asks.

Anyway, our strident times are reflected in every letter. Some present meticulous calculations of beggarly family budgets, some angrily berate the country's leaders for "being determined, as was ever the custom in Russia, to swindle the people again" (A. Anosov, Novokuznetsk), others are bewildered: "Why are they trying to pass off another price rise as market relations? We are not so foolish that we do not see it" (Yu. Abramov, Poltava).

So, just one element out of the entire economic reform program has been seized on—price rises. This, seemingly, was the only thing that was heard, and hence the panic, the confusion, and the whirlwind of buying that swept through our already empty stores. You have an interesting phenomenon, Yu. Volodina (Penza) remarks:

"People are alarmed and they are bent on one thing—stocking up with at least something; meanwhile, the authorities pontificate to us about lofty matters that we do not really understand."

The fact that our economy is in a crisis, in an impasse, many stress, no one need say: There is evidence of this everywhere. It is also self-evident that we need to find a way out of the crisis: It could not be any worse, after all. But where is the guarantee that on this occasion the government is offering a way out, and not "another experiment with our economy and our long-suffering nature?" (M. Kumryasova, Kuybyshev Oblast). "One must bear in mind the very important fact," L. Kupriyanov (Kaluga) develops the idea, "that few people are going to believe mere verbal assurances. In my opinion, the program proposed by the government is not cogent, convincing, and concrete enough."

Most readers are of the same opinion. "The transition to market relations is essential, if only because all the measures that have been adopted even in the past five years have had no effect. But why is it essential to begin by raising prices?" D. Butakov (Alma-Ata) asks. "Particularly as the assurances that no one will be worse off are unconvincing: Is the meager compensation going to save the day?"

Price rises, many writers are convinced (one often encounters economists among them, I notice), are a consequence, but by no means a prerequisite of the formation of a market. "One need not do the market's work for it," K. Tolmachev (Leningrad) believes, "it will itself bring prices into line and do it better than the best government." A. Lyudvinskiy of Poltava is convinced (and his view could be called typical) that to form a market economy you need first of all both to eliminate diktat by state monopolies and to destatize the economy, even creating a private sector (in whatever proportion)—all this will fill the market with goods and subsequently stabilize prices.

As we know, if we do not understand something it causes alarm, distrust, and suspicion. What we do not understand, many people stress, is how the market relations will take shape and what specific mechanism is being proposed. "Either the government does not know how to do it," Ye. Shabanov (Temryuk) suggests, "or it knows, but for some reason does not consider it necessary to explain it all to us: Have faith, it says, everything is going to be better. But faith is also in short supply at the moment." "But perhaps it is all dead simple?" N. Borodin (Tula Oblast) writes not without irony. "Let us bring prices into line, they say, confiscate surplus money, produce a stack of goods, and let us regulate all this and call it a socialist market. Very likely we can do without private ownership and trick the idiot capitalists."

"What is the market?" A. Pogromskiy (Moscow) asks. "I am sure that many people, like me, a reserve officer with 35 years of military and political training, associate this concept primarily with the Cheremushkinskiy or Moskovoretskiy market, where by no means everyone can afford the prices. It is both laughable and sad, but, as the facts and the press show, the people have started storing boxes of salt, matches, and pasta in bathrooms and cupboards in preparation for the market economy. What the authorities need to do is provide a clear and convincing explanation, not frighten people with price increases. Then there will be no false rumors either."

Any, even the best laws and decisions are doomed, readers stress, unless their meaning and content are translated into a language that everyone understands. Hence the numerous questions: What is the market economy going to give each one of us? Where are the goods going to come from, when everything is scarce at the moment? How are the millions of our fellow citizens currently living in poverty going to be protected? The list of questions is endless and there appear to be no answers. "Apparently," V. Mezentsev (Vitebsk) remarked, "as always, we lack the ability to explain everything to people thoroughly and intelligently. We always have the same problem with good ideas: We drop them into unprepared soil—on the off-chance that they will take root. Then we are amazed: How can it be, they have not taken..."

As if continuing this train of thought, A. Golyan of Poltava writes: "I believe the authoritative economists who assert that there is no escaping from the crisis without switching to a market economy. And I am for it. I am prepared to make sacrifices, but on a just basis, so that everyone—from cleaner to president—shares the burden of the switch to the market. But I do not see in the program any real measures to implement the switch: price rises—is that all? So I get the impression that the government itself does not believe in the formation of the market in this way."

As is known, the program proposed by the government is under direct fire in the country's Supreme Soviet. There are stinging polemical darts "from below" as well. If one discards the emotional element and sums up the multitude of opinions, one has to say that by presenting an ill-considered concept for the switch to a market economy the government has unwittingly laid itself open to attack. The theory of the need for a switch that is not backed up a range of measures to implement it is not going to convince many people today. Moreover, people have begun to associate the market economy solely with price increases. "Perhaps 'shock treatment' is needed," the aforementioned Kharkov resident, K. Moskalenko, remarks. "But since this medical term has been suggested, one must also mention the first commandment of medicine: "Do no harm"...

A. Zarenok (Pervomayskoye, Crimea Oblast) cites an interesting comparison in his letter: "Our market and economy are an automobile damaged in an accident with an injured passenger. Ask the injured passenger what he would find more aggreeable: slow, but painless treatment

over a period of several years, with unknown consequences, or surgical, that is, painful, intervention, but rapid recovery. I am sure that 95 percent would go for the fastest possible recovery. So it is with the economy."

Indeed, the market economy is a path that has been tried out by other countries and its effectiveness has been demonstrated by world experience. Here, however, the economy has spent long decades in the role of a servant of ideology. It has won the right to self-determination and the chance to live according to its own laws "in constant battles and fights, and it is now hollering for help," as L. Karpov (Moscow) put it.

It is no longer a question now of whether we go or do not go to the market. We go, of course. The question is how. Slowly or quickly, at great or little cost? And on this score, many people are convinced, there should be not one, but several programs; let them compete, let economists with the most disparate views debate the matter—the sole criterion being a high level of competence. And the sole authority being the authority of argument.

"We can do without illusions, consolation, and self-deception," A. Medvedev (Cherepovets) writes. "Things are bad—it is common knowledge. The war with the rich has gone on long enough. It is high time we declared war on poverty. The saying that poverty is not a crime has been current in Russia for centuries. Clearly, it was invented by the rich—to console the poor..."

Sources of Street Violence Weapons Viewed

LD2606100690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Unfortunately, one of the realities of our life is the rising wave of violence threatening to sweep away our young democracy. Bursts of automatic fire on the streets of our cities and exchanges of fire at the borders of neighboring republics are no rarity. There are more and more victims. But let us ask ourselves the question: Where does so much weaponry come from in our country? One of two places. Either it is being manufactured at weapons factories or it is being misappropriated from military garrisons. Our correspondent investigates this problem in Ivanovo.

[Begin recording] [video opens with shot of a wide variety of confiscated weaponry laid out on a table, including handguns and automatic machine-guns and belts of machine-gun bullets].

[Correspondent S. Vetoshkin—identified by caption] The Vladimir militia, together with KGB staffers seized all these weapons just this year, and only from workers of one factory in the town of Kovrov, and what is involved here is not simply the theft of off-the-shelf weaponry. Showing enviable inventiveness, the workers of the works thus turn a signal flare-gun into a combat pistol, and the rifled insert of a machine-gun barrel turns an ordinary hunting rifle into a fearful weapon. [video shows inserts placed into these weapons, then correspondent talking with A.S. Strekalov, head of the administration of the KGB for Vladimir oblast—identified by caption—who shows him examples of the weapons involved]

[Vetoshkin] Aleksey Sergeyevich, I cannot believe that it is possible to make weapons like this in a factory workshop in such a way that no one notices. [video shows Vetoshkin holding a short-barrelled rifle].

[Strekalov] It is possible. And I will say moreover that this barrel-insert—in its manufacture, no fewer than six people came into contact with it. Very many people knew about this. But things have got to a stage where vigilance, and the guarding and stocktaking of the components of off-the-shelf weapons themselves have been dulled, and so things have reached a stage where this arsenal got outside the confines of the factory.

[Vetoshkin] With the weapons business on such a scale, it may be presumed that it is profitable, and an investigation is now clarifying for whom the machine-guns were being taken out, but here, perhaps it is not even this which is interesting, but the price paid for weapons in Kovrov.

[Strekalov] Let us say, the workers of the factory were able to carry out this barrel and sell it for a litre of alcoholic spirit, for a litre of vodka, even at their workplaces. Then they would drink these spirits, and in practical terms this did not particularly bother either the foreman or the head of the workshop or the management of the factory.

[Vetoshkin] There you have it. Somewhere shots are heard, blood is spilt, and here they are prepared to give fearful combat weapons to the first person they meet for a bottle of vodka. [end recording]

New International Weekly Published

LD2206031490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1544 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Summary] The presentation of a new international weekly entitled "MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS," took place today at the Moscow International Trade Center. It publishes current affairs, economic, historical, and entertaining articles and is founded by the international journal "PROBLEMY TEORII I PRAKTIKI UPRAVLENIYA." Its publisher is the international journal "MEGAPOLIS".

Baltic Republics

USSR Deputy Defends Baltic Independence

90UN2077A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 25 May 90 p 2

[Speech by USSR People's Deputy Arkadiy Murashov at the "Political Transformations in Europe and the Helsinki Process" Consultative Conference in Tallinn City, 19-20 May 1990: "For Your Freedom and Ours"]

[Text] I represent here the Interregional Group of Deputies.

First of all I would like to express my profound regret that there are no representatives of the Hungarian Republic at our table. I cannot apologize for this because I do not believe that we were involved in any action of this kind.

The Interregional Group is a parliamentary opposition within the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and it has stated its opposition precisely so that it does not share responsibility for particular steps that are taken by the country's leadership and government. It seems to me that this circumstance perhaps requires some special assessment at our meeting here, expressed either in a press release or in some other way. I might compare what has happened to the outrageous refusal by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it refused entry to American congressmen invited for the elections in Lithuania. I remember well the astonishment that seized us when we learned of that refusal.

I am a former physicist, and each of us who has come into politics recently bears the imprint of the profession that he followed previously. I would therefore like to use associations from the field in which I used to be employed.

As is known, in thermodynamics a system that is in a state of equilibrium, given changes in the external environment, will move to another state of equilibrium. And so it is with us: Now the pressure of ideology has become too much for the now former socialist camp, now the volume of foreign exchange from oil has shrunk, but obviously the temperature of sociopolitical processes is rising and we find ourselves in a state of disequilibrium that is far removed from a new state of equilibrium. And this transition from one state to another is being accompanied by profound changes in the system, I would say phase transitions, and one of these phase transitions is the restoration of the statehood of the three Baltic republics.

The Helsinki Accord recorded a certain state of equilibrium characterized by an opposition in Europe—an opposition that was no longer very aggressive in nature, even though in the field of ideology it was constantly displayed. It seems to me that a future treaty, a future conference similar to the one that took place in Helsinki in 1975 could record a new state of equilibrium in Europe. Meetings similar to the one that we are holding today are extremely useful: It is precisely here that mutual understanding is being developed that is subsequently expressed in new agreements at a higher level, with the participation of all European countries.

Here, I would like to share with you my alarm about the split that has taken place in the Russian democratic movement precisely in connection with the national question. I would characterize the existing positions as follows.

The first position, of which I am an advocate, is based on the break with the totalitarian order. It is a position of penitence about the past, penitence about the peoples who suffered from the occupation, from deportation, from destruction. And as a consequence of this penitence, it is the position of recognizing the Baltic states as independent and the legitimacy of their will, which has occurred this year.

The second position, which unfortunately many people hold, including eminent participants in the democratic movement, has been half jokingly described thus: Well, perhaps the marriage between the USSR and the Baltic states was not legal, it was never registered, but notwithstanding there has been cohabitation and withdrawal from this Union should be done through negotiation, not by a restoration of statehood but by seceding from the Soviet Union.

It seems to me that a better analogy here is not a civil marriage but the situation of a concubine and her master, and I am not sure that freeing the concubine should be analogous to the dissolution of a marriage and accompanied by agreement between the highest organs of power, which is what is happening now in the Soviet Union.

In fact, this difference of positions has a very important political basis that has increasingly begun to acquire a simply religious coloring. I use the word "religious" because it is largely a question of faith—faith in Gorbachev as the only political figure capable of leading this country along a bloodless path of peace. And with respect to this religious principle there is also a delineation within the Interregional Group, which obviously reflects very many profound democratic trends within the Soviet Union.

It is precisely on faith in Gorbachev that the position vis-a-vis the Baltic is based, with which many interregional people and West European leaders, and the American President are now engaged. The fear of spoiling relations with the head of the Soviet state is leading to ambiguity with respect to the principles of morality in politics.

Apart from this political basis there is evidently also a more profound philosophical and moral basis, and I would like to speak about this a little. What I have in mind is the question of the legitimacy of power. I see an analogy between what is happening and has happened in

the Baltic republics and what happened in Russia itself. Because strictly speaking, the power of the CPSU in the Soviet Union is unlawful. However, it took time, it did not happen all at once, but nevertheless Soviet power started to be recognized as lawful and trade and other agreements were concluded with the Soviet Union, and it is a member of the United Nations, and thus an unlawful power in that country was legitimized by the world community.

Arguments from those who would give the Baltic peoples the right of immediate self-determination have something in common with the problem that I touched on. Is not participation by people's deputies from the Baltic republics in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies a kind of legitimization of this Congress as the highest organ of power in the Soviet Union? I find it difficult to formulate precisely any argument against this view, although I can imagine the position of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov, who was one of the organizers of the Interregional Group and in the final months of his life devoted much of his effort and time to work in it. Sakharov legitimized the Congress for himself by speaking in it and by calling on the Congress to adopt a decree on power, and he legitimized Gorbachev by talking about his own support for him. Notwithstanding, I have no doubt that if Andrey Dmitriyevich were alive now he would, I think, appeal directly to our present president asking for immediate recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the Baltic republics.

This difference of views was seen recently with respect to the Lithuanian Republic. In April, I and one of the co-chairmen of the Interregional Group, historian Yuriy Afanasyev, were in Lithuania, and we agreed that the Interregional Group should send a delegation to the Lithuanian Republic. When we convened a meeting of the Coordinating Council on the matter, to my great consternation, the views expressed at it were totally polarized. We failed to gain the understanding of our own colleagues, and most unfortunately no delegation was sent, and I take advantage of this opportunity to apologize once again for this.

Our political opponents and rivals are beginning to take advantage of these differences. I must say that this occurred yesterday at the Congress of Russian Deputies, when they succeeded in adopting a resolution condemning to some extent the position of Lithuania and calling on her to cease (or even reverse—I do not know exactly) action on the decisions reached on 11 March. And the most regrettable thing is that the democratic forces represented at the congress once again demonstrated lack of unity: Some walked out of the hall in a demonstrative way, refusing to take part in the voting on the issue.

Despite these quite regrettable circumstances, I would like simultaneously with my alarm to express optimism also. Observing what is now happening in the democratic processes in Moscow and Leningrad and in Russia, I am becoming convinced that we are on the threshold of great advances, including in the democratic movement. We have already witnessed Russian deputies at the Congress trying to proclaim Russia's sovereignty and political independence and the priority of republic laws over all-union laws, and how the voting to include this issue on the agenda was almost unanimous. I can imagine a situation that will evidently arise even this autumn when Russia becomes, as it were, a large Baltic, and will not be particularly concerned about what is happening in this present, quite reactionary USSR Supreme Soviet, or what decisions and ukases the president may issue.

The insertion of troops into the enormous Russian Federation or a refusal to sell it oil and gas for domestic rubles is quite ridiculous. I think that this contradiction will work in favor of democratic forces. Having been brought face to face with the need for political struggle for self-determination, it seems to me that greater understanding will be found than there has been for the Baltics. I think that the beautiful slogan, "For Your Freedom and Ours," will be raised up by the deputies of Russia not only with their minds but also their hearts.

Footnotes

1. The representatives from Hungary were unable to come to the USSR because they did not feel that the invitation from the People's Front of Estonia was adequate.

Baltic Participation in Helsinki-2 Sought

90UN2077B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 22 May 90 p 3

[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIA government correspondent Yaroslav Tolstikov report on press conference by Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet, Edgar Savisaar, chairman of the Estonian government, and others following 19-20 May meeting "Political Transformation in Europe and the Helsinki Process": "The Baltic and Helsinki-2"]

[Text] Khaabneeme—An international consultative meeting under the name "Political Transformations in Europe and the Helsinki Process" took place on 19 and 20 May here in the suburbs of Tallinn. It was attended by representatives from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and also the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and the Republic of Poland. An invitation to attend was also sent to Hungary, but its representatives were not allowed into Tallinn by the Soviet side. There was also a good reason for a delegation from Slovenia not attending.

On Sunday, 20 May, an appeal was signed by those attending the meeting in Khaabneeme. It states in particular that the restoration of the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is an international issue and that success at the new Helsinki meeting, planned for the autumn of 1990, will depend on the reinstatement of this historical justice. Those signing the appeal

call on all interested parties to recognize the right of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to take part in the Helsinki-2 conference.

Peet Kask, Edgar Savisaar, Olegs Kangur, and Rein Veidemann signed the appeal for the Estonian side. The document contains a total of 17 signatures. Copies of the appeal will be circulated to all those attending the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

It was noted at the consultative meeting that the political processes under way in the Baltic republics are similar to the changes taking place in the countries of East Europe. And this circumstance must be taken into account during the preparations for the Helsinki-2 conference. It was decided to continue the consultations between the Baltic republics and representatives of the countries of East Europe. It is planned to convene a new consultative in August 1990 in Bratislava.

Following the signing of the final document of the consultative meeting a press conference was held in Khaabneeme for Estonian and foreign journalists. It was attended by Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet, and Edgar Savisaar, chairman of the Estonian Government.

Here is a brief description of the press conference.

Question (to representatives of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Republic of Poland): What is the attitude of your countries' leaders to the processes taking place in the Baltic?

[Answer] In the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic there is support for the restoration of the independence and sovereignty of all the peoples of Europe. The Polish Government also supports the aspirations of peoples for democracy and independence. Time is needed, however, for official recognition of the governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. At present the European countries are, as it were, waiting to see who will be first to extend recognition.

Question (from a Japanese journalist to A. Ruutel): What is your attitude toward the ukases issued by President Gorbachev rescinding certain decisions of the republic Supreme Soviet?

[Answer] Of course, according to his logic President Mikhail Gorbachev has the right, and he must act exactly as he is now acting. However, it is inevitable that we in the republic are now reaching decisions that are not in the interests of Moscow. We are reaching those decisions because they reflect the deep processes taking place in our society and they reflect the interests of the Estonian people. I do not believe that the Supreme Soviet deputies have agreed to rescind them. Although it is possible that some of the decisions reached, those that are not so much a matter of principle, could be revised.

Question (from REUTER to A. Ruutel): What concessions might Estonia be ready to make today?

[Answer] It is very difficult to talk about that at this time. However, any very complex question can be resolved in a spirit of good will, taking into account the fact that about 40 percent of the republic's population are not Estonians.

Question (from the FINANCIAL TIMES to E. Savisaar): What do you think of the strike planned for 21 May?

[Answer] A number of enterprises, as, for example, the "Dvigatel Plant and some others, intend to hold a political strike. At the same time it is known that there is also great opposition to this wish, including among the Russian collectives. I think that the strike will be short-lived and will involve only a narrow circle of labor collectives since the economic harm from such actions is very great.

A. Ruutel added this: Very many of the Russians in Estonia understand the desire of the Estonian people for independence. And they are against a strike for political reasons.

Questions (in English for A. Ruutel): As far as we know you are to meet with Gorbachev in Moscow on 22 May. What do you expect from this meeting? And a second question: Have any arrests been made in the republic since 15 May?

[Answer] In the dialogue with Moscow we are now acting together, all three Baltic republics. I hope that the meeting with President Gorbachev will take place. On behalf of the three republics we have sent a letter to Gorbachev, and also to President Bush. And we are counting on moving out of the impasse without confrontation.

A criminal case has been opened on the use of force on 15 May. As far as I know no arrest have been made meanwhile. A subpoena has been issued for Lysenko by the republic procuracy. However, Lysenko did not appear and the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] is now looking for him; he has not been seen either at home or at his work. Following the investigation of the case steps will be taken based on legislation.

Question (from REUTER to A. Ruutel): Nevertheless, what do you want to achieve at the meeting on Tuesday? Is there a specific plan?

[Answer] No, there is not. We want to meet with Gorbachev and find realistic ways to solve the Baltic question. We shall also be talking about this at the session of the USSR Council of the Federation.

Question (from the newspaper DAILY MAIL to the representatives of Estonia and Latvia): What are you able to say about Moscow's intention to send additional contingents of MVD internal troops in connection with the events of 15 May?

E. Savisaar: We are in full control of the situation in the republic and there is no need for intervention by Moscow. Moreover, it would be a very ambiguous

action, taking into account the presence of conservative forces within the republic. I agreed personally with Minister Bakatin not to send in our own troops.

A representative of the Latvian Republic: There are now so many Soviet troops on our territory that they would have more than enough for any action. Minister Bakatin called on the internal forces deployed in Latvia, and also the militia, strictly to carry out their professional duties. Incidentally, in Riga the Presidium building was stormed by people from the military school dressed in uniform. But MVD troops broke the assault.

Question (in English for E. Savisaar): Will the enterprises take any steps against the strikers?

[Answer] We have an all-union legislative enactment that covers this. And according to that enactment a political strike may be declared unlawful.

A. Ruutel, concluding the press conference: If the Baltic question is resolved, in principle the question of the Baltic area and the national question will be resolved.

None of the Russians or the representatives of other indigenous nationalities living in the Baltic area today are to blame for the existing situation. The issue must be resolved in the interests of all the sides. We are firmly convinced of this.

At the end of the press conference Arnold Ruutel issued a statement specially for the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA. Replying to a question from our correspondent on how he assesses the political situation in the republic today after the events of 15 May, he said this:

As leader of the republic Supreme Soviet I shall try in every possible way to maintain the stability of the political situation, proceeding from the interests not only of Estonia but of the country as a whole. And we in Estonia have a sincere and deep interest in this. It is quite clear that the question of the Baltic area and the sore points that now exist in our three republics must be resolved. And not only in words; it is essential to move from words to deeds, and to take specific steps. What is happening in our republics is the result of complicated political processes. And it would be incorrect to blame some specific leader, as, for example, Landsbergis in Lithuania, for particular events. And for my part, I have repeatedly emphasized, including at the Supreme Soviet meeting and even before 15 May, that there is a need for mutual attitudes of good will toward the interests of each of the sides, and the Russian-speaking population in particular. The tension that has developed between national communities in the republic in recent times cannot be relieved by some kind of power methods. And I appeal to the population not to use power methods, and to not today, or even less tomorrow, resort to these kinds of methods because this only exacerbates the situation and fills the historical memories of the people with new unfavorable impressions. Let us not do this, rather let us move to dialogue without raising our voices, and without threats.

I think that I have a good idea of the feeling of uncertainty among the Russian-speaking population in the republic. In human terms it is quite understandable. However, over the past decades the Estonians, too, have suffered many hurts. But we must respect each other as people, as neighbors living on the same land. And as today's republic leader, for my part I shall do everything possible to insure that mutual respect one for the other. I am well aware that what one person or one not particularly influential political movement may say does not reflect the interests of the entire Russian-speaking population. It cannot be taken as a foundation. In just the same way that some of the things said by particular representatives of the Estonian side cannot be taken as a foundation. We must find mutual understanding, and the events of 15 May will not be repeated.

Article Examines Plight of Baltic Russians

PM2206153090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 24, 12-18 Jun 90 pp 31-35

[Leonid Mlechin article: "The Russians in the Baltic Republics: Strangers in Their Own Homes"]

[Text] A popular TV show in the Soviet Union, called "View" made a brief mention the other day of the first refugees from Estonia. The report said they were 39 Russian families in Moscow region. The news spread fast to spark off a veritable private investigation into the matter by Tallinn-based Estonian newspapers. The search produced no results, yet general audiences in this country took the story in their stride: All the mass media, from national television to radio and Moscow newspapers have made interethnic conflicts in the Baltic republics a priority issue over the last three years. In this context, an exodus of Russians (or to be more precise, of "the Russian- speaking population," as they are referred to nowadays) from the three Baltic republics seem logical enough. Even though, unlike the Transcaucasian republics, the Baltics have not seen any exchange of gunfire.

Who is going where?

A letter like this one is fairly typical of a Russian residing in the Baltic republics (this one was written by a woman from the Estonian town of Parnu): "I hear some of the towns and villages near the town of Pskov are inviting people to come and stay there and providing them with jobs and apartments. My request is: please send us appropriate addresses as soon as possible. We have to move right away. We would like to settle somewhere where our children will not feel infringed upon in any way. They have already suffered enough as it is having been denied a chance to attend Russian-speaking clubs, children's theatres, or sport gymnasiums..." The trouble is, there is slim chance that the hopes of the author of this letter will be realized either in Pskov or any other Russian city: theatres in Russian provinces are almost nonexistent, to say nothing of sport gymnasiums. Moreover, new problems will continue to pile up, since life in the Russian Federation is much poorer than in Estonia.

So children will simply be deprived further of good healthy food, adequate medicine and other simple necessities of life. Modern life in Russia is drab.

And so it goes that, along with reports on national confrontation in the Baltic republics, we hear of the shower of requests made to the official representation of the Lithuanian republic in Moscow from the Russians wishing to abandon their homes in search of a better life in one of the self-proclaimed independent republics on the Baltic Sea.

An opinoion poll conducted by the two biggest youth papers in Latvia, Latvijas Jaunatne and Sovetskaya Molodezh a month before the passage of the official declaration of independence showed 68 percent of nonletts wishing to stay in an independent Latvia, set to assume Latvian citizenship, and 50 percent saying they were ready to endure hardships and overcome the difficulties that might arise on the road towards independence. But what do these figures mean in reality?

Above all they signal the Russian people's close affinity with the republic they have settled in and set down roots. neither of the republics has even been a monolythic ethnic community, and even the post-war generation of Russians have had time to raise their children and grandchildren, making the Baltic republics their homeland.

Second, what is behind these figures is a deep-seated fear of abandoning one's familiar environment forever. And indeed, moving into a new house, let alone moving to another republic, is no easy thing in this country given the notorious, mandatory practice of assignment to places of residence branded by human rights organizations as a measure paralizing freedom of travel. Where would the newcomers be welcome? Who would offer them a roof over their heads? Or make way for them in shops? Food rationing for staple products like soap, sugar, meat and butter has been introduced across the board. Manpower is without question needed in Russian villages, yet the Russian-speaking population of the Baltics are for the most part urban residents, blue-collar workers, who work in large industrial enterprises. Keep in mind that no big cities today are ready to accept newcomers as those of their residents on waiting lists to recieve new, more comfortable apartment are so numerous that those at the bottom of the list can hope to receive an apartment only in the 3rd millenia. The government is unable even to help those who fled their homes under the threat of death. Finally, think of the potential benefits in moving to either Russia, or the Ukraine or Byelorussia. The country's hopes are pinned on pending economic recovery, yet the prospects of an economic upsurge look more real in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. While Russia is rent by rancorous debate over ways and directions of change, the Baltic republics flaunt their determination to pursue their desired course. And this inspires hope: in any case, people think, what is given today will not be taken away tomorrow.

Why then are the opposition forces in Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn comprise of the Russian-speaking people? Do they not take heart in the quite tangible future of the republics that have shed the manacles of state socialism?

Vicegerents [subhead]

What would come of non-Estonians, mostly Russians, who now live in the republic? Tunne Kelam, Chairman of the Estonian National Independence Party has this to say:

"They can decide for themselves what to do. Some 600,000 non-Estonians are now illegally residing in Estonia, as in fact, citizens of another country. Out of these, 200,000 are Soviet Army officers and men as well as servicing units and families. They will have to go since they represent an occupation army. About 100,000 Russians have already been granted Estonian citizenship (which many of them are unaware of) since their parents or grandparents lived in Estonia before world war II."

"What then will happen to the remaining 300,000?"

"Moscow's strategic goal has been the colonization of the Baltic republics. It was with this goal in mind that thousands of Russians have been resettled to live here. Naturally, these people oppose Estonia's independence, which deprives them of their privileges. They don't have roots here, and I think they will go."

"Of their own free will?"

"Of course. We all agree that we cannot deport all Russians from democratic Estonia even though they may have settled here unlawfully."

"So what will become of them?"

"We have suggested that the Russians file applications for Estonian citizenship, and despite a wide-scale intimidation campaign, over 50,000 people have jumped at the chance. Many of the Russians are trying now to overcome their own fears, gradually realizing that no one is going to get back at them and that their children have a future in Estonia, a future that is guaranteed."

Advocates of this viewpoint will easily find arguments to back it up. The implementation of large-scale industrial projects in Estonia was possible only with a heavy influx of manpower to the republic. Tens of thousands of people from all across the country flooded into the Baltic republics destroying the national way of life, ousting the native tongue from everyday use and even taking over whole apartment complexes for their own families. Today, Letts comprise a third of the population of Riga, and Tallinn numbers less than 50 percent Estonians.

By and large, a blending together of languages and nations is no tragedy these days, as long that is, as it happens naturally. Yet the events that followed 1940 were viewed by the majority of Estonians, Letts and Lithuanians from an entirely different angle: they were

denied a chance to be masters of their own lives. Everything was taken care of by Moscow and its vicegerents who are still growing in number. Strangers were personified not just by "second secretaries" of party committees, but by any official who arrived in the reublic from elsewhere. In a unitary state, such as the Soviet Union has been all these years, the spread of Russian-speaking bureaucrats and officials was not at all a reflection of great-power chauvinism, but rather a handy instrument of control of the totalitarian regime over the entire country. So the fact that the Baltic states insisted on speaking their own lanuages and preserving their customs and traditions were viewed as a nuisance, as an anachronism hindering the country's unity.

What helped erode and eventually dismantle popular support for Soviet power in the republics was the lack of rights of Letts, Estonians and Lithuanians whose original way of life had been ruined which had taken place even after the period of political repressions. Every passing day was another confirmation of the fact that life could get back to normal only without Moscow and its bossy vicegerents. Yet almost all those who came to live in these republics felt it their prime obligation to rule. For local officials, the newcomers seemed more "familiar" and definitely more reliable than the dubious dodgy locals, who were always suspected of nationalism. The newcomers, meanwhile, seldom represented the best in the Russian people. Even party officals evinced no interest in the native languages or traditions of their "republic of residence." As for builder and workers, they often came from the lower layers of society. But then, these people are really beside the point. There were others too, more deserving and likable, yet the locals treated them with the same mistrust, as aliens who were never needed in the first place. The reason often was a simple lack of undersanding from the start.

The arriving visitors too had a hunch that their reception was far from warm. Their reaction to this tepid reception varied from indifference (for those who preferred the privacy of their close-knit circles of friends to something of a backlash (with accusations of "nationalism," "separatism" and ungratefulness).

Several decades proved too short a time for the establishment of a modus vivendi of sorts: peace and calm was deceptive, while the dividing line dissected even the atmosphere of children's games.

Merry making, fund and games at pre-school institutions, the learning of a new language from them was just a prelude to the lesons they were to learn later: for instance that they could be grouped not only into boys and girls, but into Russians and non- Russians, Letts and non-Letts.

The latter discovery was often more staggering than the former, setting off in every child an innate "friend-or-foe" identification system and laying the basis for future opposition between the two communities. One was to go to a Lettish-speaking school (Estonian or Lithuanian) and the other, to a Russian school. In bigger cities, Russian-speaking schools were attended not by Russians only, yet the awakened curiosity about one's ethnic background prevented any attempt in the future of identifying "us" with "them." The recent effort at setting up mixed schools with instruction in different languages provided in adjoining classrooms only made matters worse. The two sides, still divided, met every 45 minutes to settle scores in the most traditional way of all.

Let us leave it to the experts to decide just how the education system should have been structured. One thing is clear however. That is that the government washed its hands of the whole business, not even attempting to facilitate cultural integration of the communities. The Russian schools followed the curricula compiled in the Russian Federation, a practical move allowing school graduates easier access to higher educational establishments in Moscow and Leningrad. Local languages were not given any study, each time on varying pretexts (for lack of qualified teachers or textbooks, if you like), and courses on any of the republics' history were taught for only a meagre amount of time. These disciplines were considered useless and unimportant. There was no future in them.

Family upbringing often did not imply a study of a local language, again out of practical considerations since understanding Russian was much more expedient. Among the younger generation, two mentalities were poised against each other. "We are the native inhabitants of this land" and "we are the masters of the entire country, and your seclusion is absurd." And virtually no one ever tried to help the two communities understand each other. All sciences that could be instrumental for this purpose were disposed of as useless.

Collective responsibility?

The development of 1985 in this country and later were in a way sparked off by ethnic nationalism, a sinister concoction of the 20th century. The movements that have stirred the passion of so many Lithuanians, Estonians and Letts are meant not just to restore the republic's sovereignty, but also to rid them of "aliens." The only snag is that the Russian communities in either Latvia or Estonia sometimes amounting to half of the total population fail to match the traditional image of a national minority. Besides this, they have always felt notable moral support from Moscow, which only served to anger the nationalists favouring the creation of "ethnically clean" Baltic republics. The Russians were made to suffer the way a minority group would suffer listening to statements like, "It's a fact that among us live 300,000 hostile strangers plus the army" (the newspaper Uhistoo) and "the big worry is not that migrants have originally come here, but that they are here to stay. If some day by a miracle we put an end to the occupation, the problem will then go away" (the newspaper reede).

Now, this sounds like the good old logic of "collective responsibility of the peoples." If writer Valentin Rasputin believes that the Jews should bear all responsibility for "the sins of the revolution and the destruction of Russian culture" (Ogonek, No. 21/90), the nationalists in the Baltic republics have found another scapegoat to answer for "the evils of the occupation and the destruction of (Lithuania, Estonia, Lettish) culture," the Russians. In essence, it is the kind of logic Stalin or Hitler would have resorted to trying to devise a way to accuse a whole people and punish it accordingly. Any decent person in his or her right mind will find it outrageous.

The nationalist hue has instantly alarmed all those sympathetic to the democratic platforms of the Popular Fronts. Yet the Fronts' leaders were in no rush to dissociate themselves from the nationalists, moving from a mistake to a blunder. In so doing, they have alienated the Russian-speaking part of the population, making the formation of a powerful opposition inevitable. More than that, nationalism is nibbling away at the moral base of the Fronts, causing deep divisions within the movement and its fragmentation into separate political parties.

Will the nationalist concepts affect the every-day life of the Russian-speaking communities? Of course, they will. A new law on languages makes an excellent command of Lettish (Estonian, Lithuanian), a requirement for government service, opening up career opportunities for the locals. The nonindigenous population that was slow to adjust to the changing realities of the situation, will be ousted from all high-level positions. However, new areas of activity are being opened up over which the government has no control whatsoever. New political parties and social organizations are coming into existence, making personal initiative and an enterprising spirit decisive qualitities for anyone wishing to achieve anything in life. From now on, achievers will simply have to become masters of themselves first, a task most easy for young people, but an obvious obstacle for the old generation. However, becoming master of oneself will not be confined to the Baltic republics alone.

Help from the army?

"The Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic sees as its fundamental objective the creation of guarantees of political freedom and the provision of social and economic rights to all ethnic groups residing in Latvia. It regards as its primary objective the development of their national cultures and full observance of human rights and more specific cultural needs of each particular community." The declarations written are very beautiful, but how much of it is true in the every-day practices of the new governments in Riga. Vilnius and Tallinn?

The answer to this question very much depends on the type of government in each republic. Until now one could speak of the formation of structures of a parliamentary democracy, which is the most democratic form of government of all. It has no mechanisms for suppressing national minorities. In a parliamentary republic one cannot (the way Stalin was inclined to) load a train with people of a particular nationality overnight and send them off to Siberia.

The bottom of the line is neither the Popular Fronts nor any other force have any clear-cut and comprehensive programme of coexistence between the local population and the substantial Russian-speaking community in an independent Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia.

Whether or not the Baltic republics will secure the status of independent states, the way of life of the Russian communities has already been altered dramatically. The recognition of this fact will no doubt bring about a certain psychological reevaluation of the situation, a need to assess the present and outline the future.

The immediate association evoked in the minds of many people by the words "the Russian-speaking community" is that of Interfront, the councils of work collectives and committees for protection of the Constitution and Soviet citizens' human rights. This, though, is not entirely accurate. These organizations' opposition to the new power structure is of a purely ideological nature. They object to the republics' independence, denationalization and privatization of property. In Moscow, and in the country in general. In Moscow, and in the country in general, members of these organizations appear as defenders of the interests of Russians, which cretes the false illusion that all Russians oppose kthe new governments. Helping the Russians is therefore interpreted as helping these organizations, i.e., resorting to the same ideology, backing the Interfront, the intermovement, calling on people to defy the democratically elected government and parliament. These are the organizations on the far right of the political spectrum, and by backing them, Moscow is gaining a certain reputation. The swift assistance that army units or Interior Ministry troops render the Communist Party of Latvia (CPSU platform) only confirms the Lithuanians' belief that the Russian part of the population is being manipulated by Moscow in a game against Lithuania.

As a matter of fact, the Russians of Lithuania, or indeed of the Baltic republics in general, are in need of help, but of a different kind. First, one must understand their aspirations.

Part of the Russian-speaking population is at the very bottom rung of the social ladder, so hopes for a better life are naturally linked to an independent Lithuania (Estonia, etc.). As for interethnic tension, it will subside the moment the republics assume full sovereignty and the Russians are no longer referred to as "the fifth column" or "occupants." Some Russian intellectuals opt for the Baltic republics' independence out of fear of further political instability in Moscow.

So what can be done to help these people? They have every right to hope for a guarantee of their rights. This in no way contradicts the democratic principles proclaimed

in all three republics. The best thing these republics could do now would be to draw up bills regulating the rights of the non-indigenous population. Some experience has already been acquired: introducing quotas on work places, on admission to universities, the creation of state and judicial bodies to mediate in any conflict involving an infringement of their rights and discrimination against them. For its part, Moscow could grant standing Soviet citizenship to all these people, keeping the door open for them to return at any time. This would be a considerable moral pillar of support to fall back on in times of trouble.

Some people, of course, are terrified by the recent developments and fear losing all their rights and social protection. These are mostly blue-collar, unskilled workers who have lived here for only a short while, who do not know the national language and have failed to become fully integrated in the cultural life of the republic. Their biggest fear is losing their job, being subjected to humiliation and letting go of a chance to give their children a higher education. We should determine how many of these people are there and then tell them in all honesty what they can count on back in Russia. We will have to provide some sort of compensation to all those who choose to leave. Is a mass exodus a possibility? Not today, though the policies of Moscow, if not thought through to the last detail, can well exacerbate the confrontation, pitching Lithuanians, Letts and Estonians against their Russian-speaking compatriots and alienating the latter even more.

A separate group of people is composed of residents of cities populated by the Russians and located in the northeastern part of Estonia and all the major cities of Latvia. These people have more confidence in themselves and look determined to remain within the Soviet Union. In the northeastern part of Estonia, parallel power structures are being set up these days. Under the law recently passed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., these envlaves are entitled to secede from Estonia if the vote favours such a decision. A severe setback for Estonia, the move could be beneficial to the Soviet Union, though any support for such action from the centre before the referendum will inevitably gain the central authorities a reputation for connivance in favour of separatism.

At any rate, our relations with Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia, just as with the Russian speaking communities, should be based on common sense and a sense of balance. If Moscow eventually agrees to the republics' independence, its first concern should be opening up the borders for a free flow of travellers, information and cultural ideas. Even more importantly, the national government will be preoccupied with catching up with the standards of the material well-being across the border.

A certain L. Richter was a Lett who owned a store in Riga before the Second World War, above which hung an advertisemen, "orders for Parcels to the Soviet Union." "Parcels," explained the instructions, could include foodstuffs and other goods. A notice at the store notified customers that "all foodstuffs needed for a parcel are kept at a storehouse and can be freely chosen by customers." After half a century, the list of goods has lost none of its attraction: flour, rice, smoked pork, salami sausage and sausage a la Krakov, lemons, sugar, cocoa, tea, etc. Under Soviet rule, citizens of Riga were denied the right to send us those parcels, yet they hope to be able to do that again. We better move out of the way. And start thinking how to provide adequate food supplies to our own people, so that Russia can become richer than Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This last requirement, if met, will be most useful in improving the lot of Russians in the Baltic republics.

Estonian Committee Chairman Explains Goals

90UN2062A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 23 May 90 p 2

[Report on interview with Tunne Kelam, chairman of the Committee for Estonia, by A. Podvezko; date and place not specified: "What Will the Estonian State Be?"]

[Text] A new movement emerged a year ago in the republic's political arena, the Committees of Estonian Citizens, and has rapidly gathered strength. The republic Supreme Soviet has even adopted a special resolution stating that it will coordinate its actions with the Estonian Citizens' Congress and its leading organ, the Committee for Estonia.

What goals does this movement set for itself today and how does it intend to reach them? Our correspondent interviewed the chairman of the Committee for Estonia, Tunne Kelam.

[Kelam] The destruction of the totalitarian systems in the countries of East Europe has led to increased national self-awareness by the people in the Soviet Union and to a desire for national-state determination. But whereas in other parts of the Union it is a question of strengthening the independence of the union and autonomous republics, the situation is quite different in the Baltic region.

Independent states have existed and do exist here which are occupied at this time. This fact has always been recognized by the international community.

Consequently, if there was no revolution or voluntary annexation as part of the Union but only an occupation, the question of national determination in the Baltic region stands thus: In a practical way how can the independent states be restored?

We believe this is possible only on the basis of continuity; that is, restoration of the state structure that existed before 1940. Naturally only the citizens of the Estonian republic and their descendants have the right to

participate in its restoration. Today the citizens committees are the political structure through which citizens of the Estonian republic can express their will.

[Podvezko] Why is it necessary to return to 1940? Surely, even if it is possible to regard the present state order in Estonia as distorted and not in line with the will of the Estonian people, it can nevertheless be considered a form of national-state determination, and start from this today? Surely the newly elected Estonian Government and Supreme Soviet are not occupation organs of power?

[Kelam] Strictly speaking, in the legal sense, yes. For the elections took place under conditions of the presence of an army of occupation, and thus were not free elections...

[Podvezko] But young Estonian men also serve in that army do they not?

[Kelam] That is also unlawful... No matter what state institution we may mention, from a legal standpoint all of them are illegitimate if we proceed from the fact of the occupation of Estonia.

[Podvezko] And what is your idea of the restoration of independence?

[Kelam] The Estonian Citizens' Congress, which was set up in March this year, has adopted a plan for the restoration of the Estonian republic. First and foremost this plan envisages the withdrawal of armed forces from Estonian territory. This should take place on the basis of a treaty between the Estonian government and the Union Government...

[Podvezko] Let is clarify which Estonian government you have in mind. The "occupation" government?

[Kelam] A provisional government that will be approved by the Estonian Citizens' Congress.

[Podvezko] But, as you say, the elections to the congress were also held under conditions of occupation. Can the congress be considered a legitimate organ?

[Kelam] No, not in the full sense, of course. But it is undoubtedly the fully empowered spokesman for the will of the citizens of the Estonian republic.

[Podvezko] So, the Estonian Citizens' Congress and its Committee for Estonia are the only legitimate representative organs that have the right to deal with the restoration of the independence of the Estonian state?

[Kelam] Yes.

[Podvezko] But as you can see, the Estonian Supreme Soviet today also lays claim to this right. How are relations between you?

[Kelam] I believe that the Supreme Soviet is needed during the initial transitional period until we have created new power structures. In this sense we have an interest in cooperation with the Supreme Soviet.

[Podvezko] What form is this cooperation taking?

[Kelam] We are already trying to cooperate during the stage of work on draft legislation that is being submitted for consideration by the Supreme Soviet. The so-called conciliation commission, which coordinates the work of the Supreme Soviet and the Estonian Citizens' Congress, exists for this purpose.

In addition, about 40 Supreme Soviet deputies are at the same time members of the Congress. Through them we have the opportunity to exert direct influence on the decisions of the soviet organ. But two factors are decisive here; namely, the legal factor (only Supreme Soviet decisions approved by the Congress can be considered legitimate), and the moral factor (the authority of the Estonian Citizens' Congress).

[Podvezko] Congress decisions are binding for compliance by its delegates?

[Kelam] Insofar as they express the interests of the votes who elected the delegate.

[Podvezko] Do you always succeed in coordinating your actions with the activity of the Supreme Soviet?

[Kelam] No, of course not.

[Podvezko] Can you cite specific examples?

[Kelam] During the debate on the state structure of Estonia in the transitional period we had different opinions on the role of the Supreme Soviet and the Citizens' Congress. But we have the same principled goal—restoration of the Estonian republic. Only the methods are different.

[Podvezko] Your way of restoring independence deprives a considerable proportion of the population of the right to participate in determination of a future Estonia, their own future ultimately. Does it not seem to you that by thus correcting the injustice done to Estonians at one time you are yourself inflicting another?

[Kelam] No. The people who came here after the war were willy-nilly the instrument of the Center's colonial policy. And now they must recognize their own legal position. With the best will in the world we cannot now grant them all citizenship. Only the legitimate organs of the Estonian republic have the right to do that. When those organs have been created, then everyone will be able to choose: become a citizen of the Estonian republic and renounce Union citizenship, or live in Estonia as a citizen of the USSR, or leave the republic. The rights of the latter two categories of people, including material compensation in the event they leave, should be guaranteed by treaty between the republic and Union governments.

We attach great importance to acts that show good will toward the Estonian republic. What I have in mind is

applications for the granting of citizenship. And we shall do everything possible to enable these people to be granted citizenship.

[Podvezko] Similar proposals were made long ago, but up to now no legislative enactments regulating the legal position of non-indigenous inhabitants have been adopted. And people no longer believe just words. Why is this, do you think?

[Kelam] The reason why no enactments have been adopted on citizenship is clear: It is first necessary to reconstitute a legal power that will be able to make such decisions.

As far as mistrust is concerned... About 12 to 15 percent of the Russian-speaking population in the republic is sympathetic toward an independent Estonian Republic, and about the same number oppose it. But the main mass of people are simply uninformed and are prisoners of rumor. Why? You should first and foremost ask this of yourself?

[Podvezko] It seems to me that you are underestimating the "Russian" question. There certainly is distrust. It results, in particular, from the fact that up to now one thing is announced openly, but then it turns out that it means something quite different. For example, not so long ago it was being said at the highest levels in the republic that Estonia was not about to leave the Union, but now full state independence is being proclaimed. You can hardly call this direct and honest, can you?...

[Kelam] You should direct your question to the Supreme Soviet, the government, and the Estonian Communist Party, and certain People's Front leaders. As far as the Party of Estonian National Independence, the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments, and other independent organizations are concerned, they have always stated their aims honestly and openly.

[Podvezko] Much has been said about the reasons for the distrust among the Russian-speaking population, and for a long time. Nevertheless, in the matter of restoring the Estonian republic you cannot get by without the support, or at least "neutrality" of the Russian-speaking population. How do you intend to resolve this problem?

[Kelam] We are prepared to establish contacts with Intermovement, the United Council of Labor Collectives, and other organizations that express the opinion of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. And I think that we would be able to find a common language on the basis of developing true political pluralism in freeing the enterprises from the diktat of the departments, and cultural autonomy for the national minorities living in Estonia.

[Podvezko] Are you capable of compromise?

[Kelam] Politics is always a path of compromise. But given this, there is some basis that should not be forsaken. For Estonia this is legality and the need to restore the Estonian republic. If the negotiating sides take this as a basis then all technical issues can be discussed.

[Podvezko] But specifically, is it possible, from your standpoint, to hold a referendum on restoration of an independent Estonian state?

[Kelam] Under what conditions? After the Anschluss in Austria Hitler also held a "referendum"...

[Podvezko] Let us assume that Gorbachev moves to withdraw troops from Estonia.

[Kelam] When the troops have been withdrawn and Moscow recognizes the independent Estonian state, then I think we shall be in a condition to hold a referendum if we deem it necessary.

[Podvezko] But then, on what?

[Podvezko] At least on the question of Estonia's inclusion as part of the Union...

[Podvezko] What issues will be discussed at the Estonian Congress session on 25 May?

[Kelam] An assessment will be made there of the activity of the Estonian Supreme Soviet and the legislative enactments that it has recently adopted and the draft legislation that is now being worked on there. In addition the Congress is to discuss questions relating to granting citizenship of the Estonian republic.

Estonian Committee Chairman on Legislative Power

LD0506190690

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1100 GMT on 30 May in its "Antenna" program carries a 45-minute studio discussion among several members of the Estonian Committee, some of whom live permanently abroad, about the Estonian Committee's relationship with the Supreme Soviet.

Presenter Tiit Sinissaar says that much confusion has been created among the population by the new legislative powers which the Estonian Congress—whose body the Estonian Committee is—handed to the committee on 25 May. Sinissaar asks somebody to elaborate. Tunne Kelam, chairman of the Estonian Committee, explains: "So, as said, no establishment in Estonia enjoys legal power upon this territory which continues to be under the power of Soviet occupational forces. As far as the legislative rights of the Estonian Congress are concerned—because the issue mainly concerns these—then the resolution regarding the foundation rules for government during the transitional period, Article 2, says that the Estonian Congress charges the Estonian Committee with the task of elaborating and implementing temporary laws which are extremely necessary to restore in Estonia the constitutional state power on the basis of the legal continuation of the Republic of Estonia. This is the same as was agreed in principle with the Supreme Soviet

too, namely the division of roles, and the Estonian Congres has not taken upon itself any unlawful credentials; it possessed its credentials from the very beginning, right from when it was being elected. The issue now is that as those credentials have been called into question so seriously by the opposing side, they had to be highlighted at this moment, as the Estonian Congress is capable of action in the following fields which has been recognized by the Supreme Soviet: namely citizenship, the legal status of the Republic of Estonia, defining the latter, and foreign relations. so, to enable it to fulfill its role, the Estonian Committee had to be awarded credentials by the Estonian congress, credentials of this kind specifically. Yet, as we said, the Estonian Congress has had these credentials from the beginning. In principle no changes have occurred here."

Illar Hallaste, also Supreme Soviet deputy, says: "I would like to add another factor here. The Supreme Soviet, too, has acted as if it recognized the Estonian congress from the beginning as the restorer of the constitutional state power of the Republic of Estonia. This was clearly spelled out in the Supreme Soviet's 30 March resolution. In addition to this, the Supreme Soviet discussed very thoroughly how these roles should be divided—that is the functions and fields—between the two; that is, what each body should do. The resolutions of the first Estonian congress spelled out clearly that the Supreme Soviet deals with the organization of the normal functioning of civilian life, while the Estonian Congress deals with the issues connected with statehood."

Various complaints and grievances are discussed briefly, in connection with the roles of the Estonian Committee and the Supreme Soviet. The Estonian Government delegation's recent visit to Sweden went totally unannounced until the delegation was already in Sweden. similarly, important Estonian officials visiting the United States do not define the role on their visit and do not coordinate enough. The government seems to be on the point of granting citizenship to practically everybody in Estonia while the issue does not even fall under its jurisdiction and would cause problems later with over a million relatives who could also put in a claim for citizenship. There is also criticism of Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar personally as he does not turn up at Estonian Committee meetings.

Illar Hallaste says the following about the 8 May Supreme Soviet Law which changed the name of the republic from the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Republic of Estonia. "I think that the biggest danger here is not the exacerbation of ethnic tensions because ethnic tensions almost do not exist; what do exist are various political groupings which endeavor to exploit ethnic tensions. That is the first thing. The danger indeed lies in the fact that at present it is called the government of Republic of Estonia, the Supreme Soviet of Republic of Estonia, the laws of the republic of Estonia, and soon there will be citizens of the Republic of Estonia—we used to call them citizens of the Republic of Estonia previously too, but all of a sudden it will become unclear; that is, we will no longer understand which Republic of Estonia is being talked about. Is it this Republic of Estonia which was established in 1918 and which we want to restore, and have we already arrived at this republic or not yet, and when will we arrive? This has been clearly explained by both the Supreme Soviet and the Estonian Congress but among the population misunderstandings may arise and in this sense the renaming was dangerous." Hallaste admits though that the Supreme Soviet was forced to rename Estonia because Latvia and Lithuania had already done so.

Latvian Premier Interviewed on Baltic Independence

AU0506164090 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 4 Jun 90 pp 150-152

[Unattributed interview with Latvian Premier Ivars Godmanis; place and date not given: "There Is More Discipline in Our Country"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Premier, Baltic politicians have great expectations of Boris Yeltsin, the new chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Do you share this view?

[Godmanis] Yeltsin has often stressed that he is on the side of the people, and that every people has a right to its independence, and this also applies to the Baltic republics. We hope that he really means what he says. We might soon find this out.

[DER SPIEGEL] How do you want to put Latvia's independence into practice, for instance in the economy, which is dominated by Moscow?

[Godmanis] Today we do not have any influence at all on the many production enterprises, which are directly guided by the center. Our parliament may pass economic laws and we may try to enforce them, but if the managements of these enterprises so wish, they may ignore everything and then nothing works.

[DER SPIEGEL] What do you want to do about this?

[Godmanis] We have to convince Moscow that three independent Baltic states would be of great benefit to the Soviet Union—in the same way as independent Finland is of benefit to the Soviets today.

[DER SPIEGEL] Which benefits are these?

[Godmanis] Very close relations between the Baltic states and the Soviet Union are to continue. But in an independent Latvia we could for the first time raise the production of our agricultural and industrial sectors—also to the benefit of the Union. Now there is already a great difference between the Baltic states and other republics. In our country there is more discipline. In 1988 we were practically the only ones to fulfill the economic plan targets by almost 100 percent.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is this not one more reason for Moscow not to permit the Baltic states to secede?

[Godmanis] If Moscow refuses to negotiate, the next crisis is already programmed. Then Parliament will pass new laws, particularly in the area of the economy, as if Moscow were not there. And this not only applies to Latvia, but also to Estonia and Lithuania.

[DER SPIEGEL] In contrast to the Lithuanian declaration of independence, the Latvian declaration of independence recognizes the existing links with the Soviet Union for a transitional period. Does this conciliatory attitude not prejudice the importance of your paper?

[Godmanis] In practice the declarations of the three Baltic republics are aimed at the same goal: the reestablishment of our independence. We never signed the Union treaty. This distinguishes us from the other Union republics and gives us a claim under international law.

[DER SPIEGEL] A right that is not suable or enforceable by law remains just paper.

[Godmanis] Indeed, our statements would have only rhetoric value if nothing were moving and changing in other parts of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union is not an organically grown state, but a collection of various peoples with different cultures, experiences of democracy, and economic development. This gigantic empire has always been organized as a bulwark against enemies from the outside, who allegedly might have attacked at any minute. Today we have a different situation. Moscow has difficulties in finding an enemy at all.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Union cannot be cohesive without an enemy image?

[Godmanis] In any case, the economic conditions have changed. So far, we have had a command economy, that is, practically a war economy. Moscow sent orders to the periphery, and these orders had to be obeyed. Such an economy may work to a certain extent; however, a modern economy cannot be centrally organized. It is unimportant whether the planners in Moscow are top people, which they never were, or whether Gorbachev hires advisers in Western Europe or in the United States: The centrally organized command economy is dead.

[DER SPIEGEL] This insight has probably also gained ground in Moscow. Nevertheless, the Kremlin has difficulties in delegating powers for decisionmaking. What makes you hope that it will give in?

[Godmanis] In the end, there is only one way out of the economic chaos and the nationality conflicts: Moscow must decentralize. We consider the unavoidable process of decentralization as the opportunity to regain our independence.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, do you hesitate to cancel the links with Moscow all at once?

[Godmanis] We are a small people with not even 3 million citizens. It is not quite so easy to face up to a giant.

[DER SPIEGEL] Lithuania has 1 million more inhabitants and was more courageous in this respect.

[Godmanis] We have repeatedly asked ourselves whether the Lithuanian declaration of sovereignty of 11 March might have been a mistake. But it provided the Estonians and us Latvians with a platform for our own declarations of independence. On principle, we all agree with the Lithuanian declaration of sovereignty, but in practice we want to pursue a slightly different path. In the meantime the Lithuanian Parliament has adopted laws which cannot be enforced at the moment. We want to negotiate specific steps with Moscow for the transitional phase. This is the small difference between Latvia and Lithuania.

[DER SPIEGEL] Latvia has always been more restrained concerning Moscow than Lithuania and Estonia. Why?

[Godmanis] The developments in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia were very different. In a show trial in 1959 about 2,00 Latvian Communists, patriots of the republic, were driven from their jobs in Latvia. They were replaced by Russians, but also by Latvians who had lived in Russia as refugees since World War I. The result: The opposition against independence today mainly consists of these officials from the administration, in particular from the nomenklatura, who were put into the state apparatus at that time. They have a strong position in the ministries, city administrations, and production enterprises.

[DER SPIEGEL] Has the Latvian restraint in dealing with Moscow paid off for you?

[Godmanis] So far one cannot say this. The first secretary of the Latvian Communists, who are loyal to Moscow, has already threatened to form a counter government. This would certainly put us in a bad situation, because then Moscow could say: "Which role does your government actually play? Do you not have anything under control?"

[DER SPIEGEL] Why can you not be patient until something changes within the Soviet Union?

[Godmanis] If we wait for this, it will certainly be too late again. Furthermore, no one knows what is going to happen in this nonhomogeneous state conglomerate when a market economy is introduced or whether it will be introduced at all. We want to prove in our country that the market economy can be implemented. Most Russians here know this very well and restrain their opposition, because we also want to achieve this for their benefit.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Latvian capital, Riga, is practically surrounded by the Soviet military. Here is the supreme command of the Baltic Military District. Are you afraid of the soldiers?

[Godmanis] They are a serious problem. The relations between the Baltic garrison and the Parliament and the Latvian Government have never been regulated; there has never been a body responsible for them, only a "War Council"—the name is typical. It comprised the first secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia and the leading staff of the garrison. This War Council has not been anchored in the Constitution at all.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, the soldiers who are serving here for two years have even participated in the elections. Is there a legal basis for this?

[Godmanis] This was incredible. I cannot, for instance, imagine that the Americans who are stationed in the FRG are permitted to participate in elections there.

[DER SPIEGEL] How do you want to regulate the relationship?

[Godmanis] One cannot talk with the generals about this; they are only obeying orders from Moscow. In our view, the Soviet Armed Forces here should, at most, have the same rights which come from their being stationed here as the American troops have in the FRG.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is this an offer of a compromise to Moscow? After all, you could demand the withdrawal of the troops.

[Godmanis] We will have to accept the stationing of Soviet troops; they cannot disappear from one day to the next.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are there signs that Moscow is ready for negotiations?

[Godmanis] So far the talks in Moscow were one-sided events. We presented our proposals, the other side listened and vaguely murmured something about a special status for us, perhaps in a confederation. But we never received an official offer, and this is also not included in the new laws on the distribution of powers between the Union and the republics. The Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians now have to coordinated their concepts with each other, because individually the Baltic states do not have enough weight. Then, hopefully, Moscow will hold serious talks with us.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you have the impression that Gorbachev understands the Baltic efforts for independence at all?

[Godmanis] I am convinced of this, because he is an extraordinary politician. He understands this very well. He knows that it is not the work of extremists. Our parliament voted with more than a two-thirds majority for the declaration of independence.

[DER SPIEGEL] The powers of the new office of Soviet president have given Gorbachev the right to make the Baltic states directly subordinate to him, to dispose the elected president and premier, and to dissolve the parliaments. Do you fear that he will use his rights?

[Godmanis] This would mean a farewell to democracy, which would then not be worth anything anymore. With this Gorbachev has set himself a limit even in Lithuania.

[DER SPIEGEL] Might there be a civil war?

[Godmanis] The Russians, many of whom live on the periphery of the republics—here in Latvia, for instance, they constitute more than 40 percent of the population—have never started a war against other nations. Russia itself has had bitter experiences; in the 1918-1922 civil war millions of people died. During the purges in 1937 Stalin had innumerable people massacred. During World War II millions of Russians died. I am convinced that the Russians have had enough of civil wars. On the other hand: The Latvians as well as the Lithuanians and Estonians have had enough experience with democracy, particularly the older generation. This means that our peoples cannot and do not want to accept extremism.

[DER SPIEGEL] Which help do you expect from the West?

[Godmanis] The Western states claim to be true democracies—so they have to put themselves on the side of the democrats in our country. We have held democratic elections in the Baltic states; the deputies declared independence and elected the governments they trust. This is normal, concrete democracy.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why, do you think, has the West still not recognized this?

[Godmanis] Because of opportunism, of course. It is pointed out that much more depends on the development in Russia and on Gorbachev's fate than on democracy by the Baltic Sea. This is correct, but it still is opportunism.

[DER SPIEGEL] If Moscow were to offer full economic autonomy to Latvia, would you be willing to belong to the Soviet Union within the framework of a loose confederation?

[Godmanis] Moscow has never spared beautiful words. Last year we struggled for economic autonomy; the USSR Council of Ministers explained how this autonomy should be implemented in practice, but the project was shelved. Today we do not even have our bank assets anymore; they were put under Moscow's control. Verbally, Moscow has granted us new rights, but in reality we have been deprived of important rights.

[DER SPIEGEL] On principle could Latvia agree to a confederation?

[Godmanis] A true confederation can develop only out of the joining of independent, free states which voluntarily want to participate in the confederation. Therefore, it is important first of all that we again become masters in our own house.

Godmanis Addresses 4 Jun Latvian Supreme Soviet

LD0506110790 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0903 GMT 4 Jun 90

[Speech by Ivars Godmanis, chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers from live relay of Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga]

[Text] Highly esteemed chairman, esteemed deputies, please examine very carefully this question. I ask you to discuss it and state your views on it, particularly after the experience that we have acquired about the situation in Latvia.

I would like to talk about the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As you know, some time ago we discussed a possible candidate for the post of minister of internal affairs. I also had a conversation with this candidate, the esteemed Viktors Skudra, and as you recall he gave his assent. We did not resolve this matter at the time, apparently for purely procedural reasons.

However, as it turned out, it was not at all a procedural matter. Quite different issues become involved in this question. As we saw at times from the situation in the republic, things were very tense, including in Riga to some extent.

I would like to express two viewpoints. One viewpoint, which is obviously relevant, is a very serious matter in connection with internal affairs in these circumstances. After all, this affects all aspects of our life much more than is probably apparent to us at first sight. And here, undoubtedly, it is necessary to take into account the actual situation, which is that the internal affairs system was a unified system throughout the USSR and to some extent this generally remains the case.

In addition to this question, we very carefully analyzed a range of attitudes connected with the internal affairs situation and in a number of its sectors—particularly the mood among a number of internal affairs personnel. We also discussed with the esteemed Viktors Skudra how we should proceed in future.

I would like to tell you that, in time of rapid political changes, the seriousness of the situation escalates dramatically in respect of crime and of public order in the country. Unfortunately, statistical data indicate that in the republic, too, these political changes could be used as a cover for wholly criminal activities, from organized crime, including racketeering, to simple breaches of law and order.

This in turn shows an obvious link with an internal affairs system that developed in isolation to a certain extent; one could almost say that it developed separately from the external forms of social relations. We cannot describe this internal affairs situation as other than very closed and cut off from our society.

At the same time, it transpires that this situation must also be very closely linked with the law-governed state, as we say. It is precisely here that the role and significance of the justice ministry are increased in importance. Therefore, by analyzing the situation and having consultations with the leaders of the internal affairs system—and not only with them, but also at the justice ministry—we decided, we concluded that we must strengthen as much as possible both those government departments, losing in neither one nor the other their professionalism and hoping in future for very constructive and creative cooperation between them.

There is no doubt that the Internal Affairs Department has very special characteristics; therefore, I shall also obviously request the first deputy minister of internal affairs, if he is confirmed, to give an accurate report at the earliest opportunity at one of these sessions, on the structure and concept of internal affairs and how it could develop on the basis of openness.

Unfortunately, we must recognize that we have had the situation in which the internal affairs system has gone in one direction while society to some extent has gone in another. Such a system is not normal and can only cause a collision. To avoid this happening, I would like both these departments to work effectively and I request that the proposal be viewed in context, because tomorrow I would also like to propose to you the candidate for the position of justice minister. In consultation, I would also like to propose to you the candidate for the post of minister of internal affairs.

I expect immediate questions from the opposition, although not entirely from the opposition, but also from people involved in internal affairs, of which there are some specialists among the opposition deputies. To what extent has the question been coordinated at the all-union ministry of internal affairs? I can tell you that a week and a half ago I had a meeting with USSR Internal Affairs Minister Bakatin, at which we talked very seriously for about an hour about the situation in general in the USSR, and especially in the Caucusus.

We discussed how the situation is developing here in Latvia and how the center views the internal affairs situation in Latvia. I also informed him about the tension and excesses on 15 May, in connection with which the procuracy is still carrying out work.

We arrived at one conclusion: we must do everything to absolutely guarantee public and social order, notwithstanding the political manifestations and changes which remain to be tackled here in parliament. This means that politics, in this case, must not be a cause of absolute disruptions of order, in both the good and the bad sense. We already have sufficient bad examples of this.

While talking with the minister of internal affairs I also stated that the situation in Latvia obviously requires the inheritance of a certain situation, by which I mean that the people who work there should have had a good reputation in the Latvian internal affairs system, should

have much experience, and be known by the Riga militia, which has its own special characteristics, and by the internal affairs personnel in rural areas. And we must ensure by whatever means that the whole of society—regardless of political opinions or its views on internal affairs—is assured that these political changes and political struggles—in inverted commas— will not in any way impact on public order or on law and order in general.

This is the view that I arrived at with the minister of internal affairs. I also set out my proposals concerning the candidacies. I coordinated this candidacy with Viktors Skudra, taking the view that his continued work at the justice ministry would obviously be most productive. So perhaps you will allow me to voice by opinion on this tomorrow.

In this situation, there cannot be a token figure at the ministry of internal affairs; the ministry must have a minister who is a full member of the government, who participates in government meetings, and from whom government members can demand a full account of the law and order situation as well as reports which, bearing in mind the specific nature of the ministry of internal affairs, also go outside the republic.

Therefore, in consultation with interested parties, I would like to nominate for discussion by you the candidate for the post of minister of internal affairs. He is a member of the ministry of internal affairs collegium and a colonel of militia, who has worked in the internal affairs system since 1957—you have all this in your notes. In particular, he has worked recently in the department for protecting state property and combating speculation. This is especially important right now, as you know the situation at Ciekurkalns and Rumbula in Riga, which must be radically changed.

So, taking into account the necessity for this openness in the internal affairs system and so as to make the changeover to a people's police when the formation of a municipal police force is being considered, I would like to nominate to you for discussion, I would very much request that you support by candidate: Aloizs Vaznis. And I request that Mr Vaznis address you. I request very seriously that his candidacy be discussed. Perhaps here it would be possible to go less into certain political tensions and more to ascertain to what extent the candidate would be capable of stabilizing and consolidating the public order and internal affairs situation here in Latvia.

Latvian Communist Party Unity Dialogue Thwarted

WA1506201290 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 2 Jun 90 p 1

[Report by the Press Center of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee: "A 'Roundtable' Meeting"]

[Text] The Bureau of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee believes that it is important in principle to carry on a dialogue with other parties and public movements on the most significant issues of current life, regarding this as one of the guarantees of ensuring civil accord in our society. In conjunction with this it approached various parties and public entities with a proposal to hold a meeting with the leaders of these organizations. Such a meeting was held on 1 June in the conference hall of the Hotel "Latvia." It was chaired by A. Rubiks, first secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee.

Leaders of a number of major sociopolitical forces, such as the Environmental Protection Club, the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] United Council of Labor Collectives, and the Republic Council of War and Labor Veterans, responded to the invitation to a dialogue.

The discussion focused on the issues of developing unified principles for actions to settle interethnic relations in the republic, as well as coordinated measures on the key issues of the development of rural areas and in the area of ecology.

The following episode testifies that such meetings are extremely useful for establishing relations with partners and for creating a healthy moral-political climate in society, and are helpful in shifting the focus of attention from politics to specific everyday problems. Referring in his speech to the significance of ecological problems, in the course of solving which people forget their ethnic affiliation and differences in political convictions, President of the Environmental Protection Club A. Ulme shared in particular his concern about the fate of the "green" library. Its 10,000 volumes arrived from California as a gift, and at present premises to preserve the library cannot be found. A. Rubiks, first secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee, made a specific suggestion right away: A cutback in the party apparatus is under way, rooms are being vacated, and the issue will be resolved within days.

Participants in the meeting came to the common opinion that "roundtable" dialogues need to be continued. Such contacts should not be restricted to exchanging views. They should provide the foundation for making constructive decisions and appealing to the populace for mobilization with a view to solving the issues of concern. Proposals to invite representatives of the army and members of the clergy to the next meeting were accepted.

Unfortunately the meeting did not proceed without a conflict. At the very beginning of the meeting a delegation of the Independent Communist Party of Latvia left the hall demonstratively, justifying this by the fact that the organizer of the meeting, the Communist Party of Latvia, does not recognize the Declaration on the Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia adopted by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet on 4 May of this year. The Independent Communist Party of Latvia leaders also believe that such meetings should be held under the organizational auspices of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia. Participants in the meetings denounced actions of this nature, stressing that they fail to testify to striving for a dialogue and partnership with various

political and public forces which the Independent Latvian Communist Party calls for verbally. Who is going to set an example in creating civil accord if not the parties?

It was agreed to hold yet another meeting in late June.

[Signed] Press Center of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee

Latvian Party Fights Press Ownership Decree

90UN2089B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 2 Jun 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee"]

[Text] The issue of the stance toward the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet resolution "On Returning to the Republic of Latvia the Illegally Appropriated Property of the Newspaper and Magazine Publishing House" was considered at a meeting of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Bureau.

As is known, the above resolution adopted 30 May of this year maintains that the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee has no ownership rights to its own newspaper and magazine publishing house because the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee's actions in appropriating it from the state at the time were allegedly illegal.

The Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Bureau viewed the very fact of the adoption of the resolution by the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet on 30 May of this year as a violation of procedures set forth in the Constitutions of the USSR and the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], under which all issues of ownership are resolved by the courts and arbitration bodies on the basis of pleading by the parties and a comprehensive study of the evidence rather than by a parliamentary act, as in this case. It was stressed that the main laws of the country and the republic impose on the state authorities as represented by the parliament the duty to play a directly opposite role—to defend property which may be owned both by enterprises and public organizations, including the Communist Party. This is why the actions of the majority in the Supreme Soviet of the republic may only be classified as a most flagrant disregard of the ultimate foundation of building any civilized rule-of-law society which is based on respecting the right of ownership. The Bureau supported the position of the "Equal Rights" parliamentary faction of the Communist Party of Latvia with regard to the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet resolution adopted on 30 May of this year and its evaluation of such actions as acts of arbitrariness and expropriation disregarding the elementary norms of democracy and as yet another episode of blatant persecution of the Communist Party of Latvia. Apparently, having forced the parliament to assume the functions of the courts, the parliamentary majority has abandoned the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] program planks on the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

A memorandum on the history was read at the meeting, which makes it possible to understand better the unsoundness of declarations on the illegality of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee's ownership of its assets. Thus, until July 1965 the publication of Communist Party of Latvia newspapers was carried out through the "Zvaigzne" newspaper and magazine publishing house, which reported to the Main Administration of the Newspaper and Magazine Publishing Houses of the USSR Council of Ministers Committee for the Press. Later the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Presidium adopted a resolution on creating a party publishing house on the initiative of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers State Committee for the Press. By virtue of this decision, the entire "Zvaigzne" Publishing House was transferred to the assets of the party. However, the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs agreed to incorporate into party assets only nine republic newspapers, one city newspaper, and 15 magazines. Therefore, the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Publishing House "Zvaigzne," which belonged to the USSR State Committee for the Press organization and simultaneously reported to the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee, began its operations on 1 July 1965. By an order of the USSR Council of Ministers dated 10 February 1967, the Main Administration of Newspaper and Magazine Publishing Houses was abolished, due to which the Newspaper and Magazine Publishing House came to report entirely to the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee and the Production Department of Party Publishing Houses of the CPSU Central Committee which was set up.

In 1967 transportation vehicles, equipment, and other main assets of the publishing house worth a total of 231,600 rubles were incorporated into the assets of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee. No buildings, structures, premises, or production capacities were absorbed into the assets of the party. At the time the publishing house did not have its own printing plant. The Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Publishing House continued to remit funds to the proper state organizations and publishing houses for the renting of space and use of printing capacities.

In 1967 the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Publishing House proposed to create its own printing facilities. It was guided primarily by the interests of journalists' collectives, which experienced considerable difficulties with the production of publications due to worn-out material and technical facilities of State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade printing plants and considerable distances between themselves and editorial premises, which were not quite adequately equipped for creative work either. Thus absolutely new material and technical facilities for the Communist Party of Latvia Newspaper and Magazine Publishing House were created with CPSU

budget funds in 1969 through 1978 on parcels of land allocated in the present-day Leningradskiy Rayon of the city of Riga. The CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs invested 25.3 million rubles in construction. With these funds the publishing house printing plant was built, machinery and equipment purchased, buildings, structures, and warehouses erected, and residential buildings for employees of the publishing house were built with partial contributions. After construction was finished, the renting of space belonging to the city executive committee where the editorial offices of newspapers and magazines were located (5,653.95 square meters) was discontinued.

The Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Bureau resolved to approach the USSR Supreme Soviet with a request to review the legality of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet resolution dated 30 May of this year. It also resolved to advise the CPSU Central Committee of this issue.

The Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Bureau also recognized the credentials of the Preylskiy Rayon Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia elected by a meeting of representatives of Communists of the rayon party organizations, and confirmed the decision of this meeting on the election of the first secretary of the party committee.

In conjunction with the fact that the Jurmala City Committee of the party does not have its own publication and in keeping with the resolutions of the Third Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Plenum, the Central Committee Bureau adopted a resolution on a Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee newspaper in the city of Jurmala.

A resolution on the convocation of the Fourth Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Plenum on 6 July of this year was adopted at the meeting. The materials of the next meeting of the 25th Latvia Communist Party Congress will be submitted for consideration by the plenum.

The Central Committee Bureau discussed the issue of the structure of the city and rayon committees of the party. It was noted that the party committees are radically changing the forms and methods of work in a complicated political environment and imparting to them qualitative content that is new in principle and based on analysis and forecasting of the decisions made, and on invigoration of activities in the lower echelons of the party while at the same time providing for reducing their apparatuses by 20 to 50 percent. Many party committees have approached designing staff schedules and structures of the apparatuses creatively and have taken into account local peculiarities and conditions in the process. Believing that placing rigid constraints on this process will not facilitate the use of all potential opportunities for the work of the party committees of the republic, the Central Committee Bureau nonetheless considered it necessary to recommend a list of positions of ranking functionaries which could be envisaged in the staff schedules of party committees taking into account feasibility and financial opportunities on a case-by-case basis. This will make it possible to avoid confusion regarding the staff and structure of party committees and will facilitate smoother cooperation with the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee.

Latvian Party Control of Press Termed 'Illegal'

90UN2089A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 2 Jun 90 p 2

["Resolution of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet on Returning to the Republic of Latvia an Illegally Appropriated Property—the Newspaper and Magazine Publishing House"]

[Text] In view of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee's appropriating and taking possession of property belonging to the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, the state newspaper and magazine publishing house, in the period between 1 June 1965 and 21 March 1967 without legal basis and proceeding from a CPSU Central Committee resolution, the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To find the actions of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee in appropriating and establishing operational management on property belonging to the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, the state newspaper and magazine publishing house, illegal and not resulting in the right of ownership of this publishing house for either the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee or the CPSU Central Committee.

2. To instruct the Republic of Latvia Council of Ministers:

1) to take possession of the publishing house referred to in point 1 of the present resolution as state property and ensure its management according to procedures envisaged by the law;

2) to resolve the issue of freezing profits transferred to the budget of the CPSU Central Committee and the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee.

3. To instruct the Republic of Latvia Council of Ministers to ensure, in keeping with procedures envisaged in the legislation, indemnification by the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee for all losses caused to the Republic of Latvia due to the illegal actions of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee.

[Signed] A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet
I. Daudis, secretary of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet
Riga, 30 May 1990 VM/collier 15/1530z jun

Latvian Parliament Debates Press Decree

90UN2089C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 2 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA parliamentary correspondent E. Lapidus: "Interpretations of Expropriation, or the House of the Press in the Limelight"]

[Text] So, monetary "compensation" for people's deputies of the republic has been determined.

I will recount what has been going on because for some reason this plenary session was not broadcast live on the radio. The monthly salary of deputies will be 650 rubles. Besides this, all of them will be entitled to another 200 rubles for representation expenses, and no taxes will be levied on this bonus.

In addition the Supreme Soviet chairman will receive another 500 rubles, his first deputy 300 rubles, and deputies and the secretary 250 rubles a month. Chairmen of the permanent commissions and their deputies and secretaries are also included in the category of those with increased pay.

Here are the privileges which the elected representatives of the people will be given. Deputies will be able to use free of charge all types of public transportation, with the exception of taxicabs. Official apartments will be provided for deputies residing outside the capital of the republic.

The session adopted Regulations on the Status of Aide-Secretaries to people's deputies after a quite protracted debate, in its third reading. Two hundred rubles a month have been allocated for maintaining an aide.

Well, remunerations for the labor of the members of parliament set with a large margin of safety, apparently in view of the runaway cost of living, makes it possible for them not only to say goodbye to their former jobs—obviously, many of them will do so—but also to work for the good of the electorate vigorously and, most importantly, fruitfully.

A resolution on the Republic Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting was considered and adopted on Tuesday 29 May in the afternoon without special discussion and arguments. The committee now reports to the Supreme Soviet (previously, it was under the Council of Ministers), and its chairman is confirmed by parliament.

In a word, Tuesday began generally on a quiet note and, likewise, ended in melancholy. The deputies were either recovering after the difficulties of Monday or saving their energy for the battles to come on Wednesday...

Perhaps many people remember the outrage and the bitter accounts (oral and written) given by the USSR people's deputies from Latvia concerning the nonconstructive attitude of "an overwhelming majority" at the congresses and sessions of the Supreme Soviet of our country. A great many poisoned arrows were slung at those who, in the opinion of our deputies, definitely ignored dissent if not muffled it in a very way possible.

By now a number of members of parliament have come to belong to the majority category rather than a minority, to be sure, in the republic parliament. Moreover, they have come to head the Supreme Soviet.

They say that after you have happened to be in someone else's shoes you begin to understand him better. However, who will dare to prove that this popular maxim is universal? At any rate, deputies of the "Equal Rights" faction will not. On Wednesday 30 May the majority showed them graphically yet again that a minority is what it is, and there is no point in taking its opinion into account on fundamental issues.

Two permanent commissions—for legislative issues and for people's power and public affairs—presented to the parliament on 30 May the draft resolution "On Returning to the Republic of Latvia the Illegally Appropriated Property of the Newspaper and Magazine Publishing Houses."

At issue is the resolution on the House of the Press in which the Publishing House of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee and the editorial offices of many newspapers and magazines, including those of the party, are located.

The initial position of the majority faction representing in the parliament the interests of the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] was: "Between 1 June 1965 and 21 March 1967 the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee appropriated and took possession of a property of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, the state newspaper and magazine publishing house, with no legal foundation, proceeding from a resolution of the CPSU Central Committee" (I am quoting from the draft resolution).

Apparently, it is necessary to clarify this. As is known the House of the Press was built in Riga in the 1970's, and principal funding for its construction came from the party coffers. All the premises which the publishing house of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee occupied in the 1960's have long been transferred to the city.

As soon as J. Skapar, chairman of one of the commissions preparing this issue for consideration at the plenary session, "stated certain considerations," as he put it, he was caught in the crossfire of opposition deputies.

I will quote just some of the questions: "Which specific illegal actions did the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee allow to occur in 1965 and 1967?"; "What law in effect is meant when at issue is appropriating the publishing house as state property?"; "How much did Latvia invest in building the House of the Press, and how much did the CPSU Central Committee?"; "We are discussing CPSU Central Committee property. On what grounds can someone else's property

be expropriated?"; "Under the law, only a court can resolve this issue. Would it not be better to refer this case to court?"; "Mere verbal assertions by J. Skapar are not enough. Documents and economic calculations are needed. Where are they?"; "In the 1960's there was the newspaper and magazine publishing house 'Zvaigzne.' On the suggestion of the republic State Committee for the Press, it was transferred to the CPSU Central Committee. What is so illegal about that?"

However, in essence, the deputies did not get to hear a single coherent answer from either J. Skapar or an attorney who came to his aid. For the most part arguments were replaced by emotions and political pronouncements. Even if arguments went beyond them, it sounded more or less like this, as one of the parliamentarians stated elegantly: "They stole a small piglet. The piglet has now grown up, but it still has to be given back."

The speech by the leader of the "Equal Rights" faction S. Dimanis was perhaps the most balanced and convincing. He said that taking liberties with someone else's property never does any good, that actually it is not being returned to the people but is rather being appropriated by the new authorities, the NFL.

Warning that the action of expropriating the House of the Press will cause a new cycle of tension in relations with Moscow, the opposition proposed not to resolve the issue hastily, to set up a commission, search the archives, find and examine pertinent documents, refer the case to the courts, and, finally, sit down at the negotiating table with the CPSU Central Committee.

The idea of converting the publishing house into a joint-stock company in which the controlling share (51 percent) will belong to Latvia turned out to elicit some response even from the majority camp.

However, for the most part the refrain of the responses was: "We should take away... We should expropriate... We should..."

Of course, had there been good will it would not have been all that difficult to work out a compromise variant of the many proposals.

However, the start-up of the proven voting system, the reliability of which is guaranteed by strict discipline prevailing in the ranks of the majority, immediately reduced the variety of opinions to the same denominator—the draft decision prepared in advance.

Specifically, the resolution adopted instructs the Council of Ministers of the republic to transfer the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Publishing House to state ownership, ensure the management of it, and resolve the issue of freezing profits transferred by the publishing house to the CPSU Central Committee budget.

Are major changes in store for the House of the Press?..

Latvian Security Official Outlines Candidacy

LD0506113990 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0914 GMT 4 Jun 90

[Speech by Colonel of Militia Aloizs Vaznis at Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga—live]

[Excerpts] Esteemed chairman, esteemed deputies. I am very well aware that the position of internal affairs minister, for which you will be discussing my candidacy, is especially difficult and responsible at this time of extreme political and economic complexity. Disregarding the fact that in 1989 crime in the republic reached record levels, in five months of this year recorded crimes again increased by 20 percent. We are not yet half-way through the year, but already almost 19,000 crimes have been reported. Of this number, 71 were murders, 157 were cases of serious assault, 145 armed robberies, 600 unarmed robberies, 7,500 larcenies, and a number of other crimes.

The clean-up rate for crime in tyhe republic is not much more that 46 percent, which in Riga it stands at 30 percent. The proportion of criminal investigations is even lower—37 percent in the republic and 23 percent in Riga.

We observe expansion of the black economy, corruption, and organized crime, exploiting loopholes in the Soviet law on cooperatives. Road safety is in decline in the republic. [passage omitted]

Although the work load is unusually great for all internal affairs personnel and for all personnel units, there are manning shortages approaching the 1,000 mark—over 990 people. In the present system there is a shortage of more than 80 personnel for inverstigations, 40 district inspectors, and so on and so on. [passage omitted]

There must be a government of the people and a militia of the government. Only then will it be possible to ensure public security and order and a successful struggle against crime. [passage omitted]

Pro-Latvian Movement Leader Interviewed

90UN2033D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 25 May 90 p 3

[Report on 19 May radio interview with Mr. Eduard Berklavs, member of the Duma of the Latvian People's Front, deputy of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, and leader of the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia, by unnamed Latvian radio correspondent: "E. Berklavs: 'This Is Death for the Latvian People in the Future'"]

[Text] **It is planned to hold the third congress of supporters of the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia [DNNL] in Riga tomorrow. It is expected that the congress will revise the DNNL rules and program, and that it will also discuss the situation in the republic and**

determine the course of the future activity of the movement. In this connection, on 19 May Latvian Radio broadcast an interview by its correspondent with Mr. Eduard Berklavs, member of the Duma of the NFL [Latvian People's Front], deputy of the republic's Supreme Soviet, and DNNL leader, who, regarding plans of the DNNL, declared in particular:

[Berklavs] I will gladly express myself on this question, because I was an initiator on the board and in the DNNL council, and inasmuch as, apparently, we will remain a movement and not turn into a political party.

Representatives of other nationalities have always lived in Latvia, but no one knows how the situation will develop in the future.

Of course, we must say frankly that we want Latvians to be the predominant majority in Latvia. I do not need an independent Latvia in which the Latvians will be a minority, and I do not see where we would offend the residents of other nationalities, inasmuch as complete equality in the social sphere is stated in all of the programs of the NFL, LSDRP [Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party], and the DNNL. The only thing that we assert is the fact that only a citizen of Latvia can become the owner of real estate. This is the only restriction in the economy, and it is also without restriction according to national indication. There is absolute equality of rights in politics, but I cannot agree with those who said in speeches in the Supreme Soviet that any person living in Latvia at the present time could become a citizen of an independent Latvia without some kind of restrictions. This is death for the Latvian people in the future. Of course restrictions must exist, as happens in all countries of the world. Whether this is a permanent residency qualification or loyalty with respect to the government, to the political system, and to the indigenous nation and its language. And also the property situation as, for example, in the FRG: Whether the newcomer is economically independent, and whether he has capital, or whether it will be necessary to support him fully. As in every normal state, in my opinion, there should be the kinds of prerequisites that differentiate any person from a citizen of this country. We must, nonetheless, achieve through peaceful means, I emphasize, through peaceful means, the kind of situation where the Latvians in Latvia are in a predominant majority.

First, the advantages that representatives of other nationalities in Latvia had up until now should be eliminated. For example, in obtaining apartments and in differences in teaching salaries.

Second, put into effect the decree on restricting migration. I think that it is now possible to talk about a complete ban on the entry of representatives of other nationalities for a place of permanent residence. Because this restriction has not been in effect until now. And as the decree on the state language is not in force, within two years not everyone will know the Latvian language in those regions where the residents of other nationalities constitute a majority. It is apparent that this decree must be put into practice, with a view to compelling each person who wants to live in Latvia to learn the Latvian language.

More about economic means. I heard how Estonians talked about this: Material sacrifices have to be made; that is, material losses have to be compensated to those who want to resettle in a residence back in the motherland (beyond Latvia's borders); for example, the owners of homes and cooperative apartments. Most of all because there was already talk yesterday in the Supreme Soviet of Russia about the fact that they would be interested in this, inasmuch as there are whole oblasts there that are uninhabited. These people must be made mutually interested. In this way, without violence and without forceful methods, it would be possible for the Latvians in Latvia to become a majority once again.

I very much would like everyone to understand that it is not a question here about some kind of an evil inflicted on representatives of other nationalities. It is a question only about truly just and peaceful resolutions, because we in Latvia want nothing more in this scheme than, for example, the Russians in Russia.

FROM THE EDITOR. In publishing these frank statements by E. Berklavs, we ask the readers of SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA to share their opinions with us.

Latvian Fuel Supplies Not Curtailed

90UN2070C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 26 May 90 p 5

[Article by V. Vasilyev: "Readers Ask: 'Why Is There Not Enough Gasoline?'"]

[Text] As was reported to us yesterday in the Latvian republic petroleum products association "Degviyela," there has been no curtailment in fuel deliveries to the republic. For example, the plan for fuel oil deliveries was fulfilled to the level of 111 percent, diesel fuel—108 percent, and gasoline—90 percent. But this too will be completely fulfilled before the end of the month.

No problems arise with respect to state vehicles. Rural areas are also fully provided for—seeding has taken place without any problem and other work is ongoing; vehicles do not stand idle due to fuel shortage. We have seen queuing of private vehicle owners because, as it was explained to us, fuel reserves were stored up for a certain time and then it was decided to issue fuel in just 20-liter amounts—use quotas in the first quarter amounted to 10,000 tons. And now many people wait in line several times, although there is no need to do so, there being a sufficient amount of fuel.

'Nationalist Ambitions' Persist in Lithuania

PM2505120790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by Colonel V. Gavrilenko under the rubric "Lithuania: Political Situation": "Inside and Outside Parliament"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The Lithuanian parliament spent the whole of Tuesday debating the economic situation and an official document on the preconditions for talks between the USSR and Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian parliament deputies had a great deal that was offensive and unjust to say about our country, of course. Incidentally, however, you could also hear worried questions: Where do we go from here? There were sensible proposals for a quest for compromises. Maybe I am wrong, but a proposal for a return to the pre-11 March situation seemed to be in the air, but nobody dare to voice it for fear of being labeled a "traitor to national interests." "Our successors would never forgive us," one deputy stated emotionally. But will they forgive economic collapse and a deterioration in life? Things which should and could have been avoided with a sensible policy.

The discussion of the document on the preconditions for talks between the USSR and Lithuania lasted the whole of the second half of the day. Essentially the debate had just one intention: To demonstrate a desire for talks but leave the 11 March independence act untouched. Here big hopes are being pinned on developments within the Union. It is claimed that the difficult processes in the economy and the social, political, and interethnic sphere will create a backdrop against which the Lithuanian idea of independence can triumph. A great deal is being pinned on the upcoming summit talks between the U.S. and Soviet presidents. Admittedly there is less euphoria vis-a-vis the West European countries. K. Prunskiene's visit showed that Lithuania is not being awaited with open arms there... You would think that these part-fragile, part-abortive hopes would have to make the view of talks with Moscow more sober and realistic. Unfortunately all the indications are that nationalist ambitions are still revered.

What else was memorable from this parliamentary day? The continuing attacks on the Soviet Army. Again there were calls for military units to have their food supplies stopped, their mail services denied them, their electricity and telephone communications cut off... [passage omitted]

In general waiting has become a kind of symbol of Lithuanian life today. What will tomorrow, next week, next month bring? These questions are being asked in street conversations, radio broadcasts, television programs, the newspapers. They are also being asked in parliament. The very place from where answers are also awaited. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian Poles Decide on Autonomy

PM0506130390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent L. Kapelyushnyy: "Lithuania: What Awaits the Polish Diaspora?"]

[Text] Vilnius—A congress of people's deputies of local soviets in the Vilnius district has decided to create a "national territorial-administrative unit" on the basis of rayons where there is a dense Polish population.

This event is extraordinary and its consequences could be of decisive significance in the development of the Lithuanian situation. Without agreeing on what the unit should be called—oblast, kray, or okrug—deputies voted unanimously in favor of it being an integral part of the renewed Soviet federation. As stated in the official documents, this is the position of deputies from Vilnyusskiy and Shalchininkskiy Rayons and also from parts of Shvenchenskiy, Trakayskiy, and Shirvintskiy Rayons. In that case free Lithuania will shrink to its 1939 borders and lose not only square kilometers but also its territorial and ethnic unity.

Anyone who is closely following the development of the Lithuanian situation knows that there is a history to the Polish question. More than a year ago, after the adoption of the Law on the State Language of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], a number of rural soviets declared themselves to be national autonomous formations. An attempt was thereby made to retain their right to use their native language not only in everyday life but also in education and official communications. And although the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium unequivocally deemed this "partisan approach" to be illegal, white and red banners fluttered audaciously in the fresh winds of perestroyka....

Only a short time was to pass before first Shalchininkskiy and then Vilnyusskiy Rayon declared themselves national autonomous formations. The sessions at which these decisions were made not only complained to the republic's government about the rigid structure of the Law on Language but also called it to account for the neglect of the social sphere, the backward economy, and the destruction of the national way of life.

This open rebellion by rayons with a dense Polish population, expressed in the demand for autonomy, on the one hand, had support in the form of the CPSU Platform on the Nationalities Question (at that time Lithuania still recognized the CPSU's authority) and, on the other, it was encouraged by the example of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet itself. Having embarked on the path of disobedience and defiance of the USSR Constitution for the sake of achieving its own national interests and getting away with warnings and admonitions over its blatant disrespect for the law, the republic's Supreme Soviet could apply against the transgressors measures no stricter than deeming their decisions to be

invalid and at odds with the Lithuanian Constitution and the republic's interests. In other words, it reaped as it sowed....

After the new Lithuanian parliament announced the act on Lithuania's independence and secession from the Soviet Union, the Polish diaspora became agitated. Assurances by the "Sajudis" leaders and activists who had come to power that everyone would live in peace and harmony in free and independent Lithuania could not dispel the feeling of fear, alarm, and grievance derived by the Poles from that dark period when "Orthodox Lithuanians" did not stint on harsh words.

What was said at the congress of local soviet deputies? Incidentally, it was the second congress and its delegates summed up the past year's work. First they noted that, other than promises by official circles, no particular changes had been observed. The question of opening a Polish higher school had not been decided. "We so often cite Western democracy as an example that I shall do the same myself," one speaker said. "Britain has far fewer Poles than Lithuania, but it has a Polish university nevertheless. But everyone here tries to prove to us that we do not need such a university ourselves." They said that there are not enough Polish priests. And people wishing to come here from Poland are confronted with the essential condition of being able to speak Lithuanian...

The life and problems of the Polish diaspora are given one-sided coverage by the mass media. The former CZERWONY SZTANDAR, which has been renamed KURIER WILENSKI, has also changed its political orientation. As one speaker pointed out, this newspaper might just as well be published in Lithuanian. Poles do not find their problems reflected in the weekly Lithuanian television broadcast in Polish.

The congress of deputies from Vilnius and the surrounding area [Vilenshchina], like all congresses nowadays, had the overtones of a rally. Unfortunately, one deputy's constructive, very important proposal was lost in the vast array of speeches: Namely, that the future of the district should be decided at last, that this time politicians not decide the fate of the Poles on their behalf on the basis of large and small powers' interests, and that a referendum be held to decide once and for all, so that no one is left in any doubt as to where the Poles want to live and under what social system.

It is not hard to surmise that the Lithuanian parliament will once again declare the demand for the creation of an autonomous region to be unconstitutional. Then parliamentarians will have to refute the arguments of USSR People's Deputy Anitsetas Brodavskiy, elected chairman of the Vilnyusskiy Rayon Soviet. In that very same bourgeois Lithuanian constitution of 1938 which was extracted from the archives of history and used as the basis for Lithuania's provisional basic law, Article 127 recognizes the creation of autonomous formations. As it was said in a rejoinder at the congress, the formation of such an autonomous unit is hardly likely to undermine Lithuania's authority in the international arena.

RSFSR

Yakovlev, Yeltsin Cited on Party Conference

PM2006150590 Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Jun 90 p 1

[Report by V. Konstantinov, V. Pisarchik: "Russia's Party Conference. 'Vector' of Action"]

[Excerpts] Should there or should there not be a Russian Federation Communist Party—that is the main question that Russia's party conference, which opened yesterday in Moscow's Kremlin Palace of Congresses, has been called upon to answer. [passage omitted]

Perhaps the whole country is today worried by the questions: What awaits people tomorrow, what will the confrontation between radical and conservative forces turn into, in whose interest is a possible split in the party which was the initiator of perestroyka? During a conference break we put these questions to A.N. Yakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

"At the present moment a split is not desirable," Aleksandr Nikolayevich said. "We must all get down to the matter in hand and not 'split'."

"Should only intraparty questions be discussed at the conference or must the economic situation also be broached?"

"I think both must be discussed. But I would give priority, considering the situation in the country, to the key questions of our development, and above all to such a fundamental question as the transition to a market economy. We must take a very large step in developing our economy. And the future Russian Communist Party, I think, should influence the unity of the republic's Communists in order to solve the republic's serious problems. [passage omitted]

And what does the chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet think about the possibility of establishing a Russian Communist Party?

"On the whole I am for establishing a party," B.N. Yeltsin told us, "but the kind of party it will be is important. If it merely turns into a kind of territorial formation based on old principles, there will be little point. It is important for it to be a truly renewed party with a new structure and new forms, based on the principles of openness and renunciation of the monopoly of power, a party supporting the soviets of people's deputies..."

Today is the second day of proceedings of Russia's Party Conference.

Leningrad Communist Democrats Offer Draft Program

90UN2044A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 31 May 90 p 2

[Political statement of Union of Communist Democrats: "For Civil Peace, a Strengthening of Democracy, and the Renewal of Society"]

[Text]**The confrontation of opinions, positions, and viewpoints has become characteristic of the partywide debate that has unfolded in the country on the threshold of the 28th CPSU Congress. Leningrad communists are preparing for the second stage of their party conference, at which it is planned to adopt a summary document reflecting the political position of the oblast party organization on key issues of the restructuring of society and the party itself.**

An active search for answers to these questions is now being conducted, naturally, by the primary party organizations, many communists, representatives of public movements, and political scientists also.

A group of Leningrad social scientists has prepared its version of a program political document for the 28th Party Congress. The authors offer it for examination at the oblast party conference and submit it for extensive discussion by communists and nonparty people.

The Union of Communist Democrats (the name "Union of Communist Democrats" (UCD) is suggested by the group of authors as a possibility for the transformation of the name of the CPSU; we propose putting the question of the party's name to a partywide referendum) is the legal successor to the CPSU and the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolsheviks) and a continuer of the cause of the left Marxist current in Russia's socialist, revolutionary movement.

The country is at a critical point. Its future is in danger. The absence of a profoundly considered concept of perestroyka and the miscalculations and mistakes on account of the estrangement of the party and bureaucratic upper stratum from the people and from the communist masses have brought the country to a head-on crisis in the sphere of economic, political, and interethnic relations.

An acute crisis in theory, the organization of its activity and intraparty relations is being experienced by the party itself also. Many party organizations have lost the political initiative, and the Communists are disoriented. The appearance of various platforms in the period of preparation for the 28th Congress, the delineation on the basis of them, and the events in a number of republic party organizations point to the split in the party which has emerged. However, none of the positions which have been promulgated provides an integral substantiated answer to the question concerning the ways out of the crisis of society and the party.

This document offers a basis for the achievement of the consolidation of society and intraparty concord.

Cardinal Reform of Intraparty Relations

The party's unity is ensured by community of strategic goals and a uniform party policy formulated at congresses and conferences; conscious membership of the party and active work in the primary party organization according to the place of party registration; compliance with the party rules.

The main tasks en route to the democratization of intraparty life are:

the precise political self-determination of each member of the party on a basis of principle by way of confirmation of his membership or departure from the party; membership of other political parties is not permitted;

a change in the organizational composition of the party on the basis of the principles of federation and international solidarity;

the work of all party organizations in accordance with legislation governing parties and public organizations; the preservation, creation, and strengthening of horizontal and vertical party structures everywhere that party activity is authorized by law, with the use of the production, territorial, and mixed principles;

definition within the party of the status of Communist people's deputies and factions and party representations in the soviets of all levels;

the structuring of factions, platforms, commissions, and groups in accordance with party standard documents;

definition of the status of communists who are members of nonparty public formations; a ban on party apparatus officials holding executive and senior office in such organizations;

the reorganization and shaping of the party apparatus on a voluntary, contractual, and competitive basis and stimulation of an influx into the apparatus of the best intellectual forces of the party; the formation of a union of permanent party officials;

the solution of questions concerning party property by its highest authorities on the basis of Soviet legislation.

Implementation of the following basic measures for the purpose of an acceleration of the process of democratization of the party and the assertion of the power of the party masses:

partywide referendums on fundamental issues of intraparty policy with the enshrinement of the referendum results in the decisions of Central Committee plenums (the entire period up to the next congress);

elections of the first secretaries of raykoms, gorkoms, and obkoms [rayon, city, and oblast party committees], Union republic central committees, members of the

Politburo, and the general secretary of the Central Committee by direct secret ballot according to party district on an alternative basis (October-December 1990);

hearings of the accounts of each member of all elective party authorities and determination of the procedure of the recall of any member of any elective party authority and also the procedure of the early replacement of any such authority (February-July 1991);

the elimination of all privileges and determination of the permissible benefits in accordance with a decision of the primary party organizations (August-October 1990);

preparation of a new program document of the party;

holding the next party congress in July 1991.

The Party in the Political System of Soviet Society

The party sets as its goal the formation of a state based on the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the free expression of the people.

Having renounced the monopoly of power, Communist Democrats regard the multiparty system as a factor ensuring democratic control of the state authorities and a guarantee against totalitarianism.

In the context of military reform and the reform of the law enforcement system we consider it necessary to examine legislatively the expediency of the preservation of party structures in the law enforcement authorities, the Army, and the KGB.

The party expresses and defends the fundamental interests of all working people and all citizens advocating the socialist choice and the country's democratic renewal.

In the political sphere the UCD will uphold the following positions of principle:

the priority of constitutional methods of the achievement and exercise of power and the unacceptability of forcible methods of a solution of society's problems;

participation in the leadership of society both as the ruling (government) party with a majority in the soviets and in coalition with other parties of a socialist choice; the party must also be able to act the part of constructive opposition;

the communists should aspire to active participation in the public self-management authorities; implementation of the political reform and revival of the civil society will make it possible to convert the primary self-management authorities formed according to production, territorial, and functional principles into the mass base of the soviets;

use of methods of persuasion, recommendations, and democratic concordance at the time of implementation of political decisions;

political dialogue and cooperation with all parties and public formations in accordance with the law and on the principles of independence, equality, and noninterference in one another's internal affairs;

in the international sphere of activity the UCD is bound by ties of solidarity to communist, socialist, social democratic, and other progressive parties and movements of the modern world.

In the sphere of national policy the Communists advocate:

nations' right to self-determination, up to and including constitutional and legal separation and the formation of independent states;

transition to a real federation of the peoples and nations incorporated in the USSR on the basis of a new Union treaty;

compliance with the Declaration of Human Rights and other internationally recognized human rights enactments.

It is Communists' duty to combat the nationalism and chauvinism primarily of representatives of their own nationality and to avoid the counterpoise of nationalities to one another. The party will lend its efforts to the creation in the USSR of an atmosphere of interethnic understanding, loyalty, and civic peace.

The Party's Tasks in the Spiritual-Moral Sphere

The UCD advocates the restoration of the place and role in society of permanent values common to all mankind and affirmation of the ideals of freedom of speech, creativity, and belief, goodness, and justice, and will together with other healthy forces struggle for a surmounting of the crisis of culture and morality which has gripped our society.

The achievement of these goals presupposes:

renunciation of all forms of monopolism in the cultural and spiritual sphere, particularly in the mass media; renunciation of the primitive ideologization of the entire life of society;

a fundamental change in the legal, material, social, and political status of the intelligentsia and intellectual work in society and the utmost stimulation of the creativity of the intelligentsia;

a revival of the role of the family and family upbringing and the role of parents in the family; a reorientation of all public institutions in the sphere of upbringing and education to assist the self-schooling, self-education, and self-development of the creative personality of the citizen and patriot of one's country and republic; an official youth policy prompting the youth to occupy a worthy place in society;

restoration of cultural traditions, the classical cultural heritage, and national cultures; respect for the efforts of

the churches pertaining to the moral renewal of believers and society as a whole, given a critical attitude toward religious teachings;

the speediest surmounting in official policy of the residual approach to the financing of culture, science, and education and prevention of the total commercialization of culture and the shifting by the state and the soviets of their responsibility in this sphere onto the public formations and private individuals;

the communists' assimilation of the entire wealth of world culture, including study of the dialectical-materialist legacy of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and the party's historical experience; formulation of a modern scientific concept of socialism and the communist perspective.

Principles and Priority Directions of Economic Policy

An efficient economy may develop given reliance on the following principles:

1. Economic freedom and enterprise.
2. Social justice and social protection.
3. Harmonization of personal and public interests.
4. Extensive use of world economic experience.

In economic policy the UCD will uphold:

renunciation of the monopoly of state ownership and state forms of the organization of management through the reorganization of state-owned enterprises into stock, collective, and leased enterprises; the extensive development of cooperative and individual enterprises;

creation of the prerequisites for and the development of enterprise as a socially useful and necessary activity and recognition of entrepreneurial income as a form of legitimate compensation for creative efforts pertaining to the organization and management of modern production;

decisive transition to a controlled market and market forms of the organization of management asserting the priority of the consumer, the prestige of the high quality of the merchandise, the equivalent nature of exchange, and the competitiveness of the producers as an incentive to scientific-technological progress;

a strengthening of official guarantees of the social protection of the needy, unemployed, and disabled strata of the population by way of the allocation of the necessary material and financial resources for a system of social insurance and assistance at the level of international standards;

formulation and realization of mechanisms of the efficient regulation of the market by means of the forecasting of socioeconomic processes, program-goal planning, and an active fiscal, financial, credit, antitrust, anti-inflation, and structural policy;

introduction of a new incomes policy designed to stimulate highly productive labor and efficient management and realizing in practice the priority of the earning of income, having done away with the influence of the command-distribution system of the state;

an unswerving increase in the proportion and amount of state spending on society's social needs with the use of elements of financial autonomy and the self-financing of some social services for the high-income strata of society;

restitution of the debts to the countryside by way of the equivalent exchange of products and services in the agroindustrial complex; the purposeful formation of more propitious living and work conditions in the countryside (comfortable housing, higher income, priority material and technical supply and trade services);

the organic incorporation of the country's economy in the world economy for the purpose of utilization of the advantages of the international division of labor, deliverance from food imports and predominantly raw material exports, the assimilation of high technology and new markets, and the increased competitiveness of individual commodities as the basis of transition to a convertible ruble.

The communists see fundamental transformations in the economy as the foundation of the transition to a society of real humanism and democracy.

The UCD does not renounce the communist perspective. The party affirms in democracy a guarantee of realization of the communist ideal as the highest value common to all mankind achieved through suffering by the people's masses over centuries of struggle. The party sees communism as a contradictory process of the movement and formation of a new quality of human civilization.

The congress delegates call on all communists, members of other parties, and nonparty persons to support our policy of civic peace, political stability, a strengthening of democracy, and the renewal of society.

Action draft prepared by a group of social scientists consisting of M.S. Vershinin, candidate of philosophical sciences; P.M. Kolovangin, candidate of economic sciences; Yu.V. Laptev, candidate of economic sciences; A.V. Losik, doctor of historical sciences; A.I. Sibirev, doctor of economic sciences; V.T. Smirnov, doctor of economic sciences; V.V. Fortunatov, candidate of historical sciences.

Gidaspov Gives Post-Election Press Conference

90UN2069A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 May 90 p 1

[Article by V. Koshvanets: "Who Is Next to the First"]

[Text] A press conference took place last Wednesday in the Smolny. Among other questions, Boris Veniaminovich Gidaspov was asked this:

"The joint conference of the Leningrad party organization reelected you first secretary of the CPSU obkom [oblast party committee]. Does this mean you will try to adhere to your previous course?"

The answer was as follows:

"The policy conducted by the first secretary does not depend on him entirely. In many respects his policy and his course are defined by circumstances as well as by the immediate surroundings of the first secretary.

"As for the circumstances, this is what they are now during the interval between the first and the second stages of the party conference (as you know it will resume its work on 8 June). The obkom and, therefore, its first secretary have to learn to function within a realistic multiparty system. We have to develop new relationships with the Lensovet [Leningrad city soviet] and with the center. The rapidly changing socioeconomic situation in the region and in the country naturally affects and amends our policies also."

As for the surroundings... That, primarily, was the subject of almost the entire press conference. The journalists could also personally meet some of the people who are going to work side by side with the first secretary.

But first I want to tell you about the main elected ruling organs of the Leningrad party organization. About 80 percent of the obkom members are new now, the CPSU obkom bureau is practically all new.

"The party organization now is headed by the people," B.V. Gidaspov said, "many of whom do not know the party work too well in its traditional form. But they are noted for their energy, common sense, and independence—qualities that cannot be overestimated at present when the situation in the party and in the country changes almost daily."

These are the people who will have to work out the strategy and the tactics for the oblast party organization while the obkom staff, almost halved by now, will preserve just the executive functions. That is the direction in which the obkom is being restructured now. The commissions on various activities of the party organization will play a major part in it.

One of them—the commission on the analysis and prognosis of sociopolitical processes—is headed by the new party obkom secretary Elena Ivanovna Kalinina.

"For a long time now we have lived in an atmosphere of constant confrontation and opposition," she said as she characterized the position her commission is going to support. "And if we fail to find some unifying ideas then the destructive processes will continue. For that reason our main task is to provide such ideas, to set up a dialog with those who stand for the socialist orientation in the development of our society. It is just as important to find a truly scientific approach in all this work instead of acting by intuition as usually happens now. A scientific approach will enable us to foresee very clearly any changes or deviations in the social conscience and that includes the activity of sociopolitical formations or parties. And speaking of the decisive condition helping to lower the confrontation level and to conduct a constructive dialog, for that we have to overcome the 'enemy image' in our own conscience, we have to give up the decades- old habit of the society to live and think according to the principle: 'He who is not with us is against us.' The obkom is prepared to set an example of such tolerance; it is ready for an honest and open conversation with everyone."

The CPSU obkom second secretary, Valeriy Vasilyevich Yashin, is also a new person in the party organization leadership. He became the head of the organizational party work commission:

"As you can see I will have to start working under the old sign. Our task is to put new meaning into it. Such new approaches are what we are looking for now. I can describe it in short like this: not the obkom for the bureaucrats but the bureaucrats for the obkom. It sounds simple enough but to put it into practice we have to bring radical changes into the structure of the obkom and of the bureaucracy as well as into the psychology and ideology of the entire organizational party work."

Together with B.V. Gidaspov the new obkom secretaries had to answer numerous questions posed by the journalists. I must admit that neither E.I. Kalinina nor V.V. Yashin looked at Gidaspov for approval of what they were saying; their evaluations of various problems sometimes differed greatly from those given by Gidaspov. The latter, for instance, had a much more optimistic opinion about the future of the people who had to leave their full-time party jobs. According to him, any good specialists and organizers were always more than welcome in the people's economy. But V.V. Yashin considers the situation a lot more dramatic because to be labeled an "apparatchik" does not help much in finding a new job. And E.I. Kalinina's description of the politicized social movements and formations used a lot more hues and shades of color than that provided by B.V. Gidaspov or V.V. Yashin.

This must be the kind of people we need to see today around the first secretary. And the future will show what kind of influence they have on him and he on them.

Meanwhile the press conference continues and B.V. Gidaspov is answering a question about what he expects from the coming 28th CPSU congress:

"I expect that the congress will provide a clear answer to the question of why many of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and of the 19th party conference were not applied in real life, why the party is constantly late in adopting the decisions that are of utmost importance for it.

"I expect radical changes in the composition of the central committee and I expect that the new committee will be showing some work and be capable of this work.

I expect the congress to start in such a strategic direction which will allow the party to preserve an adequate place in our society."

Popov Discusses Moscow May Day Events

90UN2090A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jun 90 p 3

[Letter from Gavriil Popov, chairman of the Moscow Soviet of People's Deputies, to MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA: "Concerning the May Day Demonstration"]

[Text] The trade unions of Moscow asked the Mosgorispolkom [Moscow city soviet executive committee] to allow them to hold a rally, using the tribune of the Mausoleum, on 1 May on Red Square. The executive committee granted this request.

Later, on behalf of the Moscow Association of Voters (MOI), a request arrived to allow a rally next to the Mossovet [Moscow Soviet of People's Deputies] and to conduct its own demonstration. The Mossovet approved this request and sent a letter to the USSR Council of Ministers since an Ukase of the President concerning Sadovoye Koltso had already made its appearance.

In a day or two before 1 May, the leaders of the country proposed that the two demonstrations be united into one—after the trade union rally.

After discussions, the MOI approved the idea of a single demonstration and canceled its own rally.

The idea of a single demonstration, like the development of the idea of a "roundtable," was in the making a long time, and in principle it is correct. But there was already no time for its implementation. As a result, the traditions of rallies, and also spontaneity, prevailed in the process of preparations.

The complete abandonment of the MOI rally was not justified. Either it should have been held somewhere before the demonstration. Or it was necessary to try to participate in the trade union rally (by proposing several speakers); in other words, it was necessary to spread the idea of an association not only at the demonstration, but at the rally as well. This was not done, and the MOI demonstrators were left with the feeling of being deprived, and of "inferiority" and of being second rate. The speeches at the trade union rally aggravated the feeling of resentment among this part of the demonstrators. The resentment broke out into chants and so forth.

During the demonstrations, one more mistake was made. Part of the column of MOI demonstrators stopped on the square. A strange situation developed: The demonstrators are stopped, and the leaders are standing on the Mausoleum. After five minutes, the president left the tribune, and all of those who were invited on the tribune left with him, including me. At that moment, I thought we behaved properly. We left because of the unplanned and incomprehensible halt of the demonstrators.

But the newspapers began to associate this departure with the slogans of the second part of the demonstration. When journalists write about this, it is their business. But even the president himself spoke out in connection with the 1 May demonstration in a meeting with rectors. I myself was not at this meeting, and for this reason I am quoting the newspaper PRAVDA. He said the following: "This was a political provocation." Further: "The main tendency was against Lenin, against the CPSU, and against perestroyka." And, in the end, this kind of an assessment was employed as well—"a reactionary attack."

Such assessments are simplistic and therefore dangerous, prompting conclusions in the spirit of the well-known Tbilisi model. Since there is a provocation, and since there is a reactionary attack, of course, everything is appropriate and justified, right up to men with submachine guns.

I have my own opinion about the May Day demonstration, and I want to lay it out, not imposing my own assessments.

I cannot believe that the thousands of CPSU members who participated in the second part of the demonstrations under the placards "Democratic Platform of the CPSU" were readying a provocation against the CPSU, not to mention "antisoviet actions."

I also cannot agree that the MOI, which played a tremendous role in the fight to intensify perestroyka, which was against attempts to reduce perestroyka to apparatus games, and for whose candidates millions of Muscovites voted, is an enemy of perestroyka.

Of course, there were also opponents of the CPSU among the demonstrators. But since different parties are allowed, then it would be strange if they did not criticize their opponent—the CPSU. There is nothing anticonstitutional in this criticism.

I myself consider Lenin to be a symbol of today's state. But I can also understand those who do not want this kind of symbolism, especially not stated in the Constitution.

I am against digging into the past and ideas of reducing perestroyka to the squaring of accounts. Therefore, I am against the slogan about "Kremlin Ceausescu's" (there was one like this). But I myself associated it with the well-known recipients of merit pensions, the heroes of the epoch of stagnation. And it is incomprehensible why some of the figures of perestroyka took this slogan as referring to themselves.

I am categorically against slogans "Down with the president" and in general against all "down with" slogans. This is Bolshevist extremism that everyone has been familiar with for a long time, and we recall "Down with autocracy." There is no place in a rule-of-law state for "down with" slogans.

But at the same time, I believe the slogan "President—resign" is absolutely constitutional. I myself am against this appeal. But the Constitution allows for the resignation of the president, and, therefore, anyone's call for the president to resign is not unconstitutional.

Groups participated in the demonstration that rejected not only the CPSU, but even the Soviet Constitution on the whole, which in itself is a socialist choice.

Was it possible to permit them in the demonstration in question? I think that it was necessary to be guided by the Constitution and the laws. If the slogans of these movements criticize our system but do not call for anticonstitutional methods of struggle with it, then such slogans are permissible. Different thinking must not be suppressed. But we must also resolutely suppress appeals to violent illegal methods of changing the system that are alien to democracy, and we know from 1917 what this leads to in the final analysis.

Unfortunately, here also the demonstration was not kept within the bounds of criticism of the socialist system permitted by the laws, and there was a lot of extremism.

What kinds of lessons can be derived from the demonstration?

In the Mossovet, in establishing the organizational committee, we adhered to new democratic principles: Each block in the demonstration would have representation according to the scheme, one representative for 10 persons. But this did not happen in the demonstration. A group consisting of 50 members, bringing out all of its supporters to a man to the demonstration, occupied the same space on the square as the 50 persons who represented an organization with 50,000 persons. In this way, the ratio of groups of demonstrators did not reflect their real influence among the Muscovites.

It will be necessary in future joint demonstrations to establish quotas. All who agree to observe the requirements of the laws and the Constitution, of course, must have the right to participate in the overall measures, but in accordance with the number of their supporters and quotas established by the organizational committee. If this is not wanted, arrange your own rally, but general rules have to be observed in a general demonstration.

The other problem is slogans. There are various organizations in Moscow, and they have their own slogans. But for participation in general arrangements, the organizational committee, it seems to me, has the right to require a list of slogans. Otherwise, one placard can float over the entire demonstration with the personal opinion of one person. Every person has a right to his own opinion. But there is also the right of the whole demonstration and its organizational committee to defend itself against a personal opinion appearing to represent the opinion of a part or even of an entire demonstration.

A demonstration is not a rally. The right of all demonstrators to pass by the tribune must also be respected. It should not be that some demonstrators could stand in front of the tribune for 10 minutes with their slogans, while others just pass by. Therefore, there must be an agreement also about a steady pace of movement, and to respect and observe this agreement.

And what should be done with those who break the rules; for example, those who brought concealed slogans? We must think about how and who will contend with these violators of an agreement (who definitely could turn out to be the typical instigators).

And one more reason. Red Square is an especially historical place. And in the future it will hardly be proper to conduct political measures here. This is a place for important state holidays.

I will sum up. The demonstration reflected the crisis our society is undergoing. This is the reality. Unfortunately, in many ways the demonstration turned out to be an indistinct picture. But still it cannot be reduced to the slogans of rightist and leftist extremists. This would be a serious mistake.

The 1 May demonstration overall was a definite step in the development of democracy. A step in an attempt at the joint action of all political forces. A step in the readiness of the leaders of the country to meet personally with all of the forces that are functioning in society.

The peaceful outcome was also positive: There were no serious incidents. This is a credit both to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the KGB, and to the demonstrators themselves.

Unfortunately, this step in the development of democracy was spoiled by a number of anticonstitutional slogans.

I was not an organizer of the demonstration. But as the leader of Mossovet, I am obliged to assume the blame and to apologize to the president that anticonstitutional slogans of this kind and direct insults were not avoided.

In the future, we must learn more correctly to organize mass actions in which various political forces participate. Mistakes are not a reason for rejecting one of the basic institutions of democracy—rallies and processions. We must honestly admit these mistakes and move toward legal forms of democratic life.

Delegates Appeal to Russian Party Congress

90UN2090B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jun 90 p 1

["Appeal to Participants in the Second Phase of the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party Within the CPSU Structure"]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

On 19 June of this year, delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from party organizations of the Russian

Federation will assemble at a conference to resolve the question concerning the organization of a Communist Party of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

We share your uneasiness regarding the lack of information about the activity of the CPSU Central Committee, the Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR, and the organizational committee for the preparation of the conference, and we view with understanding your initiative in carrying out this work. At the same time, we cannot help but express our concern in connection with the possibility of your making decisions that are a prerogative of the conference that begins on 19 June and the 28th CPSU Congress.

We appeal to you with a proposal to direct your work in a channel of preparation for the conference and to submit for its examination the proposals that have been drawn up.

This approach will help us avoid a confrontation, and it will facilitate the progress of the conference, which is examining the question of the creation of a Communist Party of the RSFSR.

We are ready to discuss your proposals within the context of the work of the delegates club jointly with you before the start of the Russian conference.

We hope that you truly understand our concern.

[Signed] Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the Moscow city party organization (93 signatures)—participants in the delegates club.

Moscow Party Resolution on Russian Party

PM2006075790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jun 90 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Resolution of the 28th Moscow CPSU City Organization Conference 'On the Creation of a Russian Federation Communist Party'"]

[Text] The Moscow party conference, supporting the declaration on RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] sovereignty, considers the resolution of the question of the formation of an RSFSR Communist Party within the CPSU to be an urgent matter requiring immediate resolution.

The conference calls on delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the Moscow City party organization to strive at the Russian party conference for the proclamation of the formation of an RSFSR Communist Party and proposes dividing the entire process of setting up a republic party organization into two phases. In the first phase a declaration on the formation of an RSFSR Communist Party would be adopted proclaiming its creation and the main principles underlying its organization and activity. Elections of leading organs would be held in the second phase, following the 28th CPSU Congress, which would make it possible to have a wide-ranging democratic discussion in primary party organizations of candidates for elective organs. An interim organizational committee is to be set up at the conference to organize this work.

The Moscow City party conference believes that all of the work to formalize the organization of an RSFSR Communist Party within the CPSU should be completed as soon as possible after the 28th CPSU Congress.

Moscow Rayon Party Conferences Held

90UN2096B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 May 90 p 3

[Article by M. Grodnitskaya and I. Kosarev: "The Market Mirrored in Party Discussion"]

[Text] Communists of the Leniniskiy Rayon party organizations have not formed their own platforms and positions. They have preferred to concentrate on a discussion of the drafts of the Party Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress and the Position Paper of the Moscow city party organization. And there is a reason for this. After all, it is not always necessary to create one's own platform.

What was at the center of attention at the conference? These days many purely party problems have been pushed into the background by recent events: the program proposed by the government for changing over to the market. This is what is occupying people's minds now. Clearly, this subject was constantly coming up at the rayon conference.

V. Senkov, first secretary of the party raykom [rayon committee], called the existence in a market economy of such a phenomenon as exploitation of man by man a fundamental issue and devoted a good deal of time to it in his speech. Citing the opinion of academician S. Shatlin to the effect that the party "should take responsibility for protection of the market path and allaying public fears regarding the possibility of a lowering of the standard of living," he said that the party would thus be condoning exploitation—something many generations of Communists had fought against. He offered another view: The party should speak out categorically against any attempts at restoration of capitalist relations, against a society in which 10 cooperators exploit the hired labor of 200-300 people.

V. Senkov also criticized the leading party organs for their inconsistency and lack of a clearcut political line. "Five years ago we were assured that we would not turn to the market, then they talked about individual elements of it, and today it is a regulated market... Over the past few years there has been a continuing series of elections both to the soviets and within the party, which make it practically impossible to concentrate on solving other problems."

But there were also other statements about a market economy. A. Gvozdev, a head specialist of the All-Union Institute of Agricultural and Aerophotogeodesic Research, formulated the problem precisely: The market needs protection, political protection. That is, in a multiparty system. Why did the NEP fail? It did not have political support; monopolies had begun to take a firm hold in politics of that time. So the more quickly other parties are formed, the more quickly and diversely the market will be established in our economy, and the deeper our social life will be.

It did not seem to use that the audience listened very attentively to the chairman of the KRK [expansion unknown], N. Pavlyuk. And that is a shame: He said some very interesting things. He discussed the fact that people are withdrawing from the party on an ever larger scale. In general this is nothing new. But while previously those leaving the party were mainly pensioners, now they are workers. And this is at a time when all party forums are declaring the need to protect their interests.

The first secretary of the MGK [Moscow City Committee] of the CPSU, Yu. Prokofyev, participated in the work of the conference.

Hardly anybody has any doubt that the changes taking place in the chain of the "CPSU—the state—society" are very significant today. Article 6 of the Constitution has been abolished and the conditions of the multiparty system are forcing the CPSU to determine how and by what methods to proceed with its work. And up until recently in discussions of this subject there have frequently been suggestions from party members themselves, for example, to "separate" from the economy and take a purely ideological path.

The conference of the Kalininskiy Rayon party organization which took place the day after the government made its new decisions in the economic area public, clearly showed that there was no way it could "separate." It could not because the life of the party lies in its work with people. And people are very sensitive to any economic changes, even the most insignificant ones. Yes, the number of purely internal party problems designated in the draft of the Position Paper of the rayon party organization was large enough that they could not all be discussed in one day. But still the report of the first secretary of the raykom, V. Korneyev, and practically all the statements in the discussions in one way or another touched upon the latest government decisions. The delegates discussed these decisions in light of the opinions of their collectives. And either they supported them as a whole, as did the director of the Moskabel Plant, V. Prusov, or they considered them unacceptable, as did the secretary of the party committee of the Voytovich Plant. But both groups considered it wrong that such decisions are discussed after the fact in the party and among the people. For it is hard to think of a more important party task than to explain to the people the need for various transformations and the achievement of social harmony. Just as it would be difficult to find any other organization which because of its structure and mass nature would be better prepared for this than the CPSU. But nonetheless we are discussing this question again, after an extraordinary situation has already been created in the city.

Discussing problems within the party, the delegates concentrated a considerable amount of attention on the need to consolidate the party as a political force. They discussed the fact that the dispute between the social democrats and communists (which today is essentially a discussion within the party) against the background of economic instability has already brought large European states under the dictatorship of the "firm hand."

"There is no doubt that the discussion of the organizational principles of party construction is crucial today, but it cannot be conducted while criticizing one another, as it were, to death. We must remember that splitting the party plays into the hand of the right-wing forces," noted the rector of the Moscow Institute of Electronic Machine Building, A. Tikhonov, in a discussion between meetings of the delegates.

And so the delegates of the Kalininskiy party conference were in favor of consolidating the party on the basis of principles. But they also introduced one clarification into the text of their position: The letter from the Central Committee with a similar name contributed not to consolidation of various movements in the CPSU but only to a split.

A. Nemtinov, secretary of the CPSU MGK, participated in the work of the Kalininskiy party conference.

Conferences were also held in Baumanskiy, Zelenogradskiy, Kuybyshevskiy, Leningradskiy, Moskvoretskiy, Frunzenskiy, and Cheremushkinskiy CPSU rayon organizations.

N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, participated in the conference of the Leningradskiy Rayon party organizations.

On the agenda were the results of the discussions in the local party organizations of the drafts of the CPSU Central Committee Platform and the Party Regulations, the election results, and in a number of rayons also the elections for free mandates of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th City Party Conference, the consideration of positions of rayon party organizations for the forthcoming party congress, and proposals for higher party election organs.

The critical stage in the life of the party and the country determined the heated nature of the discussions. But they did not succeed in holding constructive dialogue everywhere. Sometimes emotional criticism of the difficulties of the moment prevailed over sober analysis. In the activity of the rayon party organizations they noted a tendency toward concentration of forces on the development of positions and platforms to the detriment of

programs for working with the basic party units—the local organizations. In practice the rayon committees had departed from an in-depth analysis of the campaign for the election of delegates, no serious conclusions were heard, and instead of interpretation there was statistical information from the chairmen of the election commissions.

Moscow 'Democratic Platform' Meeting Held

90UN2096C Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 May 90 p 3

[Article by A. Osinskiy: "Three Variants on the Scales"]

[Text] As we have already reported, the second Moscow regional conference of advocates of the movement "The Democratic Platform in the CPSU" was held 26-27 May. It would seem that a good deal of time has passed since January when the all-Union conference "Democratic Platform" was organized. It essentially declared the establishment of this platform in the party. And even less time has passed since the first Moscow regional conference of representatives of the platform completed its work. But so many noted and significant events have taken place in our party and political life that in former times they would have covered many years. During this time period, naturally, there could not but have been changes in the Democratic Platform movement as well.

Of course they have taken place. The notoriety of the platform has grown and, as members of the coordination council assert, the number of its proponents has increased significantly. But, on the other hand, something else is also known: Signs of significant differences have also appeared in the platform and, moreover, some of its, shall we say, leaders have decided to change over to other parties, particularly Yu. Afanasyev and N. Travkin. In other words, there have been signs of separation. All this taken together would seem to have increased even more the interest in the regional conference which was attended by representatives of Moscow and Moscow Oblast.

One cannot say that the hall in the Movie Center on Druzhinnikovskaya Ulitsa was overcrowded. But it would seem that the fact that almost 400 delegates attended the conference speaks for itself. This is quite a few. But still, as compared to the preceding conferences—both the all-Union and the first Moscow regional ones—something has changed even on the outside. What is it?

Possibly these are purely personal impressions. But one way or another the delegates who came to conference were inclined toward greater thoroughness. The previous rally-like enthusiasm had almost disappeared and there was more of a desire to evaluate what had happened as objectively as possible. Even the first speech was perceived in quite different ways. A report was given by I. Chubays. And immediately one of the delegates expressed doubts: "In what capacity speaker speaking?"

Let us note that this was not a random question. As we know, I. Chubays was recently expelled form the CPSU. But if proponents of the Democratic Platform have the right to assess this as arbitrariness on the part of the party apparatus and to express protest, considering that a person who was unfairly expelled is still a member of the platform, it is much more difficult to explain another circumstance this way. And this circumstance is that the speaker had already parted ways with the CPSU and is linking his future to another party. So in which capacity is he speaking at the conference? Is he simply giving a report?

Let us say that is what he is doing. This in itself would probably not bring about any great objections from the majority. But when I. Chubays announced that the line proposed by some people toward renewal of the CPSU would lead to an impasse and would even be dangerous, when he declared that the party had not been renewed and demanded in a challenging way that they immediately bring the question to a vote (renewed or not), here the people in the hall really became agitated.

But this could be considered simply an individual episode such as those that always occur at meetings and conferences, the more so at this level and the more so today. But something else is much more important: The opinions of the participants in the conference diverged on many issues. And in some cases one might even say that they diverged sharply. This pertains above all to possible variants of the development of the Democratic Platform movement.

In the opinion of the coordination council, there could be three such variants.

The first variant would be to go to the CPSU Congress, achieve democratic changes there, and, regardless of its results, stay in the party while continuously working for its democratization.

The second variant would be to go to the congress with their package of documents and if the demands of the Democratic Platform were not satisfied there, announce their collective withdrawal from the CPSU and the creation of a new party. And their demands in general outlines were as follows: to reject communism as the goal of the CPSU (and, consequently, change the name of the party), to reject the monopoly of the single ideology, to conduct a radical structural reform, to abolish democratic centralism and the territorial-production principle of constructing the party, to completely replace party leadership both in the center and in the local areas, and so forth.

The third variant would be to announce even before the congress, at the Second All-Union Conference of Advocates of the Democratic Platform, the creation of a new political party and to withdraw from the CPSU at the congress.

It is not difficult to note that the second and third variants leave very little room for constructive dialogue.

discussions, or search for acceptable solutions and they practically predetermine the direction of the Democratic Platform—outside the CPSU. This probably also served as the main cause for the heated polemics that broke out. For example, the representative of the interclub party organization, G. Gusev, expressed his complete disagreement with this way of posing the question. And he was the one who discussed the inadmissibility of a situation in which the members of the coordination council assume the right to speak on behalf of all advocates of the platform and make decisions that do not reflect the opinions of the majority.

Incidentally, one gets the feeling that the past unity is no longer to be found in the coordination council itself. One could draw this conclusion partially even from the speech of coordination council member I. Yakovenko. Why? If for no other reason than because, while speaking like V. Lysenko in favor of the second variant, he did not agree that party renewal should be rejected as impossible.

But this is not a matter of nuances. It says in the draft of the general political resolution offered for the delegates' attention that "the Democratic Platform movement in the CPSU is in transition and is entering a qualitatively new stage of its development." And this cannot be disputed. One can sense this. But what kind of transition will this be?

It would seem that these questions, which are of considerable importance, would evoke no less heated and involved discussion than they did at the two preceding conferences. But, alas, in spite of all expectations, the next day there were many more vacant seats in the hall, which also gave one cause to think.

Moscow City Party Leader Gives Monthly Interview

90UN2096A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 May 90 p 2

[Interview with Yuriy Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow CPSU City Committee, by V. Yevseyev; place and date not specified: "May, Moscow, and Panic Buying Because of a Lack of Faith in Tomorrow"]

[Text] **What Happened on the "Macaroni" Market?**

[Yevseyev] To be honest, Yuriy Anatolyevich, when preparing for our next conversation I wanted very much to give it some kind of optimistic headline. But life, unfortunately, destroys preliminary preparations. And we have to begin today's conversation with a situation that is, frankly, extraordinary.

The last few days have rocked the capital, its guests, and even Muscovites who would seem to be used to everything. Until quite recently everyone knew: If there was a waiting line in front of a store it meant that "they had thrown something in there." But now this tells us something else—there is "something left" there. Beginning on Thursday the crowds of people literally stormed the half-empty shelves of the stores selling the most ordinary products. According to data of the Moscow Soviet, during these couple of days they bought up literally months' supplies of flour, groats, macaroni, vegetable oil... There were also waiting lines in the savings banks. People were in a hurry to exchange money for any commodity. And while previously the causes of such disturbances were, as a rule, rumors, now the signal for the "buying boom" was a state report in the USSR Supreme Soviet...

[Prokofyev] Like everyone else, I was alarmed to hear the report of Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov. You did not have to be a prophet to see that the measures proposed by the government would hardly be popular among the population. At the same time it seems to me that one could not but understand that we simply have no other way out of the economic crisis than through the creation of a regular market. But we are speaking about something else—at what price must this be accomplished. And how well thought-out was all of this? First of all, I have in mind questions of social protection of the population. After all, it is no accident that people "gleaned" from the report the fact that they would be affected most of all by the forthcoming price increases. Hence the immediate reaction expressed in the outbreak of panic buying.

[Yevseyev] But does it not seem to you, Yuriy Anatolyevich, that this panic buying is a result of a crisis of confidence which, judging from sociological polls and the letters that come in to our editorial offices, all state and social institutions are experiencing along with the party?

[Prokofyev] The decline of the authority of all of our institutions was inevitable. In the very beginning, as you will recall, two theses were put forth—perestroyka and acceleration. And society was oriented toward rapid achievement of positive results. This did not happen. There was not an improvement but a deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in the country. And this was natural because it was impossible to achieve positive and quick results while simultaneously reconstructing two systems at a time—both political and economic. The more so since the reconstruction was so fundamental that it was necessary to change the very foundations of our edifice. But this is only an explanation. And the explanation is probably too late. What the people see is a mass of unfulfilled promises, unjustified decisions, empty shelves in stores, and a shortage of practically everything. A derivative of this is the lack of confidence in both the country's leadership and above all the party, which began perestroyka and which, in spite of the change in the wording of Article 6 of the Constitution, continues to bear responsibility for everything that occurs in the society.

In this connection I cannot but note the paradoxical situation in which the party finds itself today. On the one hand, as I have already said, nobody has removed responsibility from the party since it is still the ruling

one, but on the other, the discussion of the fundamental changes in the country's economic system have bypassed the party so far. They have been discussed repeatedly by the Presidential Council and now they are being brought up for the discussion of the USSR Supreme Soviet and it is as though the party is on the sidelines. And this against the background of discussions of the need to increase the role of the party masses! These issues have not been on the agenda of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. It seems to me that this is wrong. The party, whose representatives are working in the government, and comprise the majority in the Supreme Soviet, should develop its own position with respect to the proposed program.

Will the Government Receive Support?

[Yevseyev] In your view, what practical steps are necessary in the very complicated situation that has developed?

[Prokofyev] First of all we need an honest and open consultation with the people.

[Yevseyev] Do you have in mind what we previously called "nationwide discussion"?

[Prokofyev] That is needed too. But above all I have in mind a nationwide referendum.

[Yevseyev] But this will take a good deal of time, and ours is running out.,,

[Prokofyev] But yet the report submitted for discussion is still not a program developed in detail. It is merely the concept of changing over to market relations. I an convinced that developing a real program and the laws necessary for providing for a changeover to a market economy will take time in any case. And it should be used for explanatory work and preparation of the referendum.

[Yevseyev] But have you no fears, Yuriy Anatolyevich, that the referendum will lead to a negative result? Many people who are now, frankly, in a state of shock, will hardly be able to make a correct choice with an eye to the future when they are asked to say "yes" or "no" to a market economy. As a result the country will be cast back to some time in the past. And yet you also think that we have no other choice except for the market.

[Prokofyev] We must give the people an extremely clear explanation of the existing situation. We must prove to them the need for what has been earmarked. And above all we must honestly tell them the consequences a changeover to the market will have for all social segments of the society. And, of course, we must again think of a system of protective measures. For it is one thing to raise the prices of gold and automobiles, yet another for goods and products that are in daily demand. Everything must be properly thought out. And properly explained. I am profoundly convinced that unless the people accept this program it will be impossible to carry it out. Only with civil harmony and public confidence in the proposed measures will they be able to produce the desired result.

[Yevseyev] You speak about the need for extensive explanatory work. Of course the mass media will conduct it. But it does not seem that this will be enough. Serious, thorough work is needed in each labor collective, perhaps in each home. Tell us, Yuriy Anatolyevich, will the party, particularly the Moscow communists, be able to take on this responsibility? After all, we have no other organization with such a ramified structure making it possible actually to reach everyone.

[Prokofyev] Today it can no longer be as it was before where the leadership would make a decision and everyone would work together to carry it out. Today it is necessary for the proposed program to become the party program. And this, I think, means it must be discussed at the congress so that the communists will support it. Only then will it be possible to get to work and take responsibility for it. This is my profound conviction.

[Yevseyev] Will this question be discussed at the forthcoming city party conference?

[Prokofyev] There will undoubtedly be mention of it. And, of course, the opinion of the communists of the capital will be reflected in the Position Paper of the Moscow city party organization for the 28th CPSU Congress which must be adopted at the conference.

[Yevseyev] And what is your attitude toward the decision made by the Moscow Soviet to sell goods in the city only upon presentation of a passport with the Moscow city or oblast stamp?

[Prokofyev] Of course this measure is necessary today. Although, in addition to purely organizational difficulties, it has costs in the moral sphere as well. Perhaps it will also cause difficulties in relations with nearby regions. But this is a forced measure. And a temporary one, as was stated. So now we must all think only about what will come next.

[Yevseyev] Thank you, Yuriy Anatolyevich, for your frank discussion. And now let us turn to a discussion of other events that occurred in May, not extraordinary ones but ones which were planned ahead of time.

Why Are There So Few Workers Among the Delegates?

[Yevseyev] Judging from the editorial mail, the elections of delegates to the party congress and the city party conference evoked unprecedented interest. This is understandable. The elections were conducted in a new way. Now they are practically over. What comments do you have, Yuriy Anatolyevich, on the course of them and the results?

[Prokofyev] Actually, the party election campaign in Moscow is drawing to a close. We have already elected 272 delegates to the party congress and 1,028 to the city party conference. The readers of the newspaper will

probably be most interested in the qualitative makeup of those elected to the party forums. A complete list of delegates from Moscow to the congress and the city conference will be published upon completion of the elections. But these figures give a general idea of the composition of the delegates. Elected to the congress were 70 secretaries of party committees and bureaus, 69 economic leaders, 62 people representing engineering, technical, and scientific workers and employees, and 34 leaders at the rayon level, and, unfortunately, there were very few workers—13 of them. The ratios among the delegates elected to the city conference are approximately the same. Unfortunately, very few women were elected either to the conference or to the congress.

[Yevseyev] This is heard like a refrain in commentaries about any recent elections—few workers and few women...

[Prokofyev] The reasons for this can be understood, although they are sad. While we have asserted for a long time that the CPSU is the party of the working class, nonetheless we have been somehow condescending toward the workers. While enlisting them in the party on a large scale, we have been concerned only about preserving its social composition. One must say that the workers themselves have become accustomed to this and that their party duty is merely to vote the right way at meetings and assemblies. This policy has led to the situation we are now experiencing—hard as it is, one must say that too few of the workers have turned out to be real leaders of people who are prepared for modern political life. Representatives of the working class themselves understand this, turning their elective positions over to engineers, scholars, and writers... Perhaps for today this is the right decision—after all, work both in the soviets and in the party election organs requires a high degree of training and advanced political experience. But in principle I personally think that the working class can and should represent its own interests in all soviet and party organs. The more so since there are plenty of talented and active people among the workers. We simply must help them to gain the necessary training. In particular, this is why we have transformed our courses for retraining party workers and the University of Marxism- Leninism into a new educational institution—the Moscow Political Institute. And there we propose to engage seriously in training potential deputies and workers of the elective party organs from among the working class. But the institute is, of course, only one part of the work in this direction. In general the party now needs to concentrate most of its attention on the development of new relations with the working class.

Approximately the same thing can be said about women. While declaring our respect for them and their equal rights, we are basically thinking only about preserving the percentage ratios of them in the party and in other state and social formations. As a result, the percentages have clouded the real picture. Throughout the world people are amazed at the fruits of our "emancipation"—there are many more representatives of the weaker sex in repair and heavy work than in the halls where parliamentarians meet. Yet it would be wrong to reproach our lady friends for political passivity—women comprise more than half of the participants at almost any meeting. I think they are the ones from whom our future leaders are now being formed. The party must not stand on the sidelines of this issue! The "women's question," I am convinced, is one of the decisive ones in any political organization.

How To Conduct Party Elections?

[Yevseyev] Has the new system of conducting party elections justified itself?

[Prokofyev] We began to discuss the need to conduct these elections in a new way—by a direct and secret vote in the party districts and on an competitive basis—at the end of last year. It seems to me that the corresponding appeal from the plenum of the MGK [Moscow City Committee] of the CPSU to the Party Central Committee exerted a significant influence on the adoption by the Central Committee Plenum of the decision which gave the party organizations the right to decide these questions for themselves.

In Moscow all rayon party committees adopted a decision to conduct the elections through the party districts. In only one of the rayons, Kuntsevskiy, were the delegates to the congress elected by the district and to the city conference—according to the usual procedure. In Kuntsev the rayon party conference was not a report conference but a report-election conference. This was brought about by the need to elect a new first secretary immediately. Incidentally, this is the first sign—the leader of the rayon party organization there was elected not by the raykom [rayon committee] as before but directly at the conference on a competitive basis. I think this will become a tradition in the city party organization.

As we know, the party districts for elections of delegates to the congress and city conference were formed in different ways—with multiple mandates and with single mandates. Speaking of the former, it seems to me that they excessively complicate the procedure of the elections and make them largely pro forma. Imagine that 70-80 candidates are elected for five to six mandates. In order to have a clear idea of "who is who" in each party organization it was necessary to hold meetings with these numerous candidates. This is unrealistic in practice. Therefore in multiple mandate districts the ones with the best chances were those whose names were well known to the communists. For example, in Khoroshevskiy Rayon the candidates to be nominated first were Central Committee Secretary A. Yakovlev, Raykom First Secretary A. Zemskov, and the deputy editor in chief of the magazine KOMMUNIST, O. Latsis—well-known people. Although perhaps other candidates for delegate mandates had equally interesting platforms and proposals, they were simply not as well known.

And in places where elections were conducted in single-mandate districts the number of candidates was much smaller—an average of five to six per mandate. And the competition was more real since the communists of the district had a practical opportunity to evaluate the positions of each candidate.

[Yevseyev] In our last conversation you expressed the idea that it might make sense to return to stage-by-stage election of party delegates. Do you still hold this point of view?

[Prokofyev] I mentioned this primarily because the new system of elections involves many organizational difficulties, some of which we have already discussed. And in the future everything will depend on how the party proceeds with its work, what it will be like, its structure, and its membership.

But as of today a new election system was simply necessary. Above all it is undoubtedly more democratic than the previous one. And thus to a certain degree it makes it possible to eliminate a certain amount of tension and mistrust that had developed between the ruling party organs and the party masses.

[Yevseyev] Were the communists very active during these elections?

[Prokofyev] According to preliminary data—for the elections are not over yet—from 65 to 70 percent of the communists participated in them. Although in a number of districts where well- known personalities ran, for instance where M.S. Gorbachev was elected, the activity was considerably greater.

[Yevseyev] Were there any unexpected results from the elections? For instance, were those who under the old system would have "had to be" among the delegates to the conference or congress not elected...

[Prokofyev] I have already said that there were considerably fewer workers and women than previously. But, frankly, that was not unexpected. But what was actually unforeseen was the fact that in a number of rayons two and sometimes even three secretaries of rayon party committees were elected as delegates to party forums at the same time. Previously this was simply impossible because the nomination of candidates for delegates to party forums also took place according to a strict schedule in order to retain the same social principle.

And I definitely want to mention one other thing. The elections showed that the communists placed their confidence in people with various but necessarily firm positions and firm convictions. The candidate delegates who tried to figure out and adapt their "views" to the mood of the audience to which they were speaking, as a rule, were not elected. In other words, political uprightness and adherence to principles are valued very highly today.

How Many Gorkoms Will There Be in Moscow?

[Yevseyev] Many readers are bothered by questions of splitting within the party. Here for example is what Muscovite V. Kurkin writes: "A split within the party is already a reality and not to notice that it is really is to hide our heads in the sand. The entire question is when and how this split will be organizationally manifested—during the congress or after it."

[Prokofyev] In my view, everything depends on whether or not the congress is able to develop documents which would consolidate a significant part of the communists. If it does not succeed in doing this the split will take place at the congress itself.

I personally am speaking in favor of self-determination of communists after the party congress. I consider it necessary after the congress to conduct a free exchange of party documents. And those who accept the platform developed by the congress will remain within the party while those who hold different viewpoints will be able to withdraw from the Communist Party freely and enter other political organizations or organize new ones that correspond to their political views.

[Yevseyev] The multiparty system about which there has been so much debate is already becoming a reality. For example, our newspaper, responding to numerous requests from readers, intends to publish a series of articles that present the programs of various parties and political groupings that have appeared recently which call themselves parties. How does the CPSU MGK plan to conduct its work under the conditions of a real multiparty system?

[Prokofyev] Yes, of course, in Moscow there are many various political groupings. They are indeed incipient political parties. Although we do not yet have a law about parties. In order to regulate their actions and clearly define them, I consider it necessary in all ways to accelerate the adoption of a law and thereby place anything on a legal basis...

[Yevseyev] Excuse me, Yuriy Anatolyevich, but, after all, there is no law for the Communist Party either. It is not registered anywhere or in any way yet either...

[Prokofyev] We are not speaking about registration. A party may not be registered but still actually exist. As, for example, the Communist Party, whose existence nobody would deny. Or the Liberal Democratic Party. It already has more than 3,000 members and it actually already exists. But it also happens sometimes that about 50 people meet, elect a leadership organ consisting entirely of their relatives and in all seriousness declare this "family club" to be a political party. I describe this picture almost from life. That is the way the Monarchists declared themselves...

[Yevseyev] That is, in your view we should determine a minimum number of members of one grouping or another for it to claim the role of a party? How many should there be?

[Prokofyev] In any case I think they should gather no less than 1,000 people in order to declare the birth of a party. And then as a mandatory condition the new organization should have material independence and also its own structure which encompasses if not the entire Union at least a certain region. And if this group operates only on the scale of a single city it is a political club or circle but by no means a political party. Incidentally, many countries have laws that determine what to consider parties and regulate their activity. Perhaps there is no need for us to reinvent the wheel but instead use analogs that have already been developed.

[Yevseyev] What do you see as the paths to the development of a multiparty system?

[Prokofyev] The process of the creation of small ephemeral groups will continue, but then these party clubs will start to look for partners with similar political platforms and join with them.

[Yevseyev] There can be many parties. But how many of them, in your view, will determine the political picture of our life?

[Prokofyev] I think three political forces will appear in our society. The first is a party that has a communist perspective as its goal. The second is a party of a social democratic type. And the third is a block of parties operating from anticommunist positions. A consolidation of certain forces on this platform is already taking place. We should not close our eyes to this. Moreover, the complication of the socioeconomic situation in society which is possible due to the changeover to a regulated market economy could become fertile soil for the strengthening of anticommunist forces.

[Yevseyev] With which emerging parties are the communists prepared to cooperate?

[Prokofyev] With the parties that adhere to the socialist choice, irrespective even of the paths they envision to the construction of a socialist society.

But so far all this can be discussed only theoretically since all the parties that are now being created are declaring their opposition to the CPSU. But I hope that in the future, in the near future, common interests and directions will be defined and then the process of creating party blocks will become a reality.

[Yevseyev] Article 6 of the Constitution has been changed. But the CPSU is still the most influential political force—both in terms of quantitative composition and in terms of representation in the soviets at all levels. Nonetheless it is finding it more and more difficult to implement its policy in those same soviets. Under these conditions, party veteran V. Subbotin asks, can we consider our party the ruling one?

[Prokofyev] The situation, frankly, is complex. The Moscow Soviet is an example of this. There the party members, who comprise an absolute majority of the deputies, have broken down into various blocks and subscribe to various points of view. So it is simply impossible to speak of a unified party line. But this is a natural process. The party is now living under conditions in which there are numerous trends within it. Those party members were right who insisted on moving up the date of the congress, since only decisions adopted there will enable communists to determine their own actions. Then we will be able to say precisely how many communists there are among the deputies of the soviets. So far we are giving a general figure of communists among our parliamentarians and deputies of local soviets, an impressive figure but, alas, one that does not reflect the true alignment of forces.

[Yevseyev] I thank you, Yuriy Anatolyevich, for the conversation and I still hope that our next meeting in June will give us more of a basis for optimism.

[Prokofyev] I share that hope, the more so since the next time we meet will be after the completion of the first part of the work of the Moscow city party conference. I wish to take advantage of this opportunity to thank all the readers of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA who have shown an interest in our conversations.

Russian Leaseholders' Congress Set for Jun

PM1206125790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report on interview with P. Bunich, president of the USSR Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs, by own correspondent I. Demchenko; place and date unspecified: "Split in the Leaseholders Union?"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] IZVESTIYA (issue No. 160) published information on the congress of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs, planned for the end of June in Leningrad. But the next day the editorial office received an invitation to attend what appeared to be the very same congress, only... in Moscow. We asked P. Bunich, president of the USSR Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs, to explain:

[Bunich] At a recent congress of our union, a small group of delegates, mainly Leningraders, announced that they were the organizational committee responsible for a congress of Russian leaseholders and proposed that this congress be held immediately. But opinions differed even within this group. The majority spoke in favor of convening a representative forum at which it would be possible to form a Russian Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs. Then they formed an organizational board responsible for its preparation and comprising the leaders of regional unions, including the Leningrad union, of course. All Russian representatives voted unanimously in favor of this: Approximately 500 people,

including those who have now announced their own separate congress in Leningrad, which has not been agreed with the board. Members of the organizational board only found out about this from IZVESTIYA.

Of course, no one is prohibiting the creation of several republic-level unions as opposed to just the one, and every collective should be able to make up its own mind as to which one it is going to join. However, the way in which this is being done does not inspire respect. In my view, the leaseholders movement already has enough objective difficulties without them being aggravated by the creation of secret opposition movements.

I would like to take this opportunity to say, on behalf of the organizational board, that the constituent congress of the Russian Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs will begin in Moscow at 1000 hours on 14 June, in the conference hall of the CEMA building. All delegates from the republic are invited.

'Unity Myth' Threatened by Russian Conference

PM1506150990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Pavel Gutiontov "Political Diary": "Who Needs the Myth of Unity?"]

[Text] So, the All-Russia Party Conference, beginning Tuesday, is going to be the constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party and, in this capacity, will elect a Central Committee. Those who believe (and have gone to such strenuous efforts to prove) that this is the main thing our long-suffering republic lacks can feel satisfied. Russia is going to have "what people have" in Turkmenia, Belorussia, or Kazakhstan. They have their own communist parties, so Russia is going to have its own communist party as well. Its "inequality" within the Soviet Union will thereby be overcome.

True, it is still unclear as to **what kind** of party it will be, **where** its Central Committee will lead communists, and **which** interests it is supposed to defend before the "center." There are various options open to it, as they say, and I believe that these options should be considered dispassionately and without emotion.

After all, it is one thing if the new party decides to be a really **new** party and, having democratized internal party relations, is able and willing to begin the difficult struggle to lead the changes in our harried society in practice.

It is another matter entirely if the nameplates on the present oblast and rayon party committees are simply changed, if the old structures are merely designated for national cosmetic repairs, and if attempts are made, on this basis, to renew the credit of trust in the **old** policies.

And, finally, there is a third option: Namely, that conservatives will unite under the slogans of national rebirth and the banners of the Russian Communist Party to dismantle all of perestroyka's achievements (and there are not so many of them!) and take us back to where we started.

These would be three very different parties, you must agree.

But why "would be," incidentally?

The polemics surrounding the Russian Communist Party (including the polemics within the top party leadership concealed from the eyes of public opinion) have shown that all three "Russian Communist Parties" already exist. Their positions are now being hastily defined, and the ritual calls for consolidation made from time to time by all three are becoming increasingly obviously unfulfillable. The second stage of the so-called initiative congress of the Russian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform, which has just ended in Leningrad, is very interesting in this respect.

We can judge the course of this lofty gathering—which claimed to represent more than a million communists (the methods of calculation have not been imparted)—from the detailed report made for us by one of the participants, engineer Aleksandr Zenkov, sent to the congress as an observer by the Kolpinskiy Rayon party organization. We were helped in "proofreading" his report by a broadcast on Leningrad Television, which offered up its screen for a lengthy interview with leaders of the movement, and also by local press reports. Incidentally, we have already set out the beliefs of the "Leningrad" Russian Communist Party leaders (IZVESTIYA No. 137), and there have been absolutely no changes in these beliefs since the first stage of the congress. So we will simply remind you of those beliefs.

Well then, the main obstacles impeding our society's development are "the false dogma—origins unknown—according to which common human values must take precedence over class interests" and (no less false, one must suppose) "the dogma on the need to transfer power from the party to the soviets" (in this connection it must be demanded that the Supreme Soviet declare all elections null and void). And, all in all, "we are going from Copernicus to Ptolemy, from Marx to Brzezinski, and from Lenin to Abalkin, behind whom loom Shmelev and others like him." Naturally, the transition to a market economy is "a dangerous, ignorant, illusory adventure." Proposals to "expel Mr. Yakovlev [member of Politburo and secretary of CPSU Central Committee] from the party for the collapse of the press and ideology and put him on trial for betraying the motherland," "cut out the cancerous tumors eating away at the nation—the journal OGONEK and other publications, including PRAVDA," "ban the broadcasting of depraved music on radio and television in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and henceforth clear all broadcasts with the Russian Communist Party Central Committee," and so forth have become commonplace... All this was also said at the first stage of the "initiative

congress," so consistency could be considered its participants' strong point. This is further evidenced by the proclaimed belief that their congress "is the supreme manifestation of communist initiative!"

The second stage was not without "spirit" either, of course. One delegate, for example, who happens to be a Leningrad City Soviet deputy, said that he considers it his task to do battle "with the [Leningrad City Soviet Chairman] Sobchak gang," which prompted a number of objections against the speaker in the Leningrad City Soviet itself. I must also remark, of course, on the speech by the American emigre, Arnold Lokshin, who, although not a Soviet citizen himself, took it upon himself to denounce the forces that have destroyed an "efficient economic mechanism" in the country that has given him asylum. The emigre personally named a whole series of USSR people's deputies who he alleged are CIA agents and praised the United Front of Working People's economic program, saying that if this program were not put into effect "terror awaits you, as in East Europe! Socialism is in danger!"

It is interesting that Lokshin was honored with a standing ovation and that the Leningrad State University lecturer who took the floor after him not only failed to remark on the amazing tactlessness of the emigre's statements but even stressed: "The general secretary has his own assessment of the situation in the country, and the political emigre Lokshin is doing the general secretary's job for him"...

In the end, however, the "initiators" compromised with the "center" and did not proclaim themselves to be the leaders of the RSFSR's 10 million communists without prior arrangement: They simply named their candidates for members of the Central Committee which is to be elected by the All-Russia Party Conference. This has given rise to jubilation among those who see this as a step toward preserving unity and once again consolidating the healthy forces. It is another matter that the "initiators" have threatened that, if the party conference and the 28th congress do not go as they want, their candidates will act as members of the Central Committee regardless of the outcome of any vote...

It is these people who intend to restore the leading, guiding role in our society to **their** party. And I would like to emphasize that that is their right. Let **their** Central Committee lead **their** party from victory unto victory, just as long as this is done through the parliamentary elections which they still so decisively reject. Because nowadays it is not enough to proclaim yourself to be the bearer of the ultimate truth. You also need arguments which "people can get to grips with."

I fear that we will nevertheless have to abandon one more carefully protected myth: The myth of unity, which is supposedly our greatest asset. It has long been common knowledge that you cannot gauge "the average temperature in a hospital."

...Incidentally, the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" will be holding its congress in Moscow Saturday [16 Jun]. Its representatives will also be going to the Russian conference with their own program.

We will have to wait and see what happens.

Acid Leak Successfully Neutralized in Tomsk

PM1606155990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Next Door to Danger"]

[Text] A hydrochloric acid leak from a tank car was discovered at 0400 hours in Tomsk. The struggle against the after-effects of the accident lasted two days: Specialist chemical protection subunits and firemen dug a ditch to collect the toxic liquid and neutralized the leaking acid using lime and calcinated salt [kaltsinirovannaya sol].

A radio alert was issued and the militia cordoned off the area. The leaders of the cutting instruments plant which owns the acid container could not give an immediate answer to the question of how many years the tank car had been serving as a mobile storage facility.

This time there were no casualties or visible serious consequences. It merely shows yet again that the city and its inhabitants are prisoners of a potentially explosive situation which has built up at the storage depot located in the city center. The question of relocating the depots that belong to many Tomsk plants outside the city has been raised many times before. The city soviet executive committee even adopted a decision. But the departments, which find the move disadvantageous, have ignored the resolution.

Pollution Forces Closure of Dagestan Beaches

PM2606140790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 7

[Own Correspondent A. Kazikhanov report: "Dagestan's Beaches Becoming Deserted"]

[Text] Makhachkala—The Dagestan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers has adopted a decision to close beaches on the Caspian shore because of the adverse epidemiological situation.

This news has stunned everyone. It seemed that here in Dagestan, with its golden beaches, the sea's waters would always be curative as the scientists claim—the rodony [as transliterated; meaning unknown] beat against the shore. But according to a report from the Makhachkala Hygiene and Epidemiology Center, the bacteriological pollution indicators here are 48 times above the norm, and the figure for chemical pollution is 10 times above the norm. Within the city boundary, 60,000 cubic meters of untreated effluent are discharged into the sea every 24 hours. A large part of the city has no storm drainage. The drainage that exists is used very badly.

Essentially the Caspian is being turned into a gigantic cesspit, if it has not become one already. Typically, instead of building treatment works and obtaining help from the republics whose citizens vacation here, people in Dagestan are holding countless conferences on "improving" and "intensifying" the situation.

Western Republics

Program Worked Out for Return of Crimean Tatars

LD1205133890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0523 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 12 May (TASS)—The concept of a state program for the Crimean Tatars' return to the Crimea has been worked out. As Valeriy Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the state commission on problems of the Crimean Tatar people noted in an interview with a TASS correspondent, it specifies methods for the Crimean Tatars' organized return to the places of their historical residence while ensuring normal living and working conditions for the whole population of the Crimea.

According to the interview, there are estimated to be 330-350,000 Crimean Tatars. They live throughout the USSR, but the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], Krasnodar Kray in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the Tajik SSR, and the southern oblasts of the Ukraine are the most compact areas of their present settlement. The return of the Crimean Tatars to permanent residence in Crimea Oblast must be effected only on a voluntary basis and be carried out in an organized manner in three forms. The first is state-organized—according to a worked-out timetable, taking maximum account of individual attachments and involving the simultaneous solution of questions relating to development of the production sphere, housing, social and cultural amenities, and the infrastructure. The second is individual. This form of return frees the state from the need to provide housing. Housing is acquired at the individual's own expense, either through exchange or by building. The third form is a group return, which is based on various forms of economic relationships—leasing, family contracting, cooperatives, etc. The organized return will start in 1991 and will, in the main, be completed in 1996.

The interview points out that the capital investment allocated to Crimea Oblast is being used mainly for boosting the capacity of construction contracting organizations and for developing the base of the construction industry. Settling will take place within the structure of the existing urban and rural settlements, and also by reviving abandoned villages and creating new inhabited localities. Additional capital investment will be required for the integrated solution of questions affecting the normal living and working conditions of the resettled population. This refers, above all, to housing, schools, children's pre-school institutions, and trade, service, and public catering enterprises.

All the program assignments will be supported by the necessary material and financial resources, food and non-food goods at the expense of union funds, and also of the resources of the republics from which the Crimean Tatars will be returning. Valeriy Doguzhiyev stressed that the program must provide for a complex of measures relating to ideological backup for the return of the Crimean Tatars, and for the revival of the Crimean Tatar language, culture, and training of national personnel.

Gomel Strike Committee Presents Demands

LD1705160690 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 0515 GMT 17 May 90

[Text] The recently formed strike committee in Gomel has addressed a list of demands for the consideration of the governments of the USSR and the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. The committee unites the representatives of over 80 enterprises situated in Gomel itself and in some rayons. The list, addressed to the local, republican and all-union organs of power and to President Gorbachev, contains 25 points. Almost all of them concern the problems caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe.

It is doubtful whether the demands can be met in a short span of time. We all know that the recent one-day strike at the Gomselmash and Kirov tool-building associations cost the country nearly R3 million. It would not be difficult to calculate what losses the country would sustain if, say, 50 enterprises did the same.

The letter says that if by 15 June there is no specific reply with proposals on by what dates the listed demands will be met, the strike committee reserves the right to resort to a strike.

Cities Refuse To Recognize New Moldavian Flag

PM1405105990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Eduard Kondratov under the rubric "Direct Line; IZVESTIYA Correspondents Report": "They Disagree With New Symbol"]

[Text] Kishinev—The inhabitants of Tiraspol, Bendery, and Rybnitsa cities and a number of rayons of the left bank of the Dnestr have refused to recognize the "tricolor"—the new state flag of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR].

Back on 27 April the blue, yellow, and red flag was approved legislatively as the state flag but to this day it has not been hoisted on the other side of the Dnestr. In Tiraspol the question has not even been discussed and the attempt of activists of the Moldavian "Vatra" society to set up the tricolor on the city soviet building in Bendery met with a resolute rebuff from workers. The

day before May Day and immediately after sessions of these cities' city soviets adopted decisions not to recognize the legality of the amendment to the Moldavian SSR Constitution on changing the national symbol.

On 4 May at the resumed session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet many deputies indignantly attacked the lawbreakers and demanded sanctions, criminal proceedings, and the deprivation of their powers as deputies for the leaders of the rebel city soviets. The Supreme Soviet repealed these decisions and issued a deadline—the "tricolor" must be raised before 9 May. The response was the protest meeting of many thousands in Tiraspol the day before May Day and the sessions of local soviets in Bendery and Rybnitsa cities, which confirmed their nonrecognition of the tricolor flag.

The parliamentary arguments of the opponents of the "tricolor" are as follows: The deputies believe that the Supreme Soviet did not have the right to copy the flags of foreign states, to wit Romania and the Republic of Chad, which have the same colors arranged in the same way. If the flag had the Moldavian SSR crest that would be another matter. So far there is deadlock.

The Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet session is continuing its work. The deputies have discussed the draft law on changes and additions to the Moldavian SSR Constitution regarding articles 6, 7, and 49. In accordance with the law which has been adopted the clause on the leading role of the republic's communist party is removed from these articles. Henceforth all the party's political parties, public organizations, and mass movements can take an equal part in the management of the state through their representatives in the organs of power.

Moldavian Communist Party Congress Viewed

PM2905084790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by special correspondents A. Pasechnik and I. Podsvirov: "No Sitting in the Trenches: Notes from the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] Kishinev—...It is hot in Moldavia this year. In the afternoons the thermometer generally rises almost to the August level. There was no snow in winter and now the almost rainless spring has had frosts recently, too—the kind of things that make the crop farmer anxious. And not just him: More than half of the republic's budget depends on the productivity of the land. But here is the real problem. After traveling a good few kilometers along well-tended Moldavian roads to visit collectives we saw in people's eyes and divined in their words a quite different anxiety—anxiety for peace and calm in their land and for its future.

Well, these fears are not unfounded. The pointer on the Moldavian barometer moved away from "fine" long ago. The unbridled storms of rallies and strikes, the mass violations of law and order, and the fierce outbursts of interethnic feuds... Against this background the noble idea of national rebirth and the salvation of the Moldavian language, culture, and even statehood itself, which went into decline during the years of troubles and stagnation, completely took hold of the masses. And in a number of instances it became the winning card in the political phrasemaking game. The invisible line of national segregation unfortunately not only ran through the newspaper pages but also through various declarations and statements and decisions adopted by sessions and party meetings. The suspicion that is being fueled—the most terrifying kind!—cuts a black swath through people's souls.

On a number of occasions PRAVDA and other central press organs have written about the dangerous development of events in Moldavia, about the upstart "politickers" who skillfully exploit the ideas of national rebirth for their own ends, and about the widening gulf of interethnic alienation. It has been noted that this state was promoted, deliberately or otherwise, by the policy of the former Central Committee leadership headed until last November by S. Grossu.

"All that is true," the people we spoke to, mainly ordinary party workers, told us on the eve of the congress. "But how long can you go on talking about the mistakes of the republic's previous leadership, the one before that, and so on? Every Central Committee plenum or aktiv meeting criticized Bodyul, Grossu, Smirnov, and other former leaders. If the congress begins opening old wounds, no good will come of it."

Let us say straight away: The Moldavian Communist Party congress largely managed to avoid this pitfall. To a considerable extent because the political report on the Communist Party's activity and the program for its renewal, delivered by Central Committee First Secretary P. Luchinskiy, oriented delegates toward constructive dialogue and the search for a way out of the impasse. The belated attacks on the culprits which had become traditional at recent party forums in the republic gave way to a sober analysis of the present situation. And the equally traditional gloating over "discredited" leaders' mistakes gave way to considered conclusions from them. The congress became an important milestone on the path of consolidating healthy forces.

The keynote speaker and participants in the debates gave serious thought to the new and difficult conditions in which the Communist Party must now work. After all, even before article six of the Constitution was repealed, the party had ceased to enjoy a monopoly position in the republic's political arena. More than 20 movements of different types have begun to play their role here. And a very significant role, furthermore. Particularly when you are talking about the Moldavian People's Front, the "Unitatia" ("Unity") intermovement, and also "Gagauz-Khalky," which largely predetermined the course of the recent election campaign and the new soviets' first steps.

At first glance it may seem that the Communists scored a convincing victory in the elections to the country's parliament where they won over 80 percent of the seats. Strange as it may seem, however, this completely failed to produce the consolidation so keenly awaited. On the contrary, from the very first days of the congress session, which interrupted the sitting, deputies divided along national lines. There is only one explanation: the political convictions of many Communist deputies had been undermined. Was that not why they were the last ones to call the tune when forming the Supreme Soviet's leading organs? Even though, you would think, in a multiparty system they should struggle even more actively to preserve the position of the ruling party.

The cadre merry-go-round and the erosion of positions of a number of party committees, from rayon to republic level, has had an extremely adverse effect on the state of the party's grass-roots components. As V. Yegorov, secretary of the "Mikroprovod" science-and-production association party committee, figuratively put it in his speech, "we are sitting in the trenches and we do not know who will summon us tomorrow or where..." Hence the low profile of rank-and-file party members.

In brief, this factor was also vividly reflected in the fact that out of almost 1,200 congress delegates the working class and peasantry have... 67 representatives. And if you recall that ordinary workers received fewer than 10 seats in the Moldavian parliament, a definite trend can already be seen. We have known quite a few occasions in history when the people's fate was settled on their behalf but without their involvement, have we not? This time the situation is no simpler; it is even more complex. The ordinary worker takes what was left unsaid from the platform of the session, the congress, or the plenum with him to the rally or the strike—but with a different emotional coloring and a fierce implacability. It is in such an atmosphere that the "enemy image" is born. And it erupts in those places where there is little resistance. It is fast to erupt but slow to heal. In this case, in the sphere of interethnic interests.

That is why the delegates' speeches and the draft program for the Communist Party's renewal published before the congress talked a lot about the need to achieve a national consensus. It was stated clearly that the Moldavian Communist Party, while advocating national rebirth, rejects theories and views which absolutize ethnic exclusivity and lead to national egocentrism or chauvinism.

A precise and clear position—that is already quite a lot. But as L. Tsurkan, first secretary of the Tiraspol party gorkom [city committee], noted in his speech, that position must be backed up by an equally precise and constructive program. And that is precisely what is lacking. Admittedly, the Communists' forum stated that the Central Committee intends to put forward a number of legislative initiatives relating to nationalities problems—the sovereignty of the republic, treaties with the Union, legal guarantees for national minorities, and so forth. The questions are exceptionally important. But again it is not clear what those initiatives are, who is elaborating them, and how long it will take. Will people then complain, as before, that this or that decision was hasty and not sufficiently discussed within the party or among the people?..

Incidentally, this is a chronic ailment which still hasn't been finally eradicated. Sometimes the impression is created that the adoption of some laws, resolutions, or decisions is not the means to an end but the end in itself. Some people seriously believe that these documents, once adopted, begin working of their own accord. This point was made in particular at the congress by T. Smirnova, a teacher from Kishinev. Is it not time to stop complaining about the nonfulfillment of the laws on the language and actually set about implementing them?

The Central Committee proposal on restructuring the party press, and particularly on the fate of SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, which was expressed in the report, was a surprise to many delegates. The plan is to turn it into a weekly, reserving the status of Central Committee organ exclusively for the newspaper MOLDOVA SOCIALISTE (with a Russian-language version). In an open letter from the editorial board's collective to the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress published literally two days after that statement, journalists resolutely opposed this step which in their opinion was a quite deliberate step. They declared with alarm that the use of coercive tactics is spreading in the republic, ranging from insults to physical assault against all who have their own position and viewpoint on events happening here. This is the background to the attack on SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, without which one-third of the republic's population will be deprived of daily party information using Russian as its original language. The Central Committee's present leadership, the letter goes on to note, is not giving a due rebuff to these dangerous tendencies. They think that the tactic of yielding to pressure (quite a few other examples of this were cited at the congress, too) conflicts with the undoubted desire to restore people's confidence.

Only a real political organization of like-minded people who have not just a single form of membership card but also a single purpose and a strong and effective structure is capable of playing a firm role, the congress noted. Of course, the ultimate question here is: What should the Moldavian Communist Party be like, what form should its independence take? During the report and election campaign held on the eve of the congress and at the congress itself the most varied viewpoints were expressed, even the view that the Moldavian Communist Party should be called the party of democratic socialism.

Discussion of this problem was mostly connected with the CPSU Central Committee Platform. If we, certain speakers argued, are moving toward a humane, democratic socialism, socialism with a human face, why should the party change its name to socialist. It would be more honest that way, it was claimed, it would spare us

much disagreement. The hall was in uproar at this, people mostly being opposed. It must nevertheless be acknowledged that the idea of transforming the Moldavian Communist Party into a socialist party is alive in the minds of not just "informals." Certain republic leaders are also enthused by it. At the press conference held on the eve of congress Central Committee Secretary Ye. Sobor expressed his personal opinion in favor of renaming the Moldavian Communist Party in a socialist way. Other people we spoke with did not forget to remind us that "social democrat blood" flows in their veins.

The question, as we can see, does exist. You cannot just dismiss it. And yet anxiety does creep in. But does not this lack of ideological clarity lead to confusion and uncertainty of action?

Very trenchant disputes cannot, of course, be avoided as part of partywide discussion. Such discussion, P. Luchinskiy stated, is a normal phenomenon that is in keeping with the spirit of our dynamic times. But the main speaker and the majority of other speakers agreed that it is more realistic today to think in terms of an autonomous Moldavian Communist Party on the same platform as the CPSU.

The communists invariably linked this major discussion about the status of their communist party with the republic's future. And that is understandable: Real state sovereignty is inconceivable without the autonomy of the communist party. As, incidentally, is the reverse. Even if we do not take the whole gamut of opinions current in society, we should at least cite the two basic widely discussed options for Moldavia' future: namely, within a renewed federation or as an autonomous state. The congress was eventually unequivocal, favoring the establishment of Moldavian SSR state sovereignty on the basis of a new union treaty. But, as P. Tsymay, first secretary of Bendery Gorkom [City Party Committee], observed, the republic's communists approached their congress without a proper conception of this sovereignty, incluing its socioeconomic aspects.

As D. Chimpoyesh, director of the Chadyr-Lungskiy pilot experimental plant, correctly noted, involvement with political problems takes place in Moldavia at the expense of economic ones. Although it is clear to everyone that you cannot have a strong policy without a strong economy. The former party diktat in the economy is no longer conceivable. However, it is true that in conditions of expanding democracy, autonomy of collectives, and demarcation of functions among party, soviet, and economic organs of the republic buckpassing in the running of the economy and lack of direct cadre responsibility have intensified. One speaker remarked with bitter irony on this score: "No one wants to work today, everybody wants to talk."

Added to the overall atmosphere in the country, these negative features have sharply worsened the economic situation. The housing problem, for example,—with 200,000 people now on the waiting list—has drastically deteriorated. Meanwhile R30 million have been spent to no purpose on land improvement—equivalent to 30 unbuilt multistory apartment blocks. The consumer market is exhausted. And, additionally, the prospects for the harvest are unfavorable—a grim situation all around, so to speak. Is the communist party entitled perhaps to abdicate the heavy burden of repsonsibility for the fate of the people?

But it is not enough to grasp this and declare socioeconomic policy to be pivotal to its practical activity. Actual deeds are required. "We've got a problem, comrades," G. Nekit, first secretary of Tarakliyskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee], remarked with angusih from the rostrum, "we will have no fruit, and the winter crops and alfalfa are rotting. While Kishinev remains unconcerned..."

Eighteen months ago, at one of the first party aktiv meetings assembled by the republic's new leadership, it was widely stated that the situation would be stabilized on the basis of a very rapid solution of our acute socioeconomic problems. And not just stated. Working parties, to which Central Committee Bureau members were assigned, were set up for each area. And yet everyone has now forgotten about these intentions. However, it will be difficult to build the republic's economic sovereignty and enhance the communist party's authority on good intentions alone, even the most sincere ones. That is why the demand that the communist party must decisively alter its tactics and strategy was a constant refrain. It is time to switch from defense to offense!

The congress elected P. Luchinskiy first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee by secret ballot. The leading organs of the Central Committee were formed, being three-fourths renewed. And a resolution and a number of decisios were adopted.

Radioactive Pollution of Kiev Reservoir Revealed

LD1305125790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2010 GMT 12 May 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] One of the most fearful and insoluble of our problems is the ecological crisis.

[Begin recording] [T.A. Kharchenko, acting director of Institute of Hydrobiology of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Science—identified by screen caption] At the present time, the radionucleid content of the water of the Kiev reservoir is in the range of 10-50 times higher than it was before the accident at the Chernobyl atomic power station. However, one must note here that at the present time a very dangerous trend is being noted: these radionucleids are accumulating in connection with migration along trophic levels. For example, one could give the textbook example, that if there is one unit in the water, there will be a million of

these units in a fish. [video shows Kharchenko in lab, scientists taking and examining samples]

[M.I. Kuzmenko, doctor of biology—identified by screen caption] As a result of the accident at Chernobyl, 50 million [word indistinct] of radioactive substances were thrown into the environment. A massive quantity of them fell on the catchment area of the Dnepr, its tributaries and reservoirs. At the present time it is practically impossible to remove this colossal radioactive pollution from, let us say, the Kiev reservoir, by technical means. We are obliged to take this fact into account. In such conditions, we must reduce to a minimum man's negative influence on the Dnepr basin, and eliminate chemical pollution and the surface run-off from towns and settlements. [Video shows Kuzmenko interviewed by reservoir, shots of water] [end recording] A month after Chernobyl, I went to Kiev with a film crew. Hundreds of people were bathing in the Dnepr at that time. It turns out that the Dnepr was already polluted.

KGB Asked To Investigate Desecration in Ukraine

LD1405110590 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 0200 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Ivan Drach, Stanislav Telnyuk, Mykola Zhyulnskyy, and other members of the commission for safeguarding the heritage of poet Vasyl Stus have submitted a statement to the republic's Supreme Soviet, Interior Ministry, and KGB. The document demands that the government and law-maintaining organs investigate the acts of vandalism on the graves of poet Vasyl Stus and human rights defender Yuriy Lytvyn and also the destruction of sculputures-portraits of well known figures from the history of Ukraine in the workyard of Ivan Honchar.

Ukrainian Parliament To Discuss Sovereignty

LD1405115990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1130 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] On 15 May the Ukrainian parliament will begin work. It will form the republic's new government. Vitaliy Masol, the present Ukrainian premier, has declared that the subject of the republic's sovereignty is being actively discussed at present, both in political and public circles. But various meanings are contained in this concept, ranging from cosmetic repairs to the administrative command system to Ukrainian secession from members of the USSR.

Sumy Obkom First Secretary Reelected 14 May

PM1605151190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 May 90 Second Edition p 4

[Correspondent I. Lakhno report under the general heading: "Conferences Held"]

[Text] Sumy, 14 May—An oblast report and election party conference has been held to discuss the Ukrainian Communist Party oblast committee [obkom] report and the drafts of the CPSU Central Committee platform and the party statutes. In a secret ballot V.A. Shevchenko was reelected first secretary of the Sumy party obkom.

The conference elected delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress.

Caucasus

Union Troops 'Prepared' To Disarm Armenians

PM2705131190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel General Yu.V. Shatalin, commander of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops, by unnamed TASS correspondent, under the "Direct Line" rubric; place and date not stated: "From Armenia: Dangerous!"—first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Increasingly alarming news reports arrive from Armenia. There are virtually daily armed attacks by guerrillas against servicemen and rayon internal affairs departments. The quantity of stolen weapons is swelling. Lives have been lost... That was the topic of a TASS correspondent's conversation with Colonel General Yu. Shatalin, commander of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops.

[TASS] Yuriy Vasilyevich, how would you describe the situation in the republic today?

[Shatalin] Let me reply unequivocally: Extremely tense and explosive. The 20 April address by the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers, which contained an appeal to the population to voluntarily surrender stolen weapons and explosives, failed to achieve its objective. It is extremely necessary to achieve this today. Judge for yourself: Armed formations in the republic presently hold more than 2,500 units of stolen rifled weapons including 1,145 automatic weapons, about 900 units of smoothbore weapons, more than 500 combat grenades, and over 570,000 rounds of ammunition.

Let me note that the armed formations' positions are being consolidated with each passing month. Buildings and premises are being handed over to them in Yerevan and other cities, where the guerrillas deploy their headquarters. They have large numbers of motor vehicles enabling them to promptly move armed groups to different rayons in the republic.

[TASS] What is known about the composition and structure of armed formations, about their organizational principles?

[Shatalin] According to information at our disposal, there are several armed organizations in Armenia. Perhaps the most active one is the so-called "Armenian National Army" [ANA]. It comprises detachments made up of dozens of men. They are deployed all over the republic. According to statements by this "army's" leadership, it is fully armed with modern firearms and has a large quantity of motor vehicles. The guerrillas belonging to it are trained in special training centers where, under the leadership of instructors who are former "Afghans" as a rule, they are trained in shooting, the use of explosives and communications equipment, and so on. Documents issued by this armed organization contain the demand that all servicemen of Armenian nationality be recalled from the Soviet Army's ranks for service in the ANA, and also that draftees be assigned to it.

[TASS] Since weapons are available, they surely are more than likely to "make their presence known..."

[Shatalin] Certainly. After all, the guerrillas are not arming themselves simply to acquire automatic weapons and grenades as souvenirs. I shall not dwell on events along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan—enough has been said and written about them. Weapons are also "making their presence known" in the republic itself. One typical example was provided by the 9 May clash between hostile groupings in Artashatskiy Rayon. It resulted in the death of four citizens, including a nine-year old boy and an elderly woman.

Another such example was an attack by a group of armed guerrillas against the building of the Yerevan City Armenian Communist Party Committee and the republican Komsomol (Communist Youth League] Central Committee. Actually, there have been dozens of similar daring attacks.

[TASS] Yuriy Vasilyevich, everything you have said is difficult to comprehend: Why is it that no measures are taken to disarm and disband the sundry "armies," including measures by the Internal Troops?

[Shatalin] Let me tell you. The USSR Law "On the Duties and Rights of USSR MVD Internal Troops in the Maintenance of Public Order" specifically states who has the right to call the troops for the purpose of halting violations of a mass nature and threatening the life and health of citizens, in other words in situations like the one we face in Armenia. This is done on request by the Union republic's leadership, either with consent from the USSR Council of Ministers with mandatory examination of the question by the Union republic Council of Ministers, or in fulfillment of a decree by the USSR president. Despite our persistent addresses to Armenia's leadership, asking it to finally make a decision on disarming the illegal formations and call the Internal Troops for this purpose, we have received no specific reply.

Moreover, on 11 May Armenia's Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted a resolution talking about setting up unsponsored public formations, supposedly meant to prevent breaches of the law and step up the maintenance of public order. As you can see, the word "armed" does not appear there but, in my view, this is a downright capitulation in the face of armed formations which have been given a chance to exist legally.

[TASS] You are about to visit Yerevan. What is the purpose of this visit?

[Shatalin] For as long as an opportunity remains, the accumulated problems must be solved by political means. Today it is more important than ever before to bring the representatives of all forces existing in the republic around the negotiating table. It is necessary to find mutually acceptable solutions. Of course, it is also necessary to reiterate yet again the responsibility borne by those who are persistently striving to arm themselves and are preparing for combat operations, which means inevitable bloodshed.

As regards the Internal Troops, the personnel is prepared to perform the responsible tasks of disarming guerilla detachments in the republic.

Armenia Sets Up Committee for Economic Reform

NC1805150490 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0600 GMT 18 May 90

[Text] The Armenian Council of Ministers has created a permanent body called the Armenian Council of Ministers' State Committee for Economic Reform in order to radically improve management methods in the social and economic sectors, ensure the republic's gradual transition to economic autonomy, and organize the implementation of radical economic reforms.

In view of the creation of this new body, the Armenian Council of Ministers' Committee on the Improvement of Economic Mechanisms has been dissolved. A staff is being assembled to enable the new committee to carry out its responsibilities. The staff is being drawn from the apparatus of the Armenian Council of Ministers and employees of the relevant subunits of the republican ministries and departments.

The chairman of the new state committee will also occupy the post of deputy chairman of the Armenian Council of Ministers.

According to established procedure, the new state committee will coordinate the organization of economic reforms within the economic bodies of the Armenian republic's ministries and departments.

A scientific-economic council attached to the new state committee is being established to conduct in-depth and comprehensive scientific analysis of the implementation and progress of economic reform measures. Leading scientists and expert economists will be included in the committee.

In its work, the state committee will rely on the main scientific-research organizations, the Economics Institute of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, and the Economics and Planning Scientific-Research Institute of the Armenian State Planning Committee.

Under the principles of federalism and economic autonomy of the republics, the committee will coordinate relations between the economic reform plan in Armenia and the central economic bodies of the USSR, and between Armenia and other Union republics to promote inter-republican economic ties.

The committee will be tasked with management, planning, and government-level organization of the socio-economic processes, formulation [word indistinct] of the methods of application of the new economic management model, creation of equal conditions for development of all types of enterprise and ownership, elimination of manifestations of privileges in the economy and within enterprises and associations, implementation of measures for development of the market and its productive functioning, formulation of management methods for market relations, and creation of conditions to ensure the social protection of all citizens of the republic.

The ministries and departments will be informed in detail about the state committee, especially its functions and decisions. The public will also be informed through active use of the mass media.

Armenian Broadcasters on Information Exchange

NC2505162490 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 24 May 90

[Excerpts] A conference of the directors of the diaspora Armenian television and radio programs and representatives of Armenian television and radio was held between 10 and 20 May 1990 at the initiative of the Armenian Radio and Television Committee and the Committee for Cultural Ties with diaspora Armenians. [passage omitted]

The conferees engaged in a broad exchange of views, made observations, leveled criticisms, and arrived at conclusions on logical proposals.

1. It was considered essential for the Armenian and diaspora press, television, and radio to provide objective and factual items.

2. The conference condemned the mass emigration from the fatherland, considering it dangerous for the survival of Armenia and the Armenian people. It was suggested that a broad propaganda campaign be undertaken on this issue.

3. The conference expressed concern at the enormous difficulties faced by the Armenian community of Lebanon. (?It was decided) to provide every support for that important community.

4. In the name of the Armenian people the conference condemned the policy of indifference and denial pursued by the big powers, in particular by the Soviet Union and the United States, as regards the 1915 genocide of the Armenians.

5. The conference similarly condemned the unforgivable policy of procrastination of the Soviet central authorities regarding the just solution of the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]; a policy which lead to Sumgait, Kirovabad, and Baku genocides and to the inhumane blockade of Armenia and Artsakh [NKAO].

6. The conference expressed satisfaction at the emergence of a multiparty system in Armenia, hoping that democracy will take root and develop.

7. The conference decided to establish a joint structural system among the news agencies of Armenia and the diaspora, periodically exchange staff and information, and help each other in obtaining modern equipment.

8. With the aim of establishing a permanent tie between the diaspora and Armenia and of furthering this tie, it was decided to create centers which would ensure the exchange of information between Armenia and the diaspora. These are:

A. Radio "Ayb" in Paris [for Europe].

B. Boston's "Independent Armenian Radio" for the East of the United States.

C. "Horizon" television, for the West of the United States, in Los Angeles.

D. "Komitas" radio, in Montevideo, for South America.

E. "The Voice of Van," in Beirut, for the Middle and Near East.

F. SBS radio, Sydney, for Australia.

G. "Armenian Horizon" television, in Montreal, for Canada.

It was considered apropriate to recognize direct communications possibilities between Armenia and "Radio Armenia" of Montevideo, "Armenia" radio of Lyons, and the Armenian radio program of Sao Paulo.

9. The conference decided to set up an organization consisting of representatives of these centers and of the officials of Yerevan radio in order to coordinate and arrange activities.

10. The conference proposed the creation of a union, an association, between diaspora Armenian radio and television stations and Armenian radio and television in order to coordinate activities. That association will have its by-laws and special fund.

With the aim of implementing this proposal it was decided to convene an special meeting in Yerevan of the

representatives of the centers in the third quarter of 1990. The representatives of the Eastern and Western regions of the United States, Lebanon, South America, and Paris—which encompass the basic communities—will be invited to the meeting.

11. The conference decided to convene such a meeting every year, alternately in Yerevan and abroad.

It was decided to hold the 1991 conference abroad.

General's Ashes To Be Interred in Armenia

NC2505141090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0500 GMT 25 May 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] The paper informs its readers that on 24 May Galoyan, secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, chaired a meeting of the republican jubilee committee set up to organize the celebrations marking the 125th anniversary of the birth of Andranik Ozanyan [Armenian national hero who fought the Turks and Azerbaijanis during World War I].

The meeting discussed matters relating to the organization of the transfer of Andranik's ashes from France and their interment in Armenia. A commission has been set up for this purpose under Khodzhamiryan, deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers. Representatives from the republic's government, the Yerevan city soviet executive committee, and the Committee for Cultural Ties with Diaspora Armenians, scientists, writers, and leaders of the General Andranik association are included in the commission.

The commission has been instructed to draw up a schedule to decide on the date of the transfer and the site of the interment of the national hero's ashes, the composition of the republic's delegation to France, and organizational matters concerning coordinated action with the local Armenian community, and to inform the public about these through the press and television.

Martuninskiy Raykom First Secretary Penalized

NC2505131290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 23 May 90

[Excerpts] In accordance with the decision adopted by the CPSU Central Committee's Party Control Committee, the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee has examined work by the Martuninskiy Rayon Party Committee [Raykom] to realize the decisions adopted by the party and government for normalizing the situation in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. The Party Control Committee's decision pointed out that the measures included in the party and government decisions to normalize the situation in the NKAO are not being put into effect in NKAO's Martuninskiy Rayon. Martuninskiy Raykom and Grigoryan, its first secretary, have disregarded the CPSU Central Committee's instructions that they are to carry out (?productive) work to contribute toward the effort made to unite the party committees, communists, and the steadfast forces in the NKAO, achieve national reconciliation, and implement party and political measures to defuse tension in and around the NKAO. Furthermore, they have failed to act responsibly and [words indistinct], maintained a conciliatory position which lacked initiative, and failed to carry out work to contribute toward fulfilling the USSR Supreme Soviet and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo's demands for normalizing the NKAO situation. [passage omitted]

The Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee has decided to recognize the decision adopted by the CPSU Central Committee's Control Committee on 23 March 1990 on the work carried out by the Stepanakert City Party Committee and Martuninskiy Raykom on the party and government decisions regarding normalizing the situation in the NKAO. Grigoryan, first secretary of the Martuninskiy Raykom and a CPSU member since 1963 who carries party card No. 07664907, was stripped of his CPSU membership for strongly resisting the party and government decisions on normalizing the NKAO situation, grossly violating the USSR and Azerbaijan SSR Constitutions, closely participating in illegal arrangements which provoked interethnic discord and discrimination against the Azerbaijanis, establishing illegal organizations, and, as the head of the rayon party organization, allowing serious shortcomings which created crisis situations for all aspects of rayon life. It was noted that in accordance with the decision adopted during the plenum of the Martuninskiy Raykom, Grigoryan was removed from his post.

Baku Reports Azerbaijan Census Results

NC2905114990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 24 May 90

[Text] Our editorial office has received the report compiled by the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] State Statistics Committee on the results of the census held in the Azerbaijan SSR during the all-Union census in 1989. As is common knowledge, the all-Union census was held in January 1989.

The report notes that the census was held in a complex situation due to the incidents in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The census was carried out in 1989 after a mass explanatory campaign and with the assistance and practical help of the party and soviet organs and the people. The registering of the people took place in the [words indistinct] and the schools.

The USSR State Statistics Committee rejected the proposal that a census be carried out in the NKAO after the situation in that oblast is normalized. Consequently, the USSR State Statistics Committee has been unable to publish statistical information in connection with the

NKAO. Strenuous efforts are being carried out at the present time to hold a census in the NKAO.

The final computerized census lists for Azerbaijan, which were provided by the Azerbaijan SSR State Statistics Committee in connection with the all-Union census in 1989, also included information on age levels, [words indistinct], number of families and their structure, level of education, nationalities and languages, and means of subsistence. The existing population of the Azerbaijan SSR numbered 7,037,900 by 12 January 1989. The [word indistinct] population was 7,021,200.

Compared with the census held in 1979, the existing population of the republic increased by 17 percent, or 1,010,000 people.

The report on the census that was held in the republic will be published in the press.

Georgia Celebrates Independence Day Anniversary

LD2805202890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 28 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The day of the restoration of state independence has been marked in Georgia. (N. Gongadze—captioned—video report opens with archive film footage showing marching soldiers, preceded by a caption reading: "Tbilisi, 26 May 1920. The day of celebration of the second anniversary of the independence of the Georgian Democratic Republic."]

[Gongadze] Seventy years separate us from these film shots. For almost 70 years the truth has been hushed up. They are celebrating the second anniversary of signing the treaty on the establishment of the Georgian Democratic Republic. Its government and people looked toward the future with faith and hope, not reckoning on perfidy, treachery, and invasion.

Today is the day of the restoration of state independence and is celebrated on the very same street and the tricolor flags of the Democratic Republic are unfurled on vehicles, in the hands of passers by and on the balconies of the houses. [Video shows street scenes showing flags being waved and interview of man speaking in Georgian followed by Russian rendition]

[Unidentified man] There is profound meaning in these colors. Black embodies a dark and joyless past. White—the future, clean and bright like the peaks of the Caucasus. Crimson is the colour of the blood spilled by the heroes of Georgia. I am happy today that I am again in my homeland after an absence of 69 years, and that I again have the opportunity to celebrate this day which is a happy one for every Georgian.

[Gongadze] At numerous meetings held in various districts of the city there has been serious discussion about everything which concerns the people, what it is taking into the future, and what are the prospects for the national liberation movement. [video shows packed street meetings, banners carried by men in black Georgian national dress and street interview of man]

[V. Kotetishvili, professor—captioned] There is a sense of joy, but it is not full joy because we are celebrating an independence which was lost—attained at one time—but lost. There will be true happiness when we really get that sovereignty.

[Gongadze] So you have faith?

[Kotetishvili] Without a doubt. Otherwise it is not worth living.

[Announcer in studio] Well, of course, it is necessary to know and it is necessary to restore historical truth. But what then? To return to what there was before, throwing away the realities of the present day, or to seek a reasonable compromise for the sake of a more humane future? Well, one wishes that we all choose the right path.

Impact of Uranium Mining on Caucasus Spa Towns

PM1705082790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 90 p 2

[O. Shapovalov report: "No Cur(i)e! Uranium Mines Threaten Caucasian Curative Springs"]

[Text] ...The tunnel leading into the depths of the mountain smelled damp. And cold "as the grave"—a pessimist would have added. A trolley's unlubricated wheels squeaked. Three workers had broken off for a smoke with perfectly contented expressions on their faces, as though they were standing not at the entrance to the underworld but at a bar counter. I had never been to a uranium mine before. Still less such a one as this—at the very center of the world-renowned resorts of Kavminvody [Kavkazskiye Mineralnyye Vody]. Everyone has heard about Narzan, the local mineral water, and about the curative springs, but few people have heard about the uranium.

The secret was kept from foreigners, and from our own people too. Why worry? While patients were receiving treatment for kidney stones, nearby miners were calmly crushing uranium ore. Beshtau Mountain, at whose foot Pyatigorsk lies, resembles a giant termites' nest, its interior having been so eaten away by passages and workings. When there was hardly any uranium left there, the miners selected another mountain.

Whereas the "nuclear department" endeavored—let us give it its due—as far as possible not to make a mess of and spoil the landscape (after all, it is a resort, and the "trash" is very specific), others, particularly construction workers, did not stand on ceremony. Razed to rubble and disfigured, the mountains of Medovaya, Zmeyka, and Sheludivaya became, as it were, the sights of Kavminvody. The "ninth wave" of indignation at the

ecological barbarity overtook the land reclamation and power workers before others.

Last summer P. Verkhovykh, USSR deputy minister of atomic power engineering and industry, signed an unprecedented order—"On the Organization of Work on... Propaganda of Atomic Power Engineering." The regime of special secrecy inculcated in the former Ministry of Medium Machine Building boomeranged on the ministry itself.

Whereas the natural radiation background usually stands at 15-20 microroentgen an hour, at individual points in the city of Lermontov, where miners lived until recently behind a barrier, it is 60 microroentgen an hour. Above places where there are ore deposits this figure leaps to 180-200, and in the region of mine storehouses, where people also work, up to 400 microroentgen. Nevertheless, frequently only silicosis, which is caused by any dust, not necessarily radioactive dust, was noted among the miners' occupational diseases. Now even this disease is extremely rare. The majority of workers and specialists have worked here since the city was founded (1956), but they certainly do not produce the impression of being people with sapped health. Even pensioners (women retire on pension at age 40, and men at 50). There are four secondary schools, an eight-year school, and a secondary vocational and technical school in Lermontov. In terms of mental and physical data the children who were born and live here are not inferior to their coevals from cities standing not on uranium but on ordinary soil.

The "secret" pages in Lermontov's history, the barriers, the sealed containers of uranium leaving here by rail—all this is now in the past. A decision has been made to stop extracting crude uranium in Kavminvody. This is right, although this raw material, thanks to the inventive efforts of the local miners, was the cheapest in the country, as they say.

...Acquaintances telephone to ask whether they should go to Kavminvody in connection with the "newly revealed circumstances." If you can get a travel pass—go, of course. In any case the sanatoriums of the former fourth administration of the Health Ministry, of which there are plenty here, are not standing empty this season.

Central Asia

NKAO Rayon Secretary Expelled From CPSU

90US1019A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 24 May 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] **In accordance with a decision of the party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee, the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee has examined the issue of the work of the Martuninskiy Rayon party committee [raykom] to implement party and government decrees on the normalization of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] of the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].**

The decision of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee correctly indicates that the measures to normalize the situation in the region which were designated in party and government decrees are not being implemented in Martuninskiy Rayon, NKAO, Azerbaijan SSR.

Notwithstanding the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the need for party committees and communists in the NKAO to conduct purposeful work to consolidate healthy forces and effect national reconciliation and the need to implement effective party and political measures to defuse tensions around Nagornyy Karabakh and the oblast itself, the Martuninskiy Raykom and Comrade V.S. Grigoryan, its first secretary, have demonstrated a lack of initiative and a willingness to compromise and by their practical activities have not contributed to the implementation of the demands of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo concerning normalization of the situation in the NKAO.

A relaxation of work within the party and significant neglect of party organizational, ideological, and cadre issues were a serious defect in the activities of the party raykom.

Regulations on deadlines for conducting plenums and party assemblies were broken everywhere in the party committees and local party organizations. For example, over the last year only two issues were examined by the Martuninskiy Raykom at two plenums and by the local party organizations at their assemblies: "On Elections of Delegates to the National Congress of People's Representatives of NKAO" and "On the Decree of the 28 November 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet, of the Joint Session of the Armenian Communist Party Supreme Soviet, and of the 1 December 1989 NKAO National Council." [as published]

Separatist feelings have become stronger in the party organizations of Martuninskiy Rayon. In November 1989 the majority of the party organizations adopted a decision to withdraw from the Azerbaijan Communist Party, and a number of them halted payment of membership dues by communists and discontinued enrollment in the party as of December 1989.

During the last two years when interethnic relations became especially aggravated and nationalist tendencies became especially strong, the party committees of Martuninskiy Rayon did not take an offensive internationalist position and practically abandoned work on the internationalist education of Communists and the population. For the most part this is connected with the personal position of V.S. Grigoryan, first secretary of the party committee, who believed that "there can be no talk of internationalism."

In the Martuninskiy Raykom there was a widespread practice of dismissing without grounds workers who did not agree with the style and working methods of the rayon's leadership, and serious violations in the work with cadres were permitted.

The Martuninskiy Raykom did not implement the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo to conduct an election campaign in the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast party organization jointly with the republic's organizational committee and to conduct the necessary work to restore the authority of the Nagorno-Karabakh Obkom [Oblast Party Committee] of the Azerbaijan Communist Party.

The indicated defects in the activities of the raykom led to a drop in the party organization's role in the life of the labor collectives, to further complication of the situation in NKAO, and to nonfulfillment of the national economic plans and the 24 March 1988 decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures to Accelerate the Social and Economic Development of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR in 1988-1995." Moreover, a strike in which the rayon's workers participated was declared as of 29 January 1990, after the arrival of representatives of the republic's organizational committee for a regular visit. V.S. Grigoryan not only did not give the proper evaluation for such actions by the communists, but in the name of the strikers he demanded the departure of the members of the organizational committee from the oblast, making this demand a condition for ending the strike.

Comrade V.S. Grigoryan has shown himself an ardent nationalist during the entire period of his work as first secretary and especially during the development of events in NKAO and around it. And actions directed at inciting interethnic hostility, oppression of Azeris, and the forcible expulsion of Azeris from the oblast were committed under his direct leadership and with his participation. Azeris were used for difficult, poorly-paid jobs in all of the rayon's Armenian populated areas, for the most part in the raising of livestock. Some of those who had worked 20-30 years on farms did not have their own housing and were compelled to live in nonresidential buildings on the farms. Azeris living in villages with a mixed population were not allotted plots of land and were not allowed to build their own homes.

Prejudice toward Azeris is also clearly reflected in the fact that during 1982-1985, when Grigoryan was first secretary of Askeranskiy Raykom, 70 percent of those brought to court on criminal charges were Azeri even though Azeris only make up 30 percent of the rayon. The rayon's leadership paid practically no attention to the areas populated by Azeris, which is graphically proved by the present condition of social facilities in these villages. In order to fulfill the plan for state purchases of meat V.S. Grigoryan, using the militia, forced Azeris to surrender their personal livestock at the procurement stations.

Working as the first secretary, V.S. Grigoryan simultaneously had his own home and a state apartment in the city of Stepanakert, as well as an apartment in the town of Askeran which he used exclusively for passing the time in the company of people of doubtful reputation.

As the first secretary of the party raykom, he took an active part in the creation of the nationalist groups "Krunk" and "Miatsum" and headed the so-called "National Council of NKAO."

The Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee resolved to be guided by the 23 March 1990 decision of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Work of the Stepanakert Party Gorkom [city party committee] and Martuninskiy Party Raykom To Implement Party and Government Decrees on the Normalization of the Situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR."

For active opposition to party and government rulings on the normalization of the situation in NKAO, gross violation of the Constitutions of the USSR and the Azerbaijan SSR, active participation in the incitement of interethnic tensions, organization of illegal activities against Azeris, creation of illegal organizations, and serious errors in the leadership of the rayon party organization which have led to crises in all the spheres of the life of the rayon, Vachagan Santurovich Grigoryan, first secretary of the Martuninskiy Raykom, member of the CPSU since 1963, membership card No. 07664907, has been expelled from the CPSU.

It was taken into consideration that V.S. Grigoryan was dismissed from the position he occupied by decision of the Martuninskiy Raykom.

Central Asia Moves Against Drug Plantations

LD0506144990 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 5 Jun 90

[Text] The Interior Ministries of the Soviet Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan are conducting an operation code-named Poppy-90. The aim is to locate and destroy illicit plantations of poppies and hemp used for producing narocotics. Similar operations were mounted in the past but failed to bring down the scale of narcotic plants' cultivation. This time the operation involves 10,000 policemen and helicopters. The action will be continued in other areas of the Soviet Union that have underground plantations.

New Party Established in Kazakh Republic

NC2205115290 Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 18 May 90 p 6

[Text] (Foreign News Service)—A new party has been established in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], which is an Islamic and Turkic republic in Central Asia. The new party supports independence and close relations with Turkey.

Not much has been heard about the Kazakh SSR in connection with the democratic movements in the Soviet Union. The new party in that republic has been named as the "Kazakh National Liberation Party" [Kazak Milli Kurtulus Partisi]. A nationalist leaders in that republic, Sarkitbeg Shora [name as published], was elected party leader during the party congress held in Alma Ata on 14 and 15 May.

Party officials have disclosed the basic objectives of the party program as follows:

1. To move initially to achieve political, economic, and cultural independence from Moscow. This will be followed by a move to achieve full independence.

2. To change the name of the republic from the "Kazakh SSR" to the "Democratic Republic of Kazakhstan."

3. To establish close cooperation with democratic countries both in the Soviet Union and in the world at large, including Turkey, and to secure their support.

The Kazakh SSR is a large republic, the borders of which stretch from the Volga River to the PRC. In addition ot Kazakh Turks, Russians and Ukraianians make up its population of 17 million people.

Kazakh Supreme Soviet on Semipalatinsk Tests

LD2505111390 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 2300 GMT 22 May 90

[Text] Yesterday, the sessions of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet continued discussion of the draft law on ownership in the Kazakh SSR. The draft law on ownership in the Kazakh SSR was adopted at the first reading. It will be published for public discussion. After that the Supreme Soviet moved on to examine the issue of ending the tests at the test site in Semipalatinsk Oblast and measures concerning the people's health in the region and protecting the environment. An appropriate resolution was adopted after the reports by Deputy Nurtazin, chairman of the Committee on Issues of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources, and Deputy Yeremenko, chairman of the Semipalatinsk Oblast Soviet Executive Committee. Discussion was begun on an additional issue on the comprehensive measures to resolve the ecological problems in the Aral region which was submitted on the agenda in connection with a message from Comrade Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR to the republican Supreme Soviet. The government report was delivered by Gukasov, first deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers.

Nazarbayev Views Movement

LD2605045990 Moscow TASS in English 1851 GMT 25 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Raisa Ioffe]

[Text] Alma-Ata May 25 TASS—"I regard the popular anti-nuclear movement Nevada-Semipalatinsk that sprang to life in Kazakhstan more than a year ago with great confidence and consider it to be an effective force in the struggle for an end to nuclear weapon production and testing," President Nursultan Nazarbayev of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic told a news conference here today.

He told Soviet and foreign journalists, who are covering the work of the international congress "Voters of the World Against Nuclear Arms" here, about the stance of the republican parliament and the government towards the fate of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground.

Nazarabyev recalled that the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh Republic, supported by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, submitted to the Soviet Government the proposal to end nuclear testing outside the Semipalatinsk where nuclear weapons have been tested for more than 40 years. A similar decision was made by the first session of the newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the republic which concluded two days ago.

According to the president, the federal government is planning to endorse the decision of the republican authorities and close the testing ground located close to densly populated centres in Kazakhstan. It wil take time to relocate the testing grounds and conclude respective agreements, in particular on compensation to the republican population for the moral and material damage done by the activity of the military.

From 12 to 18 months will be needed to terminate all testing activities in the Kazakh steppes.

"It would be ideal to stop, at the same time, nuclear testing in Nevada. This would certainly facilitate the solution of the problem," the president noted.

Nazarbayev expressed confidence that the noble objectives of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement and other anti-nuclear organisations across the world, whose representatives converged in Alma-Ata, will meet with due response in the hearts of voters all over the world.

East Kazakhstan Quake Damage Itemized

PM2006140190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Valeriy Mirolevich report: "Consequences of Earthquake"]

[Text] Ust-Kamenogorsk—The scale of the damage in the parts of East Kazakhstan located near the epicenter of the recent temblor has been clarified.

One child died. More than 3,000 homes were destroyed, and around 20,000 people left homeless. A total of 41 schools, 17 kindergartens, 20 clubs, 42 stores, and 300 stockraising premises were damaged and will all have to be rebuilt. The following figure was also given—around 40 villages will have to be rebuilt on new sites away from the ruins.

A republic government commission has flown to the areas hit by the earthquake. Yurts, prefabricated housing, and tents are arriving from other oblasts of Kazakhstan. The State Bank has opened an account for aid donations to the earthquake victims.

Tajikistan Initiates Socialist Ownership Reforms

LD2005014990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0906 GMT 19 May 90

[TASS correspondent Galina Grdineva report]

[Text] Dushanbe, 19 may (TASS)—The number of agro-industrial enterprises which are being leased out for a lengthy period to labor collectives is growing in Tajikistan. In the view of Abduzhalil Samadov, republic Council of Ministers deputy chairman in charge of economic reform, this is the most efficient way of saturating the internal market with consumer goods and above all with foodstuffs. "Tajikistan has enterprises which produce and process food which are mainly small and have a small number of workers, this makes it possible for us to experiment far more boldly than would be possible for the managers of large industrial firms."

The advantages of the leasehold form of management can be judged from the results of the republic's Ministry of Breadgrain Products work. A year ago all the milling, grain forage, and baking enterprises under its jurisdiction were leased out to the labor collectives working there. The ministry is paid a tax laid out in a contract and all the other funds remain at the disposal of the enterprise's workers. They establish the range of output themselves and have the right to conclude deals with foreign firms. One of them—between the Italian firm "Braibanti" and the baking association "Nonpaz"—will make it possible to provide the Tajik capital's residents with superb Italian spaghetti. A large technological line with a capacity of 10,000 tonnes of macaroni per year has been assembled in the association and is ready to turn out its first output. A proportion of the output will be sold for foreign currency. Organizational questions on jointly producing babyfood products, fruit juices, and jams with foreign firms are being tackled.

At the same time, the republic's economists who took part in drawing up the concept of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic's economic independence believe that these steps are half-measures. In their view, enterprises and firms must be fully free from the tutelage of ministries and become subordinate to local soviets. This will make it possible to reduce the administrative-bureaucratic apparatus and to channel large funds into the soviets' budget for the social development of territories. These ideas have become the subject of a serious examination in the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet commissions and will be taken into account when drawing up the republican law on ownership.

Muslim Paper Published in Tashkent

LD2605192690 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 26 May 90

[Text] A newspaper for Muslims named ISLAM NURI meaning the THE WAY OF ISLAM has been launched in the capital of the Soviet republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent. The paper's editor, Mr. (Mohammed Jamanov), has said the paper would be informing followers of Islam about the life of Muslims in other Soviet republics and in other countries. It will be also explaining various precepts in the teaching of the prophet muhammad and the meaning of his pronouncements. The paper has a circulation of 40.000. It is published by the Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Central Asia.